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ABSTRACT
British Romanticism and the Paradoxes of Natural Education
by
Catherine Engh
Advisor: Alexander Schlutz
“British Romanticism and the Paradoxes of Natural Education” offers a distinct perspective on
Romantic-era ideas on “natural” education and human development. Though the Romantic
retreat into nature has long been understood as a break from the Enlightenment’s programmatic
commitment to the progress of reason, I contend that the ideas on natural development of four
canonical Romantic authors—Mary Wollstonecraft, William Wordsworth, Samuel Taylor
Coleridge and Mary Shelley—actually originate in the ideas of one of the foremost figures of the
Enlightenment, Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Natural education is doomed to failure in Rousseau’s
thought because “nature” is paradoxically a social construct. I argue that the literary texts of
British Romantic writers undermine hoped-for trajectories of “natural” development and, in so
doing, reconfigure the paradox that Rousseau encountered. Wordsworth and Coleridge fail to
produce the “natural” ideals that they set out to promote in their poetry because gothic figures
drawn from their romance reading and nightmares embody the paradoxical force of artifice and
irritability within “natural” education. Whereas Wordsworth’s and Coleridge’s poetic
performances reveal contradictions underlying stipulated plots of “natural” human growth,
Wollstonecraft and Shelley employ gothic narratives to offer a more scathing critique of the
artificial social prejudices built into male authors’ concepts of “natural” education. Drawing on a
variety of Enlightenment discourses, my dissertation nonetheless identifies Romantic literature
as a gothic medium that resists “natural” solutions to social problems and, in so doing, speaks to
us at a very different moment of environmental crisis.
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INTRODUCTION
Everything is good as it leaves the hands of the Author of things; everything degenerates in the
hands of man. He forces one soil to nourish the products of another, one tree to bear the fruit of
another. He mixes and confuses the climates, the elements, the seasons. He mutilates his dog, his
horse, his slave. He turns everything upside down; he disfigures everything; he loves deformity,
monsters. He wants nothing as nature made it, not even man; for him, man must be trained like a
school horse; man must be fashioned in keeping with his fancy like a tree in his garden.
—Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Emile
In the opening lines of Emile, Jean-Jacques Rousseau articulates the state of affairs that
his system of natural education will ideally remedy. In a society in which “man” “mutilate[s]” all
the things with which he comes into contact and “wants nothing as nature made it,” including his
students, the goal of education ought to be to return him to things as they are free of the
disfigurements of fancy. Complaining that “man must be trained like a school horse,” Rousseau
invokes the weaknesses of Enlightenment ideas on education. In the preface to Emile, Rousseau
criticizes John Locke for focusing his treatise on education too much on “what it is important for
men to know without considering what children are in a condition to learn.”1 Training children to
echo knowledge that they are not yet even capable of understanding, Locke tampers in
Rousseau’s view with a natural developmental process in which children’s moral sensibilities
unfold over time, as they gain experience. Rousseau’s tutor prevents Emile’s sensibility from
being corrupted by premature learning by placing him in a private world set apart from the false
tastes and artificial fancies of modern society. He goes to great lengths to ensure that Emile hears
the moral voice of nature, but Emile nonetheless falls prey in the end to the prejudices of urban
society. Though Rousseauian natural education is premised on an important critique of a system
of education that would train “man” perfunctorily, like a horse, the standard of nature according
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Rousseau, Emile, 157.
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to which Rousseau’s tutor prepares his student to thrive in society is not in the end impervious to
the fancies epitomized by the Lockean educator.
Rousseau influenced Mary Wollstonecraft, William Wordsworth, Samuel Taylor
Coleridge and Mary Shelley, all of whom develop critiques of modernity and countervailing
claims for the moral significance of “natural” feeling. The disfigured natures that indicate to
Rousseau that “everything degenerates in the hands of man”—the decorative tree, trained horse
and monster—have precise parallels in British Romantic literature: Wollstonecraft figures the
student of enlightenment education as a malformed sapling;2 Wordsworth compares that student
to a “stallèd ox”;3 Coleridge complains that the student of the “improved pedagogy”4 is trained to
reject all but his lecturer’s wisdom; Shelley suggests that modern, scientific education produces
monsters. Rousseau, Wollstonecraft, Wordsworth, Coleridge and Shelley vary, however, in their
analysis of what causes these problems of education. Originally, Rousseau wants to protect his
student from the false morality and hypocrisy of a society governed by the artificial distinctions
of amour-propre, or other-regarding self-love. Wollstonecraft hopes to protect young women
from the preoccupation with appearances that is reinforced by luxury culture and models of
education that cater to the fancies of men. She condemns the excess of artificial sensibility that
women adopt within misogynous systems of education and marriage. Wordsworth shares
Wollstonecraft’s view that appearances must inevitably interfere with the organic development
of moral sensibility in children; he attributes, however, the predominance of the eye to the rise of
scientific reason and to new influxes of literary and picturesque artifice. Coleridge roots what he

2

Wollstonecraft, A Vindication of the Rights of Woman, 181.
Wordsworth, The Prelude 1805, 5. 240-243.
4
Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, 13.
3
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calls the “despotism of the eye”5 even more firmly than Wordsworth in empirical science’s
account of human behavior and psychology. Mary Shelley develops her own critique of
empirical psychology by narrating the dangers of Victor Frankenstein’s scientific view of life.
British Romantic writers develop their own visions of natural education as an alternative
to Enlightenment approaches to education and human behavior. Much like Rousseau, however,
they find that the concept of nature upon which they base their hopes is permeable to the very
forces that they hope to correct. In each chapter of this dissertation, I differentiate between the
hoped-for trajectory of natural education as it is self-consciously posited in aesthetic,
evolutionary and/or educational theory, and the contradictions of natural education that emerge
in British Romantic literary texts, sometimes even against the intent of their authors.
Wollstonecraft, Wordsworth and Coleridge set forth theories of natural education that are
informed by a full spectrum of philosophical ideas. Shelley is unique among the four British
Romantic writers discussed in this dissertation because, unlike Wollstonecraft, Wordsworth and
Coleridge, her stance towards natural development is uniformly skeptical. Between 1762 and
1818—the years between the publication of Rousseau’s Emile and Coleridge’s Biographia
Literaria—philosophic writers represent nature as a vehicle of moral consensus and as a possible
cure for the damage done by an empirical age. The hope that nature might prove to be a basis for
human moral development is at the core of Rousseau’s natural religion, Wollstonecraft’s
revolutionary politics, Immanuel Kant’s critical philosophy, Wordsworth’s aesthetic theory and
Coleridge’s evolutionary theory and poetics. Kant is a significant figure in this dissertation,
though there is no chapter devoted exclusively to him, because his ideas inform Wordsworth’s
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and Coleridge’s stated aspirations for poetry and human society more generally.6 Though
Wollstonecraft, Wordsworth and Coleridge draw analogies between natural and social
development to posit a possible cure for the problems of modernity, nature does not prove to be a
reliable basis for human improvement in their literary writings.
It is with varying levels of authorial intent that Wollstonecraft, Wordsworth, Coleridge
and Shelley bring failures of natural education into view. Wollstonecraft turns purposefully from
the idealism of philosophic argument to the perplexities of gothic literary performance in a
period of post-Revolutionary disappointment. In Wrongs of Woman, Wollstonecraft uses a gothic
frame narrative to communicate her uncertainties about the viability of natural development as a
means to women’s independence within the present, artificial state of “things as they are.”7
Wordsworth and Coleridge are more committed to making their poetry consistent with a
teleological view of nature and society. As a reader, however, I identify substantial ways in
which their literary writings work against the goals of natural (social) development. The presence
of gothic figures within Wordsworth’s and Coleridge’s lyric poems undo, as I will show, their
most progressive claims for nature poetry’s moral significance. Shelley employs the gothic mode
to highlight the irrational prejudices which always already frame narratives of natural
development. She also refashions Wollstonecraft’s critique of systems of education that do not
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Wordsworth’s claim that poetry written in the “real language of nature” (Wordsworth and
Coleridge, Lyrical Ballads, 107) may bind together the whole human community compliments
Kant’s claim that the cognitive experience of natural beauty can be considered universally valid.
Coleridge adapts this Kantian “as if” to develop his theories of the unity of life and of the
imagination. In Biographia, he assures his reader that imagination can unify the disparate data of
ordinary experience and thus spread an ideal atmosphere around “forms, incidents, and
situations, of which, for the common view, custom had bedimmed all the lustre, had dried up the
sparkle and the dew drops” (Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, 80).
7
The phrase is borrowed from the full title of William Godwin’s 1794 gothic novel Things as
They Are; or, The Adventures of Caleb Williams. Wollstonecraft studied Godwin’s fiction while
she was composing Maria, or the Wrongs of Woman. See Wollstonecraft, Collected Letters, 399.
4

support the development of women’s reason into an equally potent critique of the logic of human
exceptionalism that is built into models of “natural” human development aimed at moral
autonomy, including Coleridge’s.
The problems of natural education that I identify in British Romantic literature are
glossed over by green ecocriticism’s concept of Romantic nature. In the early 90s, Jonathan Bate
argued that Wordsworth’s nature poetry was a harbinger of the environmental movement’s
protest of industrial and consumer society.8 He emphasized the ongoing relevancy for
environmentalists of Wordsworth’s effort to reestablish by means of poetry human beings’
connection to the laws that govern all living things. The larger field of green ecocriticism which
flourished between the 90s and early 00s expanded the canon of environmental literature beyond
the Romantic tradition even as it retained Bate’s methodological assumption that literature can
help us get back to “the nature from which culture emerged.”9 Ecocritical scholarship of the past
ten years is more skeptical about the idea that nature writing, Romantic or otherwise, can help us
resolve our social and environmental problems. In the geologic “age of humans,” the climate is
both of our making and beyond our control and this has led Timothy Clark to call for a more
honest reckoning with the limits of all ecocritical practice, green and otherwise.10 Bruno Latour
suggests that the moral injunctions to follow nature that are familiar from green Romanticism no
longer make sense at a time when the facts of “nature,” and specifically of climate science, are
not axiologically neutral but are transparently evaluative of social and political priorities.11 In
this dissertation, I contest “green” ecocriticism’s assumption of the naturalness of Romantic
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See Romantic Ecology.
Laurence Coupe, Green Studies Reader, 5.
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See Facing Gaia.
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nature by showing, on the one hand, how Wordsworth’s and Coleridge’s poems unsettle the
purifying divisions between nature and artifice, organism and mechanism, sensibility and
irritability. I argue furthermore that Wollstonecraft’s and Shelley’s gothic fictions trouble
idealistic notions of nature by calling attention to the artificial social hierarchies that are built
into male authors’ concepts of “natural” education.
Romanic writers hint at the contradictions of natural education in their criticisms of
Emile. Wollstonecraft detects a libertine’s “brutal ease”12 behind Rousseau’s descriptions of
women’s education and the state of nature. Coleridge finds in Emile a model of merely “negative
education”: he claims that a miserably neglected garden choked with weeds is “educated
according to Rousseau’s principles.”13 In Shelley’s novel, Victor Frankenstein benefits from a
Rousseauian education and is nonetheless carried away by dangerous enthusiasm.14 While
Wollstonecraft, Coleridge and Shelley all imply that Rousseauian natural education leaves too
much to untutored feeling, Wordsworth suggests that it is a mask of cultural control. Romantic
writers’ concern that a system of education founded in nature will be either too liberated from or
too committed to cultural discipline speaks to the paradoxes of injunctions to let nature be your
teacher. Bruno Latour observes of expressions such as “acting in keeping with one’s nature,” or
living “according to one’s true nature” that “they purport to orient all existence according to a
model of life that obliges us to choose between false and true ways of being in the world. In this
case, the normative power that one would expect to find rather on the “culture” side turns out to
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Wollstonecraft, Vindication of the Rights of Woman, 79.
Coleridge, Lectures 1808-1809 on Literature in Collected Works, 5, 106.
14
Pamela Clemit argues along these lines that Mary Shelley rewrites “the Prometheus legend as
a critique of Rousseauvian ‘enthusiasm.’” (“Frankenstein, Matilda, and the legacies of Godwin
and Wollstonecraft,” 33)
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be clearly imputed, on the contrary, to the “nature” side of the twofold concept.”15 The gothic
writings of Wollstonecraft, Wordsworth, Coleridge and Shelley suggest that natural feeling is not
simply natural, but is at the same time a site of cultural norms and impasses. Reading these
writers in this way, I take seriously Latour’s recommendation that “we must…take the
Nature/Culture opposition as the topic on which to focus our attention and not at all, any longer,
as the resource that would allow us to get out of our difficulties.”16
The contradictions of natural education arise in British Romanticism not only as a
theoretical and aesthetic concern, but also in response to historical events. The specific
difficulties to which Latour refers are those posed by a “new climactic regime” in which “the
political order now includes everything that previously belonged to nature – a figure that, in an
ongoing backlash effect, becomes an ever more undecipherable enigma.”17 British Romantic
writers would not have recognized non-human nature as belonging to the political order in quite
the same way as we do when we hear news of forest fires and melting ice caps. However, the
acceleration of print communication, the expanding reach of scientific reason and the postrevolutionary retrenchment of hereditary and patriarchal privileges made these writers feel that
human nature had been newly framed by a mechanistic and artificial modernity. That perception
created a “backlash” effect in the effort to shore up a didactic view of nature; again, and again,
artifice and mechanism rear their head within an educational process that is supposed to proceed
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Latour, Facing Gaia, 20.
Ibid, 19. Helpful as are Latour’s points in the Introduction and first lecture, his later lectures
take a troubling direction as he becomes increasingly reliant on Carl Schmitt to describe the Gaia
figure. I agree with Donna Haraway, who rejects along with Latour the “transcendent plots of
modernity and the purifying division of society and nature.” Like her, however, I am weary of
Latour’s and Schmitt’s reliance on “the narrative vise of trials of strength, of mortal combat” and
of “the respected enemy.” (Staying with the Trouble, 41-43)
17
Ibid, 3.
16
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from uncorrupted nature. John Stuart Mill captures the paradox that Wordsworth and Coleridge
attempt to suppress and that Wollstonecraft and Shelley willfully bring forward when he explains
that “the idea that goodness is natural grew up in a highly artificialized condition of human
nature.”18
British Romantic poetry has come to stand in for a nostalgic concept of nature now that
widespread awareness of human beings’ profound impact on the planetary environment has
rendered obsolete green studies’ assumption of a separation between nature and culture.19 Even
those scholars in the Romantic field who have pointed to the artificiality of trajectories of
development that we might otherwise think of as natural take for granted green ecocritical
readings of Wordsworth. Reading Shelley’s creature as a being who calls into question “what is
meant by nature,” Andrew Smith and William Hughes approach Frankenstein as the
counterpoint to a Wordsworthian green Romanticism that “asserts that nature can be
apprehended as natural rather than cultural.”20 Deidre Lynch finds in Jane Austen’s Mansfield
Park another alternative to green Romanticism; she argues that Austen’s references to modern
horticultural practices that made nature both portable and artificial “complicate her novels’
accounts of blooming girls and their natural development.”21 Lynch actually doubles down on
Bate’s reading of Wordsworth by citing one of his Lucy poems, “Three years she grew in sun
and shower,” as a paradigmatic Romantic-era rendering of natural human development. In fact,
as I argue, claims for nature’s priority within human development founder across the literature of
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“On Nature,” 17.
Lynn Keller proposes that the pressures of the Anthropocene cannot be adequately represented
in the genre of the “nature poem,” the origins of which she locates in English Romanticism. Her
perception of Romantic nature as a refuge from industrial society is drawn from Jonathan Bate’s
work. See Recomposing Ecopoetics.
20
Smith and Hughes, “Defining the EcoGothic,” 2
21
Deidre Lynch, “Woman are Delicate Flowers,” 695.
19
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the Romantic period, even in Romantic poetry. In Wordsworth’s The Prelude, artifice and fancy
leave their trace on autobiographical experience that is supposed to originate in an engagement
with nature. The autobiographical mode thus works against the “green” intentions of a poet like
Wordsworth. Though a now outdated belief in the naturalness of nature does indeed emerge in
Romantic educational, evolutionary and aesthetic theory, I argue that Romantic literary texts do
not so readily as Romantic philosophic writings affirm the ascendency of the didactic or
purposive aspects of nature over the artificial representations of human nature in an empirical
age.
Each chapter of this dissertation sets a stipulated trajectory of natural education against
the backdrop of paradoxes that surface in an array of literary forms, including the confessional
address, epistolary letter, lyric autobiography, nightmare poem and gothic novel. The first
chapter contrasts the aspirations for women’s education that Wollstonecraft articulates in
Vindication of the Rights of Woman with the failure of education she invokes in her gothic novel
Maria, or the Wrongs of Woman. I demonstrate the importance of gender as a framework for
analyzing the contradictions of natural education by placing Wollstonecraft’s writings in
conversation with Rousseau’s ideas as he develops them in Emile, The Solitaries and Reveries of
a Solitary Walker. In Rights of Woman, Wollstonecraft appropriates Rousseau’s claim for the
moral significance of sensibility to theorize the possibilities of a more democratic form of
education, one which would support women’s independence. At the same time, she links
women’s frailties to Rousseau’s and other male writers’ artificial, feminized concepts of
sensibility. In Wrongs of Woman, Wollstonecraft is far less hopeful about the possibility of
educational reform. She casts doubt on the pedagogical significance of her heroine’s story of
natural education by embedding her memoir within a gothic narrative of legal injustice that ends

9

in isolation, confinement and despair. I contrast this outcome of the novel with the outcome of
natural education in the fifth walk of the Reveries, in which Rousseau confesses his belief that
happiness can be achieved through a total retreat from society and politics. Wollstonecraft
counters in my view Rousseau’s portrait of the happy and self-sufficient social exile by
attributing her heroine’s isolation to her socially enforced dependency on her husband. She thus
employs the gothic mode to warn that natural education will fail so long as it does not adequately
address the social forms that discredit women’s reason.
Chapter two moves from Wollstonecraft’s and Rousseau’s claims for the didactic value
of “natural” sensibility to Wordsworth’s claims for the educational import of nature poetry. For
Wordsworth, questions of natural education are bound up with questions about the moral
significance of reading and aesthetic representation. In the Preface to Lyrical Ballads,
Wordsworth suggests that poetic language gives non-conceptual expression to the vital,
productive laws of “our nature.”22 Wordsworth’s proposal approaches, as I suggest, Kant’s view
that all judgements of beauty about which we can hope to form a consensus entail an
appreciation of the “purposiveness” of nature. Wordsworth hopes to displace the “mechanical
device[s]”23 of contemporary literature with a more natural language and a more discriminating
practice of aesthetic judgement, one that would draw the modern subject out of the “savage
torpor”24 induced by print modernity’s manifold of representations. He hopes even more
specifically that the nature poems in Lyrical Ballads will present an alternative to the mindless
sensationalism of the gothic forms that were popular in the 1790s. I contrast this aspiration of the
Preface with Wordsworth’s argument in book 5 of The Prelude that natural education ought to
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Wordsworth and Coleridge, Lyrical Ballads, 97.
Ibid, 100.
24
Ibid, 99.
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admit a role for gothic romance and the “eye” of fancy. I argue that the privileged place of nature
within Kantian aesthetics and Wordsworthian poetics is undermined as The Prelude and Tintern
Abbey reveal the role of artifice and romance in shaping Wordsworth’s formative experiences of
rustic life. In the final verse paragraph of Tintern Abbey, for example, the autobiographical
speaker longs to retain via Dorothy’s image the memory of who he was at a time when he
interacted with the landscape like a character in a gothic text, or “like a man / Flying from
something he dreads.”25 The texts of The Prelude and Tintern Abbey are uncanny in that they
reveal contradictions that Wordsworth did not set out to address, but that are nonetheless visible
to his readers.
Chapter three brings ideas on natural history into the fold of the previous chapters’
inquiry into nature’s place within educational and aesthetic theory. Rousseau’s, Wollstonecraft’s,
Kant’s and Wordsworth’s hopes for progress are grounded in their faith that the sensibilities of
human beings may have a “natural” purpose; they may support moral community and/or the
making of a rational, independent moral actor. In Coleridge’s unpublished study of natural
history, Theory of Life, sensibility is likewise enabling of human social development. Here,
however, sensibility is not an aesthetic or moral feeling, but is rather a biological term for the
“power” of nature that is generative of refined forms of sensory intelligence in animals.
Coleridge differentiates sensibility from the biological “power” of irritability by affiliating the
former with perceptual organs like the eye or ear and the latter with a nonspecific physical
feeling. Coleridge worries in Theory of Life that irritability will take precedence over sensibility
at the last stage of animal evolution and that feeling may thus bear an uncertain purpose in life.
This possibility vexes Coleridge's effort to narrate the history of life in terms of a continuous
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progression from animal individuation to human self-governance. In the second half of the
chapter, I argue that Coleridge’s nightmare poem Christabel goes much further than Theory of
Life in addressing the social significance of the ambiguous role of irritability in life. A biological
term in Theory of Life, irritability takes on social and psychological import in Christabel as it
becomes associated with the gothic stranger Geraldine and the signs of trauma, nightmare and
prejudice that she introduces into an aristocratic family. Though Coleridge had intended to write
a poem that would establish a stable point of view from which to view the symptoms of
irritability, the fragmented poem that he was able to publish represents human feeling as a
troubling, unsolvable problem. Ultimately, the feeling of irritability with which Geraldine is
associated prevents Christabel from passing on the moral sensibility represented by her dead
mother. As a meditation on the atmosphere of helplessness that Coleridge associated with the
experience of nightmare and withdrawal, Christabel exposes doubts about the teleological
trajectory of nature and human society that Coleridge can more easily suppress in the form of
philosophic argument.
The final chapter of the dissertation turns from Coleridge’s speculations in Theory of Life
about the continuity between natural and moral evolution to his representation in Biographia
Literaria of organic development as a symbol for the progress of the imagination. Coleridge
argues in Biographia that Wordsworth’s theory of natural language is incomplete without an
explanation of how it is possible for the poetic imagination to spread an “organic” atmosphere
over ordinary incidents and situations. He posits that the imagination may lend unity to the
diverse data of daily life by intuiting divine law directly. The mechanistic theories of human
psychology that hold sway in England cannot offer in his view an account of the mind as a power
capable of establishing the unified perspective required for moral choice. There is a contradictory
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relationship, then, between the “organic” imagination and the mechanisms of life and cognition
that Enlightenment science prioritizes. In the second part of the chapter, I argue that Shelley calls
into even sharper focus than Coleridge the catastrophic effect of mechanistic descriptions of life
on the moral imagination. Victor Frankenstein’s education in modern science alienates him from
the friendships that had been a vital source of his development in early childhood and
permanently shapes his relationship with the creature who he unwittingly brings to life. Imbuing
with horror the scene of the creature’s birth, Shelley suggests that the scientific imagination is
not in self-conscious control of its array of empirical materials. Shelley goes much further than
this, however: she identifies a Coleridgean belief in the divinity of the mind and imagination
with the vicious hierarchy between humans and all other forms of life that turns both Victor and
the creature into a monster. For Shelley, the purpose of imagination is not to affirm human
beings’ control over a world of empirical objects but to help readers become more responsive to
the needs of others both within and beyond the socially constructed bound of human community.
In order to set forth their progressive theories of human development, Rousseau, Kant
and Coleridge must assume that “nature” bears a purpose that is untainted by modernity’s
atmospheres of prejudice, artifice, irritability and mechanistic science. Bate likewise
conceptualizes Romantic ecology as a refuge from the polluted atmospheres of modern
technological progress. By bringing prejudice, artifice and mechanism into view as forces that
disrupt human developmental processes, the literary writings of Wollstonecraft, Wordsworth,
Coleridge and Shelley expose the contradictions elided by the continuously progressive
trajectories posited by Romantic-era educational and aesthetic philosophy and, more recently,
green Romanticism. Though Wordsworth and Coleridge try to subordinate the gothic and
irrational elements of their poems under the unified perspective of imagination, they are not
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wholly successful; figures of artifice and irritability undermine the naturalness and thus also the
moral authority of lyric expression. Wollstonecraft and Shelley purposefully build skepticism
about Rousseauian natural education into their novels by employing gothic frame narratives that
pit the natural feelings of excluded individuals against the prejudices of a mechanistic society
that dehumanizes them. In her study of the emotive implications of post-structuralist theory, Rei
Terada has suggested that natural, moral feeling does not prove the presence of a self-transparent
subject of expression but arises rather from an “over-forceful interpretive act” that is open to
endless re-interpretation.26 I would propose that the gothic figures in Wordsworth’s and
Coleridge’s poems and the self-reflexive structures of Wollstonecraft’s and Shelley’s gothic
novels set off this process of limitless re-interpretation by casting doubt on both the legibility and
the naturalness of natural feeling. While Wollstonecraft and Shelley intentionally ironize the
forms of natural, moral feeling expressed in confessional and epistolary writing, the gothic
figures in Wordsworth’s and Coleridge’s poetry call into question their official belief that poetry
translates the non-conceptual truths of (human) nature for the edification of the whole human
community.

26

See Feeling in Theory, 51. Terada contends more generally that emotions are a response to a
situation of uncertainty; we feel emotion when we don’t know what other people or what
language is doing. Emotion entails a flight from this uncertainty through a fixing of “literal”
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CHAPTER ONE: “The First Fair Purposes of Sensibility”: Wollstonecraft, Rousseau and
Women’s Education
In A Vindication of the Rights of Men (1790), a text that has been received as a defining
statement of Mary Wollstonecraft’s rationalism, she exclaims, “sacred be the feelings of the
heart! Concentrated in a glowing flame, they become the sun of life; and, without his
invigorating impregnation, reason would probably lie in helpless inactivity, and never bring forth
her only legitimate offspring—virtue.”1 Wollstonecraft invokes religion and obstetrics, the myth
of Prometheus and ideas about vital animation, to represent the “feelings of the heart” as the
galvanizing energy necessary for rational thought. The passage indicates that, even in the period
during which Wollstonecraft was strident in her equation of virtue with reason, sensibility
remained essential to both. That was not lost on William Godwin, who famously portrayed
Wollstonecraft as a “female Werter.” 2 In this chapter, I place Wollstonecraft’s claims for the
moral significance of sensibility in Vindication of the Rights of Woman and Maria; or the
Wrongs of Woman in dialogue with Rousseau’s portrayal of natural education in Emile, The
Solitaries and Reveries of a Solitary Walker. Both Rousseau and Wollstonecraft premise their
theories of education in the belief that a return to natural feeling, or innate emotion, might correct
the damage done by a Lockean system of education that imposes prejudice on children at an
early age. They both, however, write fictions loosely based on their own lives in which the
student of natural feeling—the subject of sensibility—ends up as a social exile. This chapter thus
traces a common arc of idealism followed by disappointment in these two writers’ analyses of
the trajectory of an education galvanized by the innate feelings of the heart. I argue that, by
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problematizing a false, feminized notion of sensibility, Wollstonecraft offers a far more specific
and far more devastating critique than Rousseau of the way in which prejudice seizes hold of
human nature. She warns that the voice of nature will have no effect on society so long as legal,
economic and educational institutions continue to enforce gender inequality.
In the first half of the chapter, I read Wollstonecraft’s naturalistic metaphors for human
development in Rights of Woman as an indication of Rousseau’s influence on her thought.
Though Wollstonecraft adopts elements from Rousseau’s Emile to work out the possibilities of a
truly democratic system of education, she emphasizes the contradiction between a natural and a
gendered form of education. In Emile, Rousseau imagines a system of education in which reason
and moral judgment evolve from “natural” feeling and are not externally imposed.
Wollstonecraft argues along similar lines in Rights of Woman that the Lockean educator and
overbearing parent stymie the process by which inborn affections naturally give rise to reason.3
Wollstonecraft uses the metaphor of a tree’s growth to picture the process by which children
might realize the “first fair purposes of sensibility,”4 which are to activate a mind capable of
constructing its own ideas. She thus adapts Rousseau’s program of natural education to her own
purposes, claiming that women might in a reformed society enjoy the benefits of it. She shows,
however, that what Rousseau assumes to be natural for women is in fact an effect of his
excessive fancy. Though Wollstonecraft speculates that it is possible for women to fully develop
the powers of reason latent in sensibility, she at the same time demonstrates that, in actual
practice, that developmental trajectory is distorted by the worldly proprieties of a “false system
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of female manners”5 that cultivates sensibility to the exclusion of reason. The demands of the
marriage market and the prominence within it of libertine standards of female beauty, delicacy
and charm weaken girls’ nature at a very early stage of development, making them more like
decorative flowers than strong, firmly rooted trees. By condemning the fanciful notion of
sensibility underlying contemporary practices of women’s education and advocating for a public
system of education modelled after a truly inclusive, egalitarian idea of nature, Wollstonecraft
presents herself as a philosopher much more committed than Rousseau to social critique and
improvement.
The second half of the chapter turns from Wollstonecraft’s revolutionary educational
theory to her more ambivalent literary reflections on the didactic affordances of nature and from
the promise of Rousseau’s Emile to the disappointments of The Solitaries and the Reveries of a
Solitary Walker. In Short Residence and Wrongs of Woman, Wollstonecraft upholds her early
view that women possess powers of mind equal to men’s by demonstrating the scope of her
epistolary female speakers’ aesthetic sensibilities. In Wrongs of Woman more than in Rights,
Wollstonecraft foregrounds the link between natural beauty and the ideas of reason. The heroine
of sensibility of this novel, Maria, represents in a letter to her daughter the process by which she,
against all odds, attained rational ideas. The novel’s gothic frame suggests, however, that those
ideas do not carry weight within the masculinist public spheres of law and politics. In Wrongs of
Woman, natural education fails because an individual woman’s cultivation of moral and aesthetic
sensibility can do little to reform the laws that uphold the credit of husbands over wives. When
the heroine is wronged by her husband, legal authorities in England do not recognize her right to
follow the moral voice of nature. Wollstonecraft replaces Rousseau’s picture in The Solitaries
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and Reveries of a Solitary Walker of the self-sufficient social outcast with a gothic account of her
heroine’s spiritual and emotional deprivation. Wollstonecraft’s portrait of her unhappy heroine
calls attention, like her figure of the luxuriant female flower, to the life-and-death stakes of a
systemic cultural assumption that women are not rational actors. While some scholars argue that
Wrongs of Woman reinforces Wollstonecraft’s early revolutionary hopes for women’s education,
others contend that it calls that hope into question.6 In fact, as I argue, her last novel lays bare the
contradictions built into a theory of “natural” development that can only be salvaged by way of a
retreat from society and its problems.
Natural Development in Rights of Woman
Scholars have argued that Wollstonecraft’s travel writings prefigure modern Western
feminism’s credo that “the personal is political.”7 Wollstonecraft’s political writings establish
the inverse maxim that the political is personal; revolutionary politics begins with the earliest
susceptibilities of the body.8 For Wollstonecraft as for Rousseau, passions and affections are at
once an inborn part of human beings’ “common” animal nature and a part of the developmental
process whose goal is reason and virtue. In Rights of Men, Wollstonecraft writes, “the common
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affections and passions equally bind brutes together; and it is only the continuity of those
relations that entitles us to the denomination of rational creatures; and this continuity arises from
reflection—from the operations of…reason.”9 It is therefore crucial that parents do their utmost
to foster the “common affections”10 of early childhood. In Rights of Woman, Wollstonecraft
argues that physical exercise and parental love are basic preconditions of learning. She
recommends that the infancy of children, “should be passed in harmless gambols, that exercise of
feet and hands, without requiring very minute direction from the head, or the constant attention
of a nurse.”11 If children are allowed “harmless gambols,” they will learn “the care necessary for
self-preservation [that] is the first natural exercise of the understanding.”12 Wollstonecraft
furthermore insists that a “judicious parent” should temper his or her power by an “even display
of affection brought home to the child’s heart.”13 Like physical exercise, affection activates
children’s understanding by suspending the authority of the nurse, parent, or educator.
Wollstonecraft claims that the “natural affections, which have been supposed almost distinct
from reason, may be found more nearly connected with judgment than is commonly allowed.”14
It will be useful to explain how Wollstonecraft differentiates the affections that are the
first “natural” carriers of understanding in human infancy from the feelings that she dismisses as
“sentimental jargon”15 in her famous retort to Edmund Burke’s Reflections on the Revolution in
France (1790). In A Vindication of the Rights of Men (1790), Wollstonecraft attacks Burke for
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placing “inbred feelings”16 in service of hereditary wealth. Wollstonecraft detects in Burke’s
famous apostrophe to Marie Antoinette a trumped-up pathos that is quite opposed to sentiments
that would correlate with rational principles. She asserts that to act rationally is to make integrity
of character, rather than rank or appearance, the basis of personal regard. When Burke laments
that the revolutionary scheme of things has reduced the French Queen to “but a woman,”
Wollstonecraft responds that any reasonable person must acknowledge that claim to be “true” as
long as the Queen “is not more attentive to the duties of humanity than…fashionable ladies
generally are.”17 Citing Burke’s outrage at how the “vilest of women”18 brought the French King
and Queen to account, Wollstonecraft argues that these women, who have had to gain their living
“selling vegetables or fish, [and] who never had any advantages of education,” are to be pitied
rather than censured, as “they have almost insuperable obstacles to surmount in their progress
towards true dignity of character.”19 Wollstonecraft’s overriding point is that Burke’s sympathies
are not “natural” but opportunistically chosen; he trades cynically on a popular assumption that
“a kind of mysterious instinct is supposed to reside in the soul, that instantaneously discerns
truth” to defend the French Queen and monarchical and hereditary institutions more broadly.20
As Wollstonecraft well knows, Burke was not the first eighteenth-century writer to posit an
instinctive moral sense: the idea was advanced by the Enlightenment moral philosophers Frances
Hutcheson and David Hume. Hutcheson argued that God implants in all minds a “moral sense”
that allows individuals to instinctively feel pleasure upon becoming conscious that a disinterested
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love of others is the “Spring” of their actions.21 In Hume, sympathy transforms perceptions that
we have concerning the “causes” and “objects” of other people’s passions into impressions that
build up our general idea of the rules of justice. Addressing unnamed writers of “books of
morals,” Wollstonecraft warns, “we ought to beware of confounding mechanical instinctive
sensations with emotions that reason deepens, and justly terms the feelings of humanity.”22
Though the cares and passions of infancy contain a form of understanding, reason must actively
deepen those feelings if they are to take on a moral significance. Burke exploits the perspective
of Enlightenment moralists who mistake instincts and impressions for actively cultivated moral
feelings. He fails to see the barbarity of social inequality in monarchical society because he
prioritizes an ethics and politics that describes sensibility as an instinctive emotional reaction
rather than as a feeling strengthened by reflection on the human condition.
Wollstonecraft is not totally straightforward about how reason deepens emotion to create
“feelings of humanity.” One way to trace the process is by turning to her description in Rights of
Woman of modesty “comprehensively considered, and not as a sexual virtue.”23 Wollstonecraft
argues that, unlike the passive, femininized, virtue of chastity, true modesty is a sexless quality
acquired by “the heart [that is] made to beat time to humanity, rather than to throb with love.”24
Modesty is achieved by way of sublimation: modest feelings are impulses that are socialized by
“pursuits purely intellectual” and “humane plans of usefulness.”25 “Throbs of love” are, by
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contrast, mechanical instinctive sensations wrought by a “false system of female manners”26 that
valorizes romance and offers only “preparation for life.”27 Reared in such a system, one which
Wollstonecraft recognizes as normative for middle-class women, girls acquire manners and
accomplishments so that they can make “an appearance in the world” and marry to “better
themselves.”28 Though Wollstonecraft defines modesty as a virtue that has more to do with
intellectual pursuits than sexual acts, she affirms that “women as well as men ought to have the
common appetites and passions of their nature, they are only brutal when unchecked by
reason.”29 Wollstonecraft’s reference to “common appetites and passions”30 recalls her reference
in Wrongs of Men to the “common affections”31 of early childhood. Wollstonecraft faults parents
for embracing a system of female manners that stifles the appetites and passions that are
common to all; she laments that, “women are so often degraded by suffering the selfish prudence
of age to chill the ardour of youth.”32 If modesty linked to the “pursuit of knowledge”33 rather
than to “selfish prudence,”34 adolescent girls might better retain the “common appetites and
passions”35 that precipitate feelings of humanity.
Wollstonecraft’s view that moral feeling arises when intellectual curiosity deepens the
first natural “ardour of youth”36 is largely consistent with Rousseau’s view of human
development in Emile. Rejecting Rousseau’s assumption that “women observe, men reason,”
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Wollstonecraft extends Rousseau’s analysis of what she calls a “common capacity to educate” to
both girls and boys.37 Wollstonecraft acknowledges Rousseau’s influence on her understanding
of childhood development when she writes, “children cannot be taught too early to submit to
reason, the true definition of that necessity, which Rousseau insisted on, without defining it; for
to submit to reason, is to submit to the nature of things, and to that God who formed them so, to
promote our real interest.”38 The first sentence of Emile reads, “everything is good as it leaves
the hands of the author of things; everything degenerates in the hands of man….He wants
nothing as nature made it, not even man; for him, man must be trained like a school horse; man
must be fashioned in keeping with his fancy like a tree in his garden.”39 In contrast with the
modern “man” who would train his student “like a school horse,” the rational educator stages a
return to the “nature of things.” Though Rousseau’s tutor plans to raise Emile as a self-sufficient
child of nature, that does not mean that he leaves Emile to fend for himself in a wilderness. The
tutor constructs a concept of the things as they are when they leave the hands of the author and
relies upon it to direct Emile’s development at every stage. Wollstonecraft’s claim that Rousseau
insists upon but never explicitly “defines” reason as a submission to the necessity of nature
offers a canny reading of the mystifications performed by the tutor’s discourse and the
nature/culture and nature/reason dichotomies upon which it depends. Jean Starobinski observes
that there is a contradictory relationship between the tutor’s method and his aspirations for
Emile: “nothing in the teacher’s theories supports or justifies his own attitude; he constantly
asserts his opposition to premature reflection, whose effects he says are harmful. He seems
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unaware of the fact that he himself is engaging in reflection, and he constructs a system
according to which his own discourse has no right to exist.”40
The tutor engages in reflection when he asserts that the “fire” of the growing adolescent
body stirs the “first emotions of Nature” that carry Emile outside of himself to “his fellows.”41
The first movements of Emile’s “nascent sensibility”42 are also and conversely precipitated, as
Tobias Meneley observes, by signs of “a passionate animacy outside of the self.”43 The tutor
conjectures that Emile’s “sensibility will in the first place be limited to his fellows….it will only
be…after many reflections on his own sentiments and on those he observes in others, that he will
be able to…join to his particular affections those which can make him identify with his
species.”44 Wollstonecraft’s view that “feelings of humanity” are sublimations of the “common
appetites and passions”45 of youth can be compared to Rousseau’s claim that the “affections” that
make Emile “identify with his species” arise as the biological growth of the adolescent body stirs
the self to reflect on the sentiments observable in others. To acquire the feelings of humanity,
which are also for Wollstonecraft the feelings of modesty, a child must submit to the necessity of
this (paradoxically) rationally determined developmental process. The natural order of things is
at this stage identified with the biology of the human body so that the “feelings of humanity”
emerge around the same time as puberty. By mapping feelings associated with ethical reflection
and judgement onto this stipulated scheme of natural development, Wollstonecraft attempts like
Rousseau to take power away from the overbearing parent.
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Though John Locke’s theory of education forms the backdrop against which Rousseau
presents his ideas on education in Emile, Wollstonecraft is far more interested than Rousseau in
analyzing the actual effects on children of Lockean ideas on education. Wollstonecraft proposes
that “an early acquaintance with human infirmities; or, what is termed knowledge of the world, is
the surest way, in my opinion, to contract the heart and damp the natural youthful ardour which
produces not only great talents, but great virtues.”46 Though Wollstonecraft’s target in this
instance is Lord Chesterfield (1774), “the avowed tendency”47 of his Letters was not new. In
Some thoughts Concerning Human Education (1693), John Locke proposed that the educator of
a “young gentleman” should aim to “fence” his pupil from “the world” by instilling a knowledge
of experience at an early age: Locke writes, “besides being well-bred, the tutor should know the
world well: the ways, the humors, the follies, the cheats, the faults of the age he is fallen into and
particularly the country he lives in.”48 In the Preface to Emile, Rousseau arraigns Locke for
concentrating too much on “what it is important for men to know without considering what
children are in a condition to learn.”49 Wollstonecraft vividly pictures the consequences of that
error for adolescent development, noting that, “the vain attempt to bring forth the fruit of
experience, before the sapling has thrown out its leaves, only exhausts its strength, and prevents
its assuming a natural form.”50 Wollstonecraft may have in mind the horticultural practice of
fixing the shoot from one tree as a graft onto another tree, with the aim of producing fruit. The
efforts of parents who intervene in the natural process of their children’s physical development
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by inculcating what Wollstonecraft frankly calls “a mean opinion of human nature”51 before the
child has gone through puberty and acquired a capacity to think for him or herself is not only
“vain” but destructive. Wollstonecraft compares those parents to horticulturalists who, in their
eagerness to jumpstart the process of vegetable reproduction, exhaust and deform their plants.
Wollstonecraft uses the figure of the malformed and sterile sapling to warn that a
“contract[ed]”52 heart is the consequence of parental distrust in the natural process by which
children autonomously acquire understanding.53
John Locke compares the work of education to the act of weeding a garden: the
educator’s role is to root out “that sort of weeds which grow not in the wild uncultivated waste,
but in garden plots under the negligent hand or unskillful care of a gardener.”54 Whereas Locke
compares education to a process of cultivation in which a vigilant educator weeds out the bad
habits of a fallen age, Wollstonecraft deploys the same gardening metaphor to warn against the
excessive intervention of the educator. At the conclusion of her critique of Lord Chesterfield’s
Letters, Wollstonecraft explains that parents who instill a knowledge of “the futility of life” and
“the follies and vices of man”55 in their children at an early age forget that “the tree, and even the
human body, does not strengthen its fibres till it has reached its full growth.”56 She continues:
there appears to be something analogous in the mind. The senses and the imagination
give a form to the character, during a childhood and youth; and the understanding, as life
advances, gives firmness to the first fair purposes of sensibility—till virtue, arising rather
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from the clear conviction of reason than the impulse of the heart, morality is made to rest
on a rock against which the storms of passion vainly beat.57
The mind’s growth is, at least at first, like the slow process by which a sapling throws out its
leaves and roots itself into place. Once the “form” of the child’s character is set in place by the
“full growth”58 of understanding, the true foundation of morality—reason—comes into the
picture. The “clear conviction of reason” and a “rational opinion respecting the attributes of
God” is the unwavering foundation—the “rock”—upon which the mutable human character—the
“tree”—rests. Though Wollstonecraft includes the image of the tree and the rock as two parts of
one image of human development, the shift from organic to inorganic form hints at the
contradictory relation between sensibility and reason. From a metaphysical standpoint, it is hard
to say which takes priority. We’ve seen that a version of this problem haunts Rousseau’s tutor’s
discourse. Though the ends of sensibility and reason can in theory be made continuous,
overbearing parents all too commonly contract children’s hearts so that they are incapable, when
the “season” arises, of following the clear conviction of reason.
Wollstonecraft’s attack on overbearing parents is coterminous with her critique of writers
like Rousseau who render women “objects of pity bordering on contempt.”59 According to
Wollstonecraft, in book 5 of Emile, Rousseau recommends that woman “exercise her natural
cunning, and [be] made a coquettish slave in order to render her a more alluring object of desire,
a sweeter companion to man, whenever he chooses to relax himself.”60 In chapter one of Rights
of Woman, Wollstonecraft claims that the author of the theory of the “state of nature” must have
been overly “enamored of solitude,” indolence, and “brutal ease.”61 Analyzing Rousseau’s views
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on the female character, Wollstonecraft discredits him along similar lines; she argues that he is
so carried away by his “voluptuous reveries”62 that he assumes that girls are biologically destined
to be preoccupied with their physical appearance. Wollstonecraft cites an anecdote from Emile in
which Rousseau identifies “the first dawn of the female character”63 with a girl’s anxious selfconsciousness about her posture. In the story, the girl learns to despise needlework after catching
a glimpse of her “constrained attitude”64 in the looking-glass. Rousseau observes that the girl’s
male counterpart cares about being constrained while she only cares about looking so.
Wollstonecraft argues that the differences between the boy and girl are not innate: if girls
become fixated on their personal appearance at an early age in a way in which boys do not, it is
because “artificial notions of beauty”65 have been “early entangled with [girls’] motives of
action.”66 It is not the workings of biological “nature,” but a plan of education designed to appeal
to the fancies of men that accounts for the “insignificancy”67 of the female character.
Though well known, Wollstonecraft’s critique of Rousseau’s theory of women’s
education and development is really only one part of her broader critique of a culture of
sensibility defined by male writers who have been led astray by “mechanical instinctive
sensations.”68 Wollstonecraft identifies an artificial sensibility behind Rousseau’s depiction of
the female character in Emile, but also behind, as we’ve seen, Edmund Burke’s apology for
Marie Antoinette in Reflections on the Revolution in France.69 Burke’s sensibilities are artificial
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and irrational because he fails to recognize that “ignorance and mistaken self-interest”70 sanction
the customs for the perpetuation of property which he lauds as the only plausible basis of familial
and national affection. Burke is so viscerally horrified by the appearance of the working women
who march on Versailles in protest of the rising price of bread that he overlooks the educational
and economic circumstances that condition their anger. In Wollstonecraft’s analysis, Rousseau’s
view of the character of women is similarly superficial. Pleased with the beauty of women,
Rousseau overlooks the educational and economic circumstances that incentivize girls to use
appearances to gain an advantage in the world. Wollstonecraft corrects Rousseau’s view of the
female character in Rights of Woman by outlining the dire consequences for women of a system
of education that prioritizes beauty over reason and moral feeling.
The overcultured woman of sensibility is the profoundly passive and therefore more
vulnerable counterpart of the man of sensibility embodied at turns by Burke and Rousseau.71 In
the “Introduction” to Rights of Woman, Wollstonecraft compares the education of women to the
cultivation of flowers. She writes, “the conduct and manners of women, in fact, evidently prove
that their minds are not in a healthy state; for, like the flowers which are planted in too rich a
soil, strength and usefulness are sacrificed to beauty; and the flaunting leaves, after having
pleased a fastidious eye, fade, disregarded on the stalk, long before the season when they ought
to have arrived at maturity.”72 While Wollstonecraft’s metaphor of the mind as a full-grown tree
evokes a possible continuity between physical and mental development, her female flowers
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evoke a discontinuity between these processes. The premature bloom and decline of flowers
“planted in too rich a soil”73 are the metaphor of a process of education that cultivates beauty at
the expense of the mind. Deidre Lynch explains that these flowers are, “in technical terms,
luxuriants, disfigured products of a gardener’s willingness to sacrifice reproductive usefulness to
beautiful display.”74 In another botanical metaphor, Wollstonecraft compares women to
decorative flowers introduced into England from abroad: women who are “decked with artificial
graces” “languish like exotics, and [are] reckoned beautiful flaws in nature.”75 Alan Bewell has
shown that Britain’s colonial project facilitated the colonization, replacement and resettlement of
traditional natures, contributing to a growing perception that nature was a “translation.”76 Lynch
adds that “at the start of the nineteenth-century knowledge of nature depended on practices of
artifice and exhibition that rendered nature a representation of itself.”77 By comparing women to
the flowers bought, sold, and shipped across seas for their beauty, Wollstonecraft finds the
perfect metaphor to describe the way in which the “fastidious eye”78 of luxury culture and the
marriage market turn women into objects of representation. Rousseau and Burke reproduce that
dehumanizing point of view insofar as they allow appearances to shape their perception of the
female character.
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Philip Barnard and Stephen Shapiro observe that modern readers of Rights of Woman
might find problematic Wollstonecraft’s “discussion of women’s disempowerment in the
absence of any consideration of male physical and sexual violence.”79 In Wrongs of Woman, a
text to which I will return, Wollstonecraft corrects this absence in her early thinking by showing
how patriarchal norms of marriage and sexuality tacitly sanction male wrongdoings such as rape,
spousal abuse and child neglect. The novel exposes the catastrophic consequences of sexual
violence and of the sexual double standards to which women are routinely exposed. In one
episode, a gentleman whose Rousseauian frame of mind is designated by his advocacy of
“unequivocal sincerity”80 cannot understand why Jemima, a poor woman who was the former
mistress of his deceased friend, is in need of charity. Marked from birth as a bastard and raped by
a man for whom she worked as a servant, Jemima loses her sexual reputation early in life and is
consigned to the gendered labor of prostitution, domestic service and washing work. The
Rousseauian gentleman who can “descant” on “the evils which arise in society from despotism
of rank and riches”81 refuses to help Jemima because he believes that her fine letter writing skills
will save her. He urges Jemima to “exert her powers,” contending that a literate woman of
sensibility “should never be in want of resources.”82 He is wrong: Jemima ends up in the
workhouse where her literacy does little to help her. This episode in Wrongs of Woman furthers
Wollstonecraft’s criticism in the two Vindications of the partiality of the view of the female
character adopted by men of “genius” who profess sensibility and yet fail to understand, much
less attempt to rectify, gender and class inequalities. Mary Shelley follows Wollstonecraft’s lead
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when, telling the story of Frankenstein’s creature, she brings into view the exclusions built into
the sentimental concept of community upon which Rousseauian natural education is premised.
Women become comparable to exotic and luxuriant flowers within a society in which
their ideal destiny is defined by the fancy of writers like Rousseau and also by a luxury culture
that caters to the rich. In Rights of Men, Wollstonecraft echoes the opening lines of Emile when
she writes that “the rich man” builds an estate in which “trees grow to recreate the fancy of the
planter” and everything “is cherished but man.”83 She conjectures that “if, instead of sweeping
pleasure-grounds, obelisks, temples, and elegant cottages, as objects for the eye, the heart was
allowed to beat true to nature, decent farms would be scattered over the estate, and plenty smile
around.”84 In book 11 of The Prelude, William Wordsworth argues that the picturesque viewer
errs in transferring “rules of mimic art” to “things above all art,” thus making “the most despotic
of our senses”—the eye— “master of the heart.” 85 Wollstonecraft’s critique is similar: so long as
the “rich man” assumes that nature exists to provide “objects for the eye,”86 he will be incapable
of feeling what he owes to both “the earth”87 and to humanity. The planter’s narrow interest in
visual pleasure is comparable to the “pride and sensuality”88 of the men of genius who render
women “alluring objects for a moment”89 rather than equal companions. Wollstonecraft’s
reference to the heart that might in some other world be “allowed to beat true to nature”90 recalls
her conjecture in Rights of Woman that, in a world absent of a false system of female manners,
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the modest, sexless heart might “beat time to humanity.”91 Alan Bewell contends that Rights of
Woman “represents a romantic critique of artificial aspects of pastoral…ultimately aimed at
reinstating a pastoral ideal.”92 The conditional tense that Wollstonecraft uses to imagine the
change of heart that might come if a more equitable pastoral were instated is just one example of
many if, then constructions in the two Vindications. Wollstonecraft uses the conditional tense to
hint that the reinstatement of true ideals (whether of taste or morality, pastoral beauty or
modesty) must be premised on a total reconstitution of civic society, one that rectifies the
inequalities symbolized by “sweeping pleasure-grounds.”93
Rousseau does not like Wollstonecraft describe the cultural changes that need to be made
before natural education can succeed. In Emile, Rousseau speculates about what education would
look like were a child raised to submit to what is biologically necessary, rather than to the
prejudices that predominate within the fallen world of eighteenth-century European culture. Thus
educated, Emile is like no other student in the world. Rousseau admits that “it is enough for me
that wherever men are born, what I propose can be done with them.”94 To begin by examining
how to reform the Lockean educational precepts that actually predominate within an
overcultured “civilization” would be to compromise with that civilization’s evil and Rousseau’s
goal is to offer a method of education that is absolutely good. The question of how the system is
to be put to use does not matter: Rousseau leaves it up to his reader to determine how natural
education might be implemented. Wollstonecraft is far more concerned than Rousseau with the
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question of what already existing practices and assumptions need to change before sensibility
can be realized by ordinary people as a galvanizing force of reason and virtue.
Very early on in Rights of Woman, Wollstonecraft casts Rousseau as a pessimist nostalgic
for a lost age of innocence and herself as the true progressive. She contends that Rousseau is
wrong to suppose “error has been introduced by the creature”95 that God formed to “think and
improve.”96 Error is instead a consequence of socially instituted “hereditary distinctions.”97 She
continues, “Rousseau exerts himself to prove that all was right originally: a crowd of authors that
all is now right: and I, that all will be right.”98 Her method in Rights of Woman is consistent with
this self-representation: she accompanies her metaphoric conjectures on the development of
reason from innate sensibility—her own hypothesis that all was right originally—with an
analysis of how a false system of education that is operative in the present can be remedied by
the state’s implementation of concrete policies for the better education of all children. She
recommends that the national government implement a public system of elementary education to
neutralize the “distinctions of vanity” that “deprave the character”99 and to ensure that the
incentive to make an appearance in the world is no longer foisted on girls from the time of early
childhood. A truly revolutionary system of elementary education will be one that obliges boys
and girls, the rich and poor to “meet together” and play outdoors on “a large piece of ground”100

95

Wollstonecraft, A Vindication of the Rights of Woman, 78.
Ibid, 79.
97
Wollstonecraft’s reading of Rousseau’s Discourse on the Origin of Inequality Among Men
(1754) is partial and strategic: she entirely overlooks Rousseau’s famous speculation that the
barbarities of civilization originated with a claim of property ownership. The question of whether
“error” is introduced by “man” or by “hereditary distinctions” is a chicken-egg problem; the
important thing is that Wollstonecraft is claiming to be more interested than Rousseau in charting
out the mundane work of “social improvement.”
98
Wollstonecraft, A Vindication of the Rights of Woman, 79.
99
Ibid, 253.
100
Ibid, 253.
96

34

for a significant part of the day. In Vindication, Wollstonecraft does not simply project a
developmental trajectory onto nature but rethinks the pastoral in an effort to nullify the
“artificial” divisions created by hereditary wealth and gendered concepts of education. When,
seven years after the publication of Rights of Woman, Wollstonecraft composes Wrongs of
Woman, her hope that the state might foster the natural education of all children has, like the
revolutionary government in France, foundered. In Wrongs of Woman, an innate sense of natural
beauty resolves a faultily educated woman to seek independence, but patriarchal authority
suppresses her voice.
Making Natural Beauty Didactic: Wrongs of Woman and the Profession of Faith
In her last fiction, Maria; or, The Wrongs of Woman, sensibility is affiliated with
spontaneous experiences of memory, natural beauty and the divine rather than with a biological
scheme of development. Wollstonecraft asks: can the memory of natural beauty and the
simultaneous intuition of order in the material and spiritual worlds prepare the self to resist the
prejudices of modern urbanized society? Wollstonecraft’s presentation of natural beauty as a site
for metaphysical speculation has an important precedent in “The Profession of Faith of the
Savoyard Vicar” of book 4 of Emile. Like Rousseau before her, Wollstonecraft tests the social
significance of the speculative claim that it is possible to resolve paralyzing doubts about how
one ought to think and act immediately, in a sensory experience that facilitates a leap from
matter to spirit.
The text of the discourse is given to help complete Emile’s education but is not an
important feature of the religious education of Emile’s future wife Sophie. In the discourse, the
Vicar introduces the male student of natural education to ideas about the physical and moral
order of the universe. The student can then evaluate the ideas of the Vicar intuitively, by
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interpreting the magnificence of a scene of natural beauty. While religious education strengthens
Emile’s reason and intuition, religious education serves principally to strengthen Sophie’s
attachment to her family. The differences between Sophie’s and Emile’s respective educations
accord with the different talents that Rousseau claims to be natural to women and men. Sophie’s
social cunning allows her to make “progress in ethics and matters of taste” though she only
“skim[s] the science of reasoning.”101 Emile is more capable than Sophie of thinking
systematically about philosophy, physics, mathematics, history and religion. Against Rousseau,
Wollstonecraft argues in Rights of Woman that women ought to be exposed to the masculine
disciplines of natural science and politics. In Short Residence and Wrongs of Woman,
Wollstonecraft upholds her early view that women possess powers of mind equal to men’s by
demonstrating her female speakers’ facility in grasping the whole order of things immediately by
means of intuition. Maria, the heroine of Wollstonecraft’s Wrongs of Woman, has the “sublime”
capacity for rising from sense impressions to abstract ideas that Emile’s education, particularly
his education in religion, is designed to draw out. 102
Seven of the seventeen total chapters in Wrongs of Woman are taken up with the memoir
that Maria pens for her daughter while she is imprisoned in a private madhouse. Maria’s memoir
is comparable in form and purpose to the “Profession of Faith.” Crucially, both texts refer to the
beauty of nature and to the intelligence of its Creator as they seek to impress the memory of a
younger reader with an appreciation of the mind’s independence. Both texts are, however,
situated within longer narratives of education that end in exile, and thus leave the reader
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uncertain whether aesthetic experience actually supports the social purposes of education.
Rousseau and Wollstonecraft ask: what impact, if any, does the independence of the mind that
seems to be affirmed by natural beauty have on social life? Can a moral resolve that has its
origins in sensation and memory prepare a subject to live independently within a social world
riven by opinion and distorted by prejudice? Ultimately, as I will show, both Rousseau and
Wollstonecraft doubt that the moral resolve communicated by natural beauty constitutes
effective armor against the prejudices of the modern social world.
In 1791, the French Constitution did not grant women the rights that Wollstonecraft
would publicly demand in 1792 in Rights of Woman. Britain’s subsequent military campaign
against France and its internal war against reformers left Wollstonecraft in despair about political
conditions at home. From France, she wrote to her lover Gilbert Imlay: “brought up here, my girl
would be freer.”103 In Wrongs of Woman Wollstonecraft adapts formal features of Rousseau’s
Emile—specifically, a text in which an older speaker tells a younger auditor about the origins of
their moral and religious convictions —to interrogate whether and how a woman might acquire
independence in a society in which the laws entitle married women to “no protection or redress
from the oppressor” and a husband may keep his wife, “a perpetual minor, forever in
bondage.”104 The novel centers on the story of a mother, Maria, who has been forcibly separated
from her infant daughter and imprisoned in a private madhouse by her husband. Though the
gothic setting highlights Maria’s unfreedom within the institution of eighteenth-century
marriage, Maria is in prison able to write a memoir to her daughter that recalls how her mind was
liberated from misogynous convention.
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Wollstonecraft’s last novel has often been described as “semi-autobiographical.”105
Certainly, Wollstonecraft drew material from her personal life. But she also incorporated her
theoretical views on religion and natural aesthetics into her heroine’s memoir. It will be
worthwhile to review her late thought on these topics. Godwin writes in his biography of
Wollstonecraft that her religion was “little allied to any system of forms” but founded rather in
taste: “She found an inexpressible delight in the beauties of nature, and in the splendid reveries
of the imagination. But nature itself, she thought, would be no better than a vast blank, if the
mind of the observer did not supply it with an animating soul. When she walked amidst the
wonders of nature, she was accustomed to converse with her God.”106 Barbara Taylor argues that
Godwin is in this instance too powerfully influenced by his own religious skepticism to provide
an accurate description of “Wollstonecraft’s deity.”107 The constitution of “nature itself”
remained a theological question for Wollstonecraft even as, late in her career, she increasingly
relied on faculty psychology to explain how the mind grasps and recombines the sensations
received from external nature.108 In “On Poetry, and Our Relish for the Beauties of Nature,” an
essay that was first published in the Monthly Magazine in 1797 and extensively edited by
Godwin for the 1798 Posthumous Works, Wollstonecraft characterizes the poet as a solitary who
ecstatically perceives God in the natural atmosphere: “God is seen in every floating cloud and
comes from the misty mountains to receive the noblest homage of an intelligent creature—
praise.”109 In a moment of “sublime admiration,” God “is worshipped in a temple not made with
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hands, and the world seems to contain only the mind that formed and contemplates it.”110 A leap
from matter to spirit occurs as the poet’s perception of the floating cloud and mountain mist
culminates in an intuition that the contemplative mind is one with the Creator’s.
Wollstonecraft’s description of the poet recalls her speaker’s more rhetorically elaborate
description in Short Residence of a pastoral, seaside scene near Tønsborg, Norway:
With what ineffable pleasure have I not gazed—and gazed again, losing my breath
through my eyes—my very soul diffused itself in the scene—and, seeming to become all
senses, glided in the scarcely agitated waves, melted in the freshening breeze, or, taking
its flight with fairy wing, to the misty mountains which bounded the prospect, fancy tript
over new lawns, more beautiful even than the lovely slopes on the winding shores before
me.—I pause, again breathless, to trace, with renewed delight, sentiments which
entranced me, when, turning my humid eyes from the expanse below to the vault above,
my sight pierced the fleecy clouds that softened the azure brightness; and, imperceptibly
recalling the reveries of childhood, I bowed before the awful throne of my Creator, whilst
I rested on his footstool.111
The speaker’s senses seem to transport her soul outward into the fluid materiality of the agitated
waves, fresh breeze and mountain mist. Pausing in the present tense, the speaker indicates the
role of memory, breath and writing in constituting her sentiments. Yet there is a higher cause: the
speaker’s turn from the “expanse below to the vault above” results in an awful sense of the
earthly scene as a mere “footstool” for God’s heavenly “throne.” While the speaker initially
figures her soul as a material thing that diffuses like a chemical element into the scene, the figure
of the scene as a footstool establishes continuity between the soul and an intelligent creator. The
final affirmation of the unity of creation with Creator is facilitated by the acts of writing and
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recollection and upholds Wollstonecraft’s view that the value of natural beauty lies in its
capacity to affirm the freedom of a mind and body that is at one with God.
Wollstonecraft would have been familiar with the contest between dualist and materialist
views of the soul that transpired in the 1790s among leading writers within the community of
rational dissent.112 While it is difficult to map Wollstonecraft’s view of the soul onto one side of
this debate or the other, the above passage from Short Residence seems to present the soul as at
least in part material. Adela Ramos has argued that Wollstonecraft’s “conception of the human
soul as an instrument of perfectibility”113 in Rights of Woman accords with Richard Price’s view
that moral action derives from abstract, universally valid rational principles rather than from
experience. But Wollstonecraft situates the material atmosphere as a site of God in the above
passage and in other reveries of her late writing. Wollstonecraft was familiar with the materialist
position of Joseph Priestly, who she met during her early days in Newington Green. Tom Ford
has shown that, in his Disquisitions Relating to Matter and Spirit (1777), Priestly “cited both air
pumps and philological investigations into the scriptural meaning of ‘spirit’ to support his
argument that air is the matter of thought.”114 Like Thomas Beddoes and Humphrey Davy,
Priestly described matter in aerial terms. As a result of this intervention, as Ford argues, “the
production of empirical knowledge became a matter of mapping atmospheric interactions.”115
Wollstonecraft is not a natural philosopher and her thinking is badly described as empirical;
however, she consistently gives force to metaphysical speculation by transposing a theological
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view of the soul’s divinity onto the field of atmospheric chemistry in which Priestly was
working.
The language of Maria’s memoir recalls the language in Short Residence in an episode in
which the heroine figures the soul as a material thing that dissolves in the atmosphere. Maria
traces the origins of her desire for independence from her cruel husband, George Venables, to
this moment of reverie. When Venables attempts to prostitute Maria to another man, Mr. S., for a
loan of five hundred pounds, she takes off her ring and abjures his name. Before Mr. S. as
witness, Maria declares her intention to quit Venables’s house and to provide for their child
alone. When Venables locks Maria in a room to prevent her escape, she asks herself, “Was I
indeed free?” Opening the window, she recalls:
The face of heaven grew fairer as I viewed it, and the clouds seemed to flit away obedient
to my wishes, to give my soul room to expand. I was all soul, and (wild as it may appear)
felt as if I could have dissolved in the soft balmy gale that kissed my cheek, or have
glided below the horizon on the glowing, descending beams. A seraphic satisfaction
animated, without agitating my spirits; and my imagination collected, in visions
sublimely terrible, or soothingly beautiful, an immense variety of the endless images,
which nature affords, and fancy combines, of the grand and fair.116
Though locked away, Maria feels that her soul is free to dissolve in the gale or to descend with
the light of the setting sun. The satisfaction that animates Maria’s imagination is physiological,
as the reference to the medical term “spirits” suggests, but it is also “seraphic,” a sign of her
soul’s affinity with the “face of heaven.” The Creator’s presence is even more closely integrated
into the imagery of the scene here than in the passage from Short Residence. Given a “face,”
heaven seems to respond sympathetically to the speaker’s wishes, yet the “face of heaven” also
refers to the literal position of the clouds in the atmosphere. In Short Residence, the speaker’s
rapturous figuration of the landscape around Tønsborg as the footstool of the Creator strengthens
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her belief that she is a “part of a mighty whole” despite the “sorrow and unkindness” that she has
suffered at the hands of the “you” to whom she writes.117 In Wrongs of Woman, Maria’s intuition
of a correspondence between her soul and the “face of heaven” strengthens her belief in the
possibility of a fulfilling emotional life free from her neglectful husband and the marriage that
she thought had, as she puts it, “bastilled me for life.”118 In this way, the reverie seems to affirm
that Maria’s “mind is freed.”119
Maria’s turn of mind is remarkable because her education had formerly been founded on
principles that Wollstonecraft warns will prevent women from aspiring to independence. Maria
is born to a mother who is like the frail flowers of modern systems of female education. The
uncle who takes over Maria’s education in the place of her mother cannot imagine any other fate
for her than an early marriage. Though Maria’s uncle arranges her marriage with the intention to
free her from an unhappy home, his decision is nonetheless in conformity with the excessively
prudent standards of women’s education that had been a target of Wollstonecraft’s critique in
Rights of Woman. Though Maria’s uncle arranges a disastrous marriage of mistaken prudence for
her, we see in the scene of reverie that she is capable of framing higher ends for herself. Andrew
Elfenbein has argued that Maria’s capacity for genius is figured as “highly erotic” in the
reverie.120 I want to emphasize instead that the reverie displays Maria’s possession of the talents
that both Rousseau’s tutor and the Savoyard Vicar aim to cultivate in the male student of
education. A comparison of Maria’s memoir with Rousseau’s “Profession of Faith” can enhance
our understanding of both of their treatments of the relation of natural beauty to the ends of
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independence in modern society. Both the Vicar and Maria suggest that natural beauty speaks of
a whole greater than the individual self. Rousseau and Wollstonecraft ask, in turn, if such an
address can furnish the individual with the resolve necessary to resist the false opinions and
prejudices of society. Aesthetic experiences of the natural world are in Wrongs of Woman and
Emile disruptive: the truths that natural beauty seems to validate change the course of a life not
gradually, in time with the biological rhythms of an education premised in instrumental reason,
but all at once. We have seen that Maria’s seraphic reverie seems to liberate her from the lifelong
progress of an education of “selfish prudence.”121 In facilitating a “great step upward” from a
practical knowledge of things that can be sensed to a moral knowledge of freedom, the scene of
natural beauty that frames the “Profession of Faith” promotes self-sufficiency in a manner that is
out of time with the gradualism of biological development within the tutor’s rational plan of
natural education.122 To better understand the correspondences between Rousseau’s and
Wollstonecraft’s evaluations of the significance of natural beauty, it will be worthwhile to take a
close look at the function of nature’s address in the virtually self-standing “Profession of Faith.”
In the first stages of his education, Emile is taught to understand only the physical causes
of things. In book 1 Emile is trained to perceive things accurately by means of his senses, while,
in books 2 and 3, he acquires a rational knowledge of things in accordance with their use. By
initiating Emile solely into the rules of perception and of calculative reason in the early stages of
his education, the tutor defers as long as possible the onset of Emile’s “nascent sensibility”123—
his ability to judge that other subjects feel. When sensibility eventually arises with the
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“adolescent fire”124 of the body in book 4, the tutor’s goal is to cultivate Emile’s imagination and
capacity for compassion so that he may enter society with an adequate understanding of the
moral significance of sensibility.125 Rousseau recommends that the tutor cultivate Emile’s
sympathies in lessons that are interesting enough to be retained in memory but that do not appear
didactic. The tutor may, for instance, train Emile to read the private hearts of historical men or to
pity real individuals subject to the vices and sorrows of urban life in an unequal society. The
“Profession of Faith” is unique among the moral lessons in book 4 because it addresses religious
belief and, in so doing, attempts to found moral thought, feeling and action in nature rather than
in the authority of a text. Rousseau worries that other lessons in book 4 risk making Emile too
reliant on the intermediary who presents them: reading historical accounts of the private lives of
great men, Emile may, for instance, internalize the historian’s bad opinions. The concern that
reading will lead children astray also informs Rousseau’s attitude towards fables. He argues that
children should not be given the fables of La Fontaine, as they express “mixed”126 morals that
children cannot grasp and are likely to misinterpret. The “Profession of Faith” addresses, and
even attempts to solve, a crucial pedagogical problem, which is how to lend Emile a knowledge
of virtue without rendering him susceptible to the misconstructions fostered by reading. In the
Preface to Lyrical Ballads, as we shall see, Wordsworth addresses this same pedagogical
problem, though he worries more about the ill effects of gothic romance than those of fables or
history books.
The Vicar’s goal is not to propound his own religious sentiment as a rule, but to articulate
his way of thinking in dialogue with a younger man who must decide for himself how to live. In
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a second layer of mediation, the beliefs professed by the Vicar are entrusted to Emile’s tutor as a
model of how to reason with his student about religion. The pitfalls and errors that Rousseau
identifies as risks of reading—the misapplication of the moral of a story or the overreliance on an
author’s faulty understanding—are theoretically nullified by the analogy sets up between the text
of the Profession and the moral order of nature. Though the Vicar’s discourse proceeds gradually
from physics to metaphysics, his claims seem to be immediately affirmed by the beauty of nature
itself. In the “Third Walk” of Reveries, Rousseau recalls that his views in the “Profession of
Faith” had been founded in “the close relation I perceive between my immortal nature and the
constitution of the world, the physical order I see all around me.”127 Much of the Vicar’s
argument proceeds from the premise that human minds are endowed with an “active principle”128
that compares memories and sensations and is correspondent with the order that persists in both
the physical and spiritual world. The Vicar presents his creed to a younger man as they gaze
together at a sunrise over the “most beautiful scene which can strike the human eye.”129 The
younger man explains that it is as if “nature displayed all its magnificence to our eyes in order to
present them with the text for our conversation.”130 It is as if external nature communicates
visually what the Vicar communicates verbally in his discourse: that the human mind is
constituted like the physical order of nature. Barbara Johnson observes that “a text ‘speaks.’ This
is how texts in general are assumed to work: they ‘say’ something. Prosopopoeia is thus the
figure for reading.”131 The Vicar’s profession is, quite simply, a reading of the scene before him.
There is no possibility of misconstruction or misunderstanding here because the text is supplied
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from nature itself; the analogy between text and prospect closes the gulf between the word and
the world that may be widened by fables and histories. The discourse, which is long and highly
speculative, appears not to be prescriptive, because the magnificent scene is also visible to the
Vicar’s auditor.
The metaphysical argument of the discourse occupies a significant section of book 4 of
Rousseau’s Emile and a thorough discussion of the philosophical precedents and significance of
Rousseau’s religious thought is beyond the purposes of my argument.132 I will provide, however,
a short overview explaining the place of the voice of nature within the Vicar’s moral argument.
Importantly, the Savoyard Vicar begins with a Newtonian concept of the physical universe as a
vast, well-ordered machine. He argues that we can perceive order and systematicity in the
physical world even if we do not always know what that order is for. The sense that ordered
relations of every kind exist in nature persuades us that there must be an intelligent first cause of
things. We cannot resist the idea that an order of providence pervades in the spiritual world that
is similar to that which is manifest in the order of physical nature. Though we have no control
over the direction of providence, we sense that an active power of judgment, which is distinct
from passive sensation, enables us to choose good over evil. Conscience entails, then, the
recognition that the laws of our “immortal nature”133 are a part of a greater order in the spiritual
world. Though conscience is innate to human beings, the Vicar claims that we have forgotten to
listen to its voice, which “speaks to us in nature’s language.”134 The noisy world distracts us
from sensing internally the place of our being in relation to the whole. Wordsworth and Kant
will make similar claims for the moral significance of natural language, as I show in chapter two.
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Paul de Man argues in Allegories of Reading that Rousseau’s claim that judgment is
founded on comparisons undoes his assertion that nature affirms the order of providence.135 I do
not pursue a deconstructive reading of the rhetoric of the Profession; I do, however, agree with
de Man that the voice of nature plays a paradoxical role in Rousseau’s thought. The paradox of
this figure becomes visible in the third walk of The Reveries, when the speaker’s surrender to
nature implies his renunciation of conscience and moral action. I will return to this moment. For
now, however, I will emphasize the hoped-for effects of the Vicar’s Profession in order to better
draw forward its similarities with Maria’s memoir. The Vicar explains that exposure to the
hypocrisy of religious authority had brought him to a “painful” state of doubt when he first
sought the truths professed in the discourse: “I ceaselessly wandered from doubt to doubt and
brought back from my long meditations only uncertainty, obscurity, and contradictions about the
cause of my being and the principle of my duties.”136 His young auditor is similarly dogged by
skepticism when the Vicar delivers his “Profession of Faith” as a salve. Rousseau implies that a
discussion similar to that between the Vicar and his auditor may help buffer Emile from the bad
effects of other-regarding self-love—from a misguided amour-propre—in advance of his entry
into society. In itself, however, the “Profession of Faith” attempts to resolve the moral
uncertainties of subjects who have, like Wollstonecraft’s Maria, already been exposed to the
corrupted morals of society’s institutions.
In Wrongs of Woman, Maria’s memoir renders communicable the correspondence
between physical and spiritual realms that is so crucial to education and the resolution of moral
skepticism in Emile. Wollstonecraft consistently figures the material atmosphere as the site of an
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ecstatic union of the self with a greater whole that is both physical and immaterial. Admittedly,
she does not provide a full discourse on religion to explain, point by point, the religious
significance of the “face of heaven” that seems to address Maria in Wrongs of Woman. Maria’s
memoir nonetheless shares a common aim with the Vicar’s profession. Both texts try to make a
vivid, even photographic, memory of a scene of natural beauty purposive for a younger reader’s
sense of moral and intellectual independence. At the beginning of her memoir, Maria hopes that
her daughter may gather from her sentiments “the instruction, the counsel, which is meant rather
to exercise than influence [her] mind.”137 Maria hopes that the memoir may help her daughter
resolve the paralyzing skepticism that arises along with exposure to the prejudices of the social
world. Ideally the text will, she writes, “lead you very early in life to form your grand principle
of action, to save you from the vain regret of having, through irresolution, let the spring-tide of
existence pass away, unimproved, unenjoyed.”138 Maria admits that her own education did not
keep time with natural rhythms: resolution and the desire for improvement did not arise in “the
spring-tide of existence,”139 but came all at once in response to the “face of heaven” and her
consciousness of degradation in a bad marriage. By inscribing the reverie as the most important
event of her development, Maria suggests that nature’s beauty may support the mind’s liberation
from the state of moral irresolution wrought by unjust social institutions.
After her reverie, Maria recognizes that misogynous prejudice had been the source of her
“irresolution.” When Venables returns to check on Maria in the room in which he has locked her,
he entreats her in the name of “prudence” and “propriety”140 to overlook his attempt to trade her
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sexual favors for debt relief. Determined to leave him, Maria explains that reflection “had only
confirmed my purpose, and no power on earth could divert me from it.”141 She notes: “I
wondered (now a film seemed to be withdrawn, that obscured the piercing sight of reason) how I
could, previously to the deciding outrage, have considered myself as everlastingly united to vice
and folly! ‘Had an evil genius cast a spell at my birth; or a demon stalked out of chaos, to
perplex my understanding, and enchain my will, with delusive prejudices?’”142 It is not an evil
genius, but the generally accepted terms of matrimonial obedience that had enchained Maria’s
will. Before Maria views her “present situation” under the “piercing sight of reason,” her
marriage to Venables is fraught with the many indignities of submitting to a husband whose
character is marked by vice and folly. Venables’s early inheritance of his father’s business affairs
facilitates habits of alcoholism, lechery, and speculation that are sustained in marriage by
Maria’s uncle’s wealth. The debts that Venables incurs to maintain his bad habits degrade his
reputation in commercial society and destroy his relationship with his wife. Maria complains of
the “violence” done to her “delicacy” and “taste” by her obligation to sleep with him and finance
his vices. It is, however, the thought of the effect that his disgraced character will have on the
well-being of her unborn daughter that finally persuades Maria to disavow his name. Pregnant
when she declares separation, Maria condemns Venables for daring “to barter the honor of the
mother of your child.”143 Venables’s readiness to sacrifice the “honor” of his wife and unborn
daughter for a loan is the last of a series of blunders that makes “irresolution” untenable for
Maria. Addressing her daughter, Maria asserts that, “there may be advocates for matrimonial
obedience, who, making a distinction between the duty of a wife and of a human being, may
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blame my conduct—to them I write not.”144 The memoir is for the reader who is prepared to
celebrate Maria’s mental liberation from the commonplace, misogynistic opinion that it is always
a wife’s duty to submit to her husband’s authority.
While Maria’s early susceptibility to the corrosive effects of worldly opinion makes her
comparable to the Vicar, the daughter to whom she addresses her memoir is more like Emile.
Once Emile enters society, his tutor insists that he wait to marry. Rousseau thinks it wise for the
male model student to have time in which to deliberate about the right match. Emile must resist
the temptation to marry the first woman who arouses his sexual interest. Emile’s entry into
married society is far more purposeful than Maria’s. Maria marries Venables because he is the
first person who, by showing an interest in her, stirs her imagination to what she takes to be love.
Feminist readers of Wrongs of Woman have long observed that Maria is mentally confined by
her “feminine,” romantic sensibility.”145 Though her gendered education makes her vulnerable to
the artificial romantic sensibilities that precipitate her disastrous marriage, her attunement to
natural beauty frees her from a false sense of obligation to her husband. She hopes that the
memory of her transformation may liberate her daughter from irresolution before she even thinks
of marriage. Ideally, the memoir will function for Maria’s daughter as the “Profession of Faith”
functions for Emile: a legacy of hope for a future of independence from the hypocrisy and
prejudice intrinsic to modern society. Though such a fate remains possible for Maria’s daughter,
for whom Maria reserves the possibility of innocence, Maria herself fails to find independence in
society. So too, ultimately, does Emile. The narratives of social exile that frame Maria’s memoir
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and the Vicar’s profession call attention to the precariousness of the lessons those texts aim to
impart.
The Inadequacy of Aesthetic Education: Exile in Rousseau and Wollstonecraft
Hina Nazar posits that, in Mary, a Fiction, Wollstonecraft “dramatizes the limits of a
Rousseauvian education by representing its eponymous heroine, educated principally by nature,
as a permanent exile from society.”146 The same can be said of Wrongs of Woman. In the
remainder of this chapter I argue that Wollstonecraft’s gothic rendering of Maria’s experience as
a prisoner revises Rousseau’s portrait of the solitary yet self-sufficient student of natural
education. In Rousseau’s uncompleted sequel to Emile, titled Emile and Sophie; or The
Solitaries, Emile enters society and quickly forgets the principles that his tutor taught him.
Poised by his education to find happiness as a husband and citizen, his marriage to Sophie proves
unsuccessful. After their daughter dies, Emile and Sophie move to the city and alike succumb,
though in different ways, to the influence of a corrupted amour-propre. While Sophie gives way
to sexual passion and is unfaithful, Emile comes under the influence of “frivolous tastes”147 and
enjoyments. He puts “a jargon of sentiment and of morality in the place of the reality.”148
Whereas in The Solitaries education’s failure results from the alienating forces at work in
civilized society, in Wrongs of Woman education’s failure is rooted in laws of marriage that
reinforce women’s moral and economic dependency. Wollstonecraft’s heroine’s unhappiness
within society is the direct result of laws and customs of marriage that destroy family life by
rendering women dependent things rather than independent persons. While Rousseau argues, as
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Philip Barnard and Stephen Shapiro remark, that “it is society in general that degrades man,”149
Wollstonecraft specifies in Wrongs of Woman that the kind of society fostered by marriage and
property law degrades women and men alike.
After Maria renounces Venables’s name, he hunts her down, abducts her daughter, and
imprisons her in a private madhouse in an effort to claim more of her uncle’s fortune. In the
madhouse Maria writes her memoir to her daughter and finds an ally in her prison guard Jemima
and a lover in the American traveler Darnford. After Jemima assists Maria in escaping from the
madhouse, Venables charges Darnford with seduction and adultery. Maria adapts the key points
of her private memoir for a legal defense in which she claims the right to a “divorce, and the
liberty of enjoying, free from molestation, the fortune left to me by a relation.”150 Addressing her
statement to an audience of judge and jury, Maria explains how, having borne Venables’s
“notorious” vices, she deemed herself “free” when he bartered her “person” and “deserted” her
“unfortunate babe.”151 She asks her auditors to trust her judgment, stating that a wife “must be
allowed to consult her conscience, and regulate her conduct, in some degree, by her own sense of
right.”152 Summing up her case for the jury, the judge explains that it is the duty of a wife to
submit to those who are “qualified by their experience to judge better for her, than she could for
herself.”153 The judge reifies Maria’s duty of matrimonial obedience while entirely overlooking
her natural rights as a human being.154 While she was writing Wrongs of Woman, Wollstonecraft
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requested the second volume of William Godwin’s Caleb Williams.155 In it the squire Falkland
frames his servant Caleb for robbery, and Caleb is tried and imprisoned for a crime that he did
not commit. The trial episode in Wrongs of Woman offers a gendered version of Godwin’s
novel’s lesson in the inevitability of legal injustice for the poor. Frances Ferguson explains that,
in such fictions, “credibility revolves around the credit of the person rather than around the facts
of the narrative, and the ‘lesser’ person will always lose.”156 With the fiction of the trial,
Wollstonecraft shows that judicial authorities in England will categorically uphold the credibility
of husbands instead of measuring the full facts of the case against the voice of conscience.
Wollstonecraft thus uncovers the political stakes of Rousseau’s psychological claim that the
artificial distinctions conjured by amour-propre drown out the voice of nature in modern society.
Wollstonecraft’s narrator’s descriptions of Maria’s desolation both before and after the
trial scene warn of the devastating effects of marriage laws that do not recognize wives as
persons. Wrongs of Woman begins in medias res with a close third person narration of Maria’s
thoughts and sensations as she wakes from a drugged state to find herself confined in a
madhouse without her infant daughter. Though determined to “effect her escape, to fly to the
succor of her child, and to baffle the selfish schemes of her tyrant—her husband,”157 whole
months transpire in which Maria can find no means to those ends. She laments, “by force, or
openly, what could be done?”158 Maria is afforded some relief when her prison guard Jemima
brings her books to read. Unable to sleep after reading Rousseau’s “Heloise,” Maria falls into a
reverie. The narrator notes that,
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far from being fatigued by the restless rotation of thought, she rose and opened her
window, just as the thin watery clouds of twilight made the long silent shadows visible.
The air swept across her face with a voluptuous freshness that thrilled her to her heart,
awakening indefinable emotions; and the sound of a waving branch, or the twittering of a
startled bird, alone broke the stillness of reposing nature. Absorbed by the sublime
sensibility which renders the consciousness of existence felicity, Maria was happy, till an
autumnal scent, wafted by the breeze of morn from the fallen leaves of the adjacent
wood, made her recollect that the season had changed since her confinement; yet life
afforded no variety to solace the afflicted heart.159
There are parallels between Maria’s reverie in the madhouse-prison and the one set in Venables’s
home: in both, Maria is confined, opens a window, and feels the touch of the air. Though the air
in the above passage initially seems to bring happiness with it, a sign of the anguish of
confinement soon arises with the “breeze from the adjacent wood.” Claudia Johnson, Catherine
Packham, and Rachel Seiler-Smith have pointed out that in Wrongs of Woman morbid figures of
animation’s opposite—an infant’s exposure to “killing frost,” for instance—figure the precarity
of female life.160 While the natural atmosphere enlivens Maria’s soul in the memoir, it is figured
in the prison reverie as just another morbid reminder of the stagnancy of her “life.”
Though Maria opens the window of her cell because the reading of Rousseau’s “Heloise”
has made it difficult to sleep, the direction that her reverie takes forces a question that Rousseau
addresses in The Solitaries and the Reveries: Can lasting happiness be found in a state in which
one is deprived of the hope of finding a place in society? At the beginning of The Solitaries
Emile writes to his tutor, “I am alone, I have lost everything, but I have myself, and despair has
not annihilated me.”161 Emile writes his history knowing that his writings “will perish without
having been seen by any man.”162 In this way, Emile’s character as a writer resembles the
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autobiographical persona Rousseau fashions in the Reveries. Rousseau composed the Reveries
after his writings, especially the “Profession of Faith,” were condemned in France and
Geneva.163 Rousseau felt so betrayed by the friends and countrymen who denounced his work
that all desire for communication with them came to an end. In the “Fifth Walk,” Rousseau
recalls the period of life that he spent on the shores of the Lake of Bienne, a “place of refuge”
that he had hoped might become his “lifelong prison.”164 Boating on the lake, Rousseau recalls
surrendering direction of the craft to the movement of the current: “I let myself float and drift
wherever the water took me, often for several hours on end, plunged in a host of vague yet
delightful reveries, which though they had no distinct or permanent subject, were still in my eyes
infinitely to be preferred to all that I had found most sweet in the so-called pleasures of life.”165
The memory of this bliss prompts Rousseau to speculate that “lasting happiness” resides in a
state in which, “nothing is external to us, nothing apart from ourselves and our own existence; as
long as this state lasts we are self-sufficient like God.”166 The “simple feeling of existence” that
may be enjoyed in such a state is superior to all of the “so-called pleasures of life” because it
suspends the “memory of calamities,” and the knowledge of the “instability of the things of this
world.”167 Having more to do with forgetting than with remembering, the “simple feeling of
existence” contrasts precisely with the inner sentiment that the Savoyard Vicar associates with
judgment’s power to compare memories and sensations. Jean Starobinski writes that “it is as if

163

Rousseau, Reveries, 34.
Ibid, 82.
165
Ibid, 85.
166
Ibid, 88-89.
167
Ibid, 91, 87.
164

55

the feeling of existence wells up not as the reward for close attention to ourselves and to the
world but as the miraculous fruit of allowing the self and the world to fall to oblivion.”168
In the prison reverie quoted above, Maria is momentarily absorbed by a “sublime
sensibility that renders the consciousness of existence felicity.”169 Wollstonecraft thus raises the
Rousseauian prospect that the happiness of her female solitary is finally to be found in oblivion.
Wollstonecraft’s narrator’s assertion that a felicitous “consciousness of existence” provides no
real “solace” to an “afflicted heart” hints, however, at the complacency of Rousseau’s response
to the pains of social exile. Though the Emile of The Solitaires and the Rousseau of the
Confessions of a Solitary Walker fail to find their happiness in society, they do find means to
remain self-sufficient and independent of society’s prejudices. For Wollstonecraft’s solitary
heroine, dependency is inescapable, and the laws of marriage have the power to seize hold of life
itself.
Wollstonecraft’s better-known revision of Rousseau’s “Fifth Walk” occurs in Short
Residence, in an episode in which the speaker teaches herself to row on the sea outside
Tønsborg. As she allows her boat to “be carried along by the current,” a “pleasing forgetfulness”
quickly turns into a dread of mortality. She reflects that a “painful consciousness of misery” is
preferable to a state of calm passivity that would seem to negate the animating “spark” of life.170
Rousseau assumes in the “Fifth Walk” that a sense of existence free from the pains of memory is
immortal like God. Wollstonecraft speculates in contrast that such an existence must be merely
ephemeral. The “pleasing forgetfulness” that the speaker of Short Residence indulges on her
rowing trip presents the frightful prospect that “this active, restless spirit, equally alive to joy and
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sorrow, should only be organized dust—ready to fly abroad the moment the spring snaps, or the
spark goes out, which kept it together.”171 Nancy Yousef observes that, “agitation, ambivalence,
and aspiration are elemental sensations of existence itself in the Letters and are precisely
opposed to the tranquil, indolent peace of mind Rousseau describes in the key fifth promenade of
the Reveries.”172 In both the prison reverie of Wrongs of Woman and the boating episode of Short
Residence, Wollstonecraft undercuts Rousseau’s praise of the “simple feeling of existence” by
identifying the Rousseauian repose of her female solitaries with a state absent of the aspirations
at the fulcrum of life. The activities of memory and imagination that move the soul in the more
explicitly religious reveries are not present in Maria’s prison reverie. An acute privation of life
and spirit appears again in the notes that Wollstonecraft left for the ending of Wrongs of Woman.
In the most developed of the notes, Jemima recovers Maria’s lost daughter and becomes the
child’s second mother. In other notes, however, both mother and daughter end up dead. In the
bleakest of all, Wollstonecraft simply wrote: “Divorced by her husband—Her lover unfaithful—
pregnancy—miscarriage—suicide.”173 These lines warn that institutional enforcement of female
dependency in England can be fatal to women and children. They recapitulate in abbreviated
form Wollstonecraft’s critique of Rousseau’s portrait of the self-sufficient social exile while also
referring to the real catastrophes of Wollstonecraft’s late life.174
Barbara Johnson remarks that, “with all the prison imagery of the gothic novel and the
marriage laws, with the efforts to find a place for unruly emotions, there is one thing Mary
Wollstonecraft left out [of Wrongs of Woman], and that was the thing that, in the end, she died
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from.”175 Johnson refers here to Wollstonecraft’s premature death from complications in
childbirth. Ironically, the incompletion of the book does refer us to Wollstonecraft’s death, even
though the dangers of childbirth are not a part of Maria’s story. The unhappy events at the end of
Maria’s story and the foreshortened form of Wollstonecraft’s uncompleted novel raise the
question of whether the hopes articulated in Maria’s memoir can be realized. While the seraphic
reverie that Maria recalls in her memoir suggests that independence is possible even for a woman
who has been badly educated, the prison reverie indicates the violence of a system of marriage
that forces wives to submit their minds, bodies, and property to the will of their husbands. It is no
wonder that scholars cannot agree whether Wrongs of Woman reinforces Wollstonecraft’s early
revolutionary hopes for women’s education or whether it expresses “defiant pessimism.”176 I
have been arguing that, like Rousseau, Wollstonecraft leaves the future of education uncertain.
They leave it up to their reader to decide how hopeful to be about the future of education.
Wollstonecraft departs from Rousseau, however, in her suggestion that natural education will fail
so long as the cultivation of aesthetic and religious sensibility remains separate from the work of
reforming the social structures that discredit women’s reason.
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CHAPTER TWO: Wordsworth, Natural Education, and the Pleasures of Artifice
Wordsworth responds like Rousseau to the problems of modern life by envisioning a
form of education that would preserve the essential sensibilities and natural passions of human
beings. In the Preface to Lyrical Ballads, he argues that nature poetry is crucial to this form of
education. Wordsworth’s vision of the role of imaginative literature in human education is not
entirely coherent, however: his autobiographical poetry deconstructs the distinction between
natural and artificial literature which he self-consciously sets up in the Preface and in parts of
The Prelude. At times, Wordsworth suggests that nature poetry alone may cure readers of the
torpor induced by the preeminence of spectacle in modern culture. In his autobiographical
poetry, Wordsworth inadvertently exposes the formative role, however, of gothic and picturesque
images in his own early development. In this chapter, I argue that a focus on the contradiction
between Wordsworth’s aesthetic intentions and his autobiographical poetic performances can
help us to reconsider well-known “green” formulations of the hierarchy between nature and
modern society. In 1991, Jonathan Bate positioned Wordsworth’s poetry at the beginning of an
environmental tradition that celebrates the harmony intrinsic to the natural world and that
protests industrial expansion. Because Bate prioritizes the elements of Wordsworth’s poetry that
prefigure a contemporary politics of environmental conservation, a strict division emerges in his
assessment of Wordsworth’s writing between the “economy of nature” and “the deprivation and
dehumanization that are the price of ‘progress.’”1 Deidre Lynch has recently applied Bate’s
framework to Wordsworth’s poetry of natural development: she reads Wordsworth’s lyric
“Three years she grew in sun and shower” as a paradigmatic example of “green” Romanticism’s
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account of nature as “culture’s antecedent or its opposite.”2 I read Wordsworth’s poetry of
natural education instead as a record of the uncanny entanglement of nature and artifice within
the ordinary course of human development at a moment of rapid historical change.
This chapter opens by placing Wordsworth’s defense of nature poetry in the Preface to
Lyrical Ballads in conversation with Immanuel Kant’s proposal that aesthetic judgement entails
an appreciation of the purposiveness of nature. Setting nature poetry against the sensational
artifice of modern culture, Wordsworth reiterates Kant’s claim that nature carries a moral interest
that artificial copies of it do not. Rousseau sets a precedent for Wordsworth and Kant when, in
the “Profession of Faith,” he attempts to work around the dangers of reading and of modern
culture more generally by drawing an analogy between the language of the confessional text and
the address of nature. In the Preface to Lyrical Ballads, Wordsworth distinguishes the salutary
effects of the poems in his collection from the debilitating effects of print modernity by stating
that his poems express the “real” language of men whose passions are incorporated with the
“beautiful and permanent forms of nature.”3 He furthermore distinguishes between the “real
language of men in a state of vivid sensation.”4 and the degrading pleasures of “capricious”
poetic language.5 For Wordsworth, the capricious language of contemporary poets and the
sensationalism of gothic art are symptomatic of an urban modernity that reduces the self to “a
state of almost savage torpor.”6 Under such conditions, readers may fail to appreciate poetry that
expresses the “primary laws of our nature.”7 Wordsworth relies on a concept of natural poetic
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language where he would, like Kant, position aesthetic judgment as a possible cure for the
symptoms of alienation that are characteristic of modernity. By placing Wordsworth’s argument
alongside Kant’s aesthetic theory, I emphasize the privileged place of nature within both of their
efforts to improve the taste of the reading public.
In the second and third sections of the chapter, I attend to figures in Wordsworth’s
autobiographical poetry that expose the contradictions underlying his assertions about the special
ethical and aesthetic significance of a nature uncorrupted by the artifices of modernity. In The
Prelude and in Tintern Abbey, Wordsworth subverts his own stated preference for literature that
is free of the taint of artifice and nonetheless retains a strong desire to protect the self from the
instrumentalizing mechanisms of modernity. In The Prelude, he recuperates the artificial
pleasures of gothic romance and “glittering verse”8 as crucial elements of a rural and pastoral
education that would safeguard the natural passions of children from the despotic eye of
educators who would turn their students into “engines”9 of scientific progress. The contradictions
of that argument surface, however, in moments in the poem in which art frames the speaker’s
feeling for and memory of rustic life. In the final verse paragraph of Tintern Abbey, Dorothy’s
“wild eyes”10 recall the constitutive role of artificial taste in Wordsworth’s early childhood
development. Dorothy evokes the sensational pleasures of an artificial modern culture and at the
same time reinforces the autobiographical speaker’s faith in a form of education that would
temporarily preserve the self from the corrosive effects of death and change. She salvages
Wordsworth’s hopes for natural education, but the relief she provides is as ephemeral as the turns
of bad taste in a sensationalist culture. I call into question the naturalness of Wordsworthian
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natural education by bringing into focus artificial figures in Wordsworth’s poetry of childhood
development. Though Wordsworth works hard to suppress these figures, they hold more promise
for education than the natural standard of taste that exists in Romantic educational and aesthetic
theory and in “green” Romanticism only to be corrupted by (late) modernity.
Wordsworth’s Critique of the Public Taste: Natural and Capricious Language
Like Wollstonecraft, Wordsworth regards the pastoral as a possible site for transforming
the public taste. He premises any possible revolution in taste in poetry’s expression of “the real
language of nature.”11 In the Preface to Lyrical Ballads, Wordsworth presents the poems in his
collection as an experiment to test whether a selection of the “real language of men in a state of
vivid sensation” can, when fitted to meter, produce poetic pleasure.12 He locates this language of
sensation in “low and rustic life.”13 Rustic life interests Wordsworth because here, as he claims,
“the essential passions of the heart find a better soil in which they can attain their maturity, are
less under restraint, and speak a plainer and more emphatic language.”14 Because they live in
closer proximity to the basic substances of nature, low and rustic subjects “speak” a language
that Wordsworth praises as a “far more philosophical language” than the “arbitrary and
capricious”15 language characteristic of the poetry of his contemporaries. Though Wordsworth
suggests that a language of passion arises from daily contact with the permanent forms and basic
substances of nature, he also claims that good poetry is only produced through repeated acts of
reflection, or by means of a training that is learned. He qualifies his famous remark that “all good
poetry is the spontaneous overflow of powerful feeling” by stating that “poems to which any
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value can be attached, were never produced…but by a man, who being possessed of more than
usual organic sensibility, had also thought long and deeply.”16 Wordsworth’s claim that poetry of
feeling is inevitably the product of a process of thought and reflection might seem to render his
distinction between emphatic poetic language and its “arbitrary and capricious” substitute
somewhat precarious: might not the process of reflection make the poet’s language more rather
than less arbitrary? Wordsworth insists, however, that poetic language is not arbitrary insofar as
it reflects “the primary laws of our nature.”17 Feeling and reflection allow the poet to access
those laws and thus produce the kind of universally significant language that “men” in daily
contact with the “beautiful and permanent forms of nature”18 speak. In the Preface, Wordsworth
carefully distinguishes the nature expressed in poetry from the “remote and unknown”19 truths
that are the objects of scientific inquiry. While the scientist converses “with particular parts of
nature,” the poet’s knowledge is universally relevant because it concerns “the primary laws of
our nature chiefly as regards the manner in which we associate ideas in a state of excitement.”20
The “primary laws of our nature” comprise an immutable foundation of associative thought and,
with it, human community.
Wordsworth explains in the 1802 Preface to Lyrical Ballads that his “opinions on the
subject of poetry do almost entirely coincide”21 with those of his friend and collaborator Samuel
Taylor Coleridge. Duncan Wu notes that Coleridge was originally supposed to write the Preface
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because as “a work of theory it was natural that he should write it.”22 In May 1796, Coleridge
decided to learn German so that he could read “Kant, the great German Metaphysician”23 among
other writers. He began study of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason after returning from Germany in
1799, around the time that Wordsworth tasked him with writing the Preface.24 Coleridge’s
studies of Kant would have unquestionably influenced the hopes for cultural progress that
Wordsworth expresses in the Preface.25 I want to make the more specific argument, however,
that Wordsworth’s claim that poetic language is an expression of “primary laws of our nature”
approaches Kant’s claim that aesthetic judgement entails an appreciation of the purposiveness of
nature. Both Wordsworth and Kant link taste to reflection on the generative power of nature and
thus also, by analogy, to the possibility of social progress.
In the Critique of Judgment (1790), Kant maintains that judgments of taste ascribe no
concept to their object and therefore have their ground in the mere “form of the purposiveness”
of an object for the animation of the cognitive powers.26 That does not mean that the sensory
qualities inherent to the object are unimportant: Kant writes about judgments of taste that “no
one allows himself to be talked into his judgment….one wants to submit the object to his own
eyes, just as if his satisfaction depended on sensation.”27 A judgement of taste thus includes both
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an immediate sensory experience and reflection on the purposiveness of the object’s form for a
harmonious disposition of the mental faculties. Though that disposition is subjective, concerning
as it does an “internal causality”28 that remains within the subject, Kant nonetheless postulates its
universal communicability because everyone shares the same cognitive faculties. Kant hints at
the paradoxical balance between subjectivity and collectivity that judgments of beauty maintain
by noting that “the predicate of beauty is not connected with the concept of the object…and yet it
extends over the whole sphere of those who judge.”29 There is some disagreement among
scholars of Kant about whether, making an aesthetic judgement, we merely expect that our
cognitive experience of beauty may be shared or whether judgements of taste also entail an
expectation that others reflect on the purposes that seem to lie behind products of nature. Robert
Pippin takes the second position, arguing that Kant came to appreciate the “fundamentality and
unavoidability of the norm of purposiveness in any realization of our distinctive vocation
(Bestimmung)” whilst investigating the nature of the “subjective universal validity” of
judgements of taste.30
We can better understand how the idea of a natural purpose makes its way into the
sociality of aesthetic judgement by turning to Kant’s discussion of the privileged “intellectual
interest”31 of natural beauty. Kant argues that our interest in natural beauty arises only if and
when we regard natural forms as interesting in their own right and not as objects of scientific
determination or artificial charm. The capacity to regard nature as interesting in itself rather than
for the ends of our gratification or use suggests something to Kant about a person’s moral
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character: “he who takes...an interest in the beautiful in nature can do so only insofar as he has
already firmly established his interest in the morally good.”32 It is not simply the negative fact of
disinterest, however, but the positive “thought that nature has produced [the] beauty” which
qualifies the experience for “universal legislation.”33 Kant proposes that, when we consider that
nature has generated the beauty before us, we experience “sensations which permit not merely
sensory feeling but also reflection on the form of these modifications of the senses, and thus as it
were contain a language that nature brings to us and that seems to have a higher meaning.”34
Kant seems here to be equating the interest of natural beauty with sensations that dispose us to
reflect on the perceptual experience as it is happening. Colors, for instance, suggest moral ideals:
"the white color of the lily seems to dispose the mind to ideas of innocence.”35 Kant clarifies
that, “this is how we interpret nature, whether anything of the sort is its intention or not.”36 We
can compare the sensory “language that nature brings us”37 to the Wordsworthian “language of
real men in a state of vivid sensation”:38 Kant and Wordsworth both align aesthetic experience
with a language of sensation that seems to originate in nature.
For Kant, natural beauty carries a moral interest that artificial copies of nature do not. He
suggests that the higher meaning that the lily seems to communicate will fall away the moment
one discovers that the flower is a mechanical imitation of nature and not the real thing.
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Wordsworth pursues a related distinction between the language of nature and of its imitation
when he claims that men who live in daily proximity to the basic substances and great forms of
nature speak a “far more philosophical language than that which is substituted for it by poets.”39
To better understand why Wordsworth associates contemporary literature with the mere
imitation of nature, it will be worthwhile to take a closer look at his historical analysis of the
state of the public taste in 1790s England. In a statement that is as vague as it is memorable,
Wordsworth worries that “a multitude of causes, unknown to former times, are now acting with a
combined force to blunt the discriminating powers of the mind, and unfitting it for all voluntary
exertion to reduce it to a state of almost savage torpor.”40 He argues that “savage torpor” is an
effect of the “uniformity”41 of men’s occupations and the “rapid communication of
intelligence”42 by, presumably, newspapers and the postal service. Bombarded with too much
information and stultified by uniform daily labors that are not integrated with great forms in
nature, urban readers may fail to recognize that “the human mind is capable of being excited
without the application of gross and violent stimulants.”43 Wordsworth’s sharp differentiation
between life in the country and life in the city forms a crucial part of his critique of urban and
industrial society, one to which early ecocritical scholars such as Jonathan Bate and Marxist
critics like Raymond Williams called attention.44
Wordsworth suggests that the mechanistic forms of daily life in urban society are
correspondent with the manufactured and mechanical forms of contemporary literature. He
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complains about the “frantic novels, sickly and stupid German Tragedies, and deluges of idle and
extravagant stories in verse” that satisfy readers’ “degrading thirst after outrageous
stimulation.”45 Michael Gamer has suggested that Wordsworth’s critique of the sensationalism of
the literary and theatrical exhibitions of his day was very likely purloined from Coleridge’s
reviews of gothic works from the 1790’s (The Monk, The Italian, and Mary Robinson’s Hubert
de Sevrac).46 In his review of The Monk, Coleridge explains that, in gothic compositions, the
superfluity of “fiends, incomprehensible characters…shrieks, murders, and subterranean
dungeons” call attention to the production’s status as a “manufacture,” a thing created with “little
expense of thought or imagination.”47 In the Preface, Wordsworth’s critique of sensationalism
applies to both gothic culture and to contemporary poetry: he proposes that frantic novels
produce outrageous stimulation and also charges the poet with “furnishing food for fickle tastes,
and fickle appetites of his own creation.”48 He rejects in particular neo-classical “personifications
of abstract ideas,” which he regards as a “mechanical device” to elevate the style.49 Martha
Woodmansee has shown that, as the middle-class readership expanded at the end of the
eighteenth century and intellectual copyright laws were not yet uniformly established, there was
an incentive for writers to churn “out imitations and variations on proven popular themes with
unprecedented rapidity.”50 We can detect in Wordsworth’s attack on gothic culture and the
mechanical devices of modern poetry an implicit defense of his work from commercial measures
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of success in a literary marketplace that rewarded the rapid manufacture of familiar themes and
styles.
At an important point in the Preface, Wordsworth comes close to admitting that his effort
to reform the public taste can only ever be “feeble.” He writes:
Reflecting on the magnitude of the general evil, I should be oppressed with no
dishonorable melancholy, had I not a deep impression of certain inherent and
indestructible qualities of the human mind, and likewise of certain powers in the great
and permanent objects that act upon it which are equally inherent and indestructible; and
did I not further add to this impression a belief, that the time is approaching when the evil
will be systematically opposed, by men of greater powers, and with far more
distinguished success.51
Wordsworth imagines a future in which, armed with a transcendent concept of the mind and the
“great and permanent objects that act upon it,” poets will oppose the “evil” of modernity. In the
early 1790s, Wordsworth embraced Godwin’s argument that the arts and sciences are evidence
of human perfectibility, or the ability of human beings to use a generalizing reason to correct
errors of prejudice. Wordsworth demonstrates his commitment to Godwin’s belief in the
perfectibility of humanity when, in the last stanza of Salisbury Plain (1793), his speaker
commands “Heroes of Truth” to rear “the herculean mace / Of Reason” against “foul Error’s
monster race.”52 Wordsworth had, however, fully renounced the rationalism of Godwin’s
Political Justice by the time he composed the Preface to Lyrical Ballads. In the Preface, truth
and progress no longer depend on the rational overturning of prejudice and error but depend
rather on an “organic sensibility”53 that grows in its interaction with the “beautiful and
permanent forms of nature.”54 In the passage quoted above, it is not calculative reason but an a
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priori fit between mind and nature that promises social improvement. Importantly, the
sensational effects of a rapidly expanding print culture are excluded from the stipulated
interaction between the “indestructible” properties of the mind and world. Wordsworth specifies
in the Preface that the forms of urban life are not indestructible but ephemeral; in cities the
“rapid communication of intelligence hourly gratifies” a “craving for extraordinary incident.”55
Thomas Pfau maintains that the “cultural fiction” of a “poetry of rural life” allows Wordsworth
to speak about the values of human community at a moment when the mechanized products “of a
literary culture frantically trying to outpace contingent change with sensational innovation”
suggested that “a stable and meaningful field of reference for poetic production” was in fact
disappearing. 56 I would suggest that Wordsworth’s strategy, which Pfau calls “pragmatic,” is
remarkably Kantian: both Wordsworth and Kant salvage a progressive view of human society by
founding culture in a nature that can be conceived as if it were shaped for human cognition.
In Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose, Kant concedes that JeanJacques Rousseau is right to suppose that modern culture has made human beings cultivated but
not necessarily moral.57 Kant turns Rousseau’s pessimism into optimism, however, by drawing
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an analogy between human beings’ psychological drive to distinguish themselves as producers of
culture and the purposiveness of nature. Kant compares the education of human beings within
civil society to the growth of trees in a forest: “each needs the others, since each in seeking to
take the air and sunlight from others must strive upward, and thereby each realizes a beautiful,
straight stature.”58 This analogy creates continuity between the distinct teleological trajectories of
nature, which has as its goal the generation of life, and history, which takes the realization of the
moral law and the rational perfection of human beings as its end. Kant continues, “all the culture
and art that adorn mankind, as well as the most beautiful social order, are fruits of unsociableness
that is forced to discipline itself and thus through an imposed art to develop nature’s seed
completely.”59 Though the botanical terms “seed” and “fruit” imply that artistic production
proceeds like the organic growth of a plant, the capacity to discipline unsociable instincts and
direct them towards the making of culture or towards the good of a “beautiful” civic society is
unique to the human species. In much the same way, Wordsworth specifies that good poetry is a
product of both spontaneous feeling and disciplined habits of reflection. As a “fruit” of
psychological discipline, poetry and culture mediate between the biological end of nature and the
moral end of history. Kant concedes that ongoing war across Europe would seem to conflict with
the ends of culture thus understood: so long “as nations expend all their energies on their vain
and violent designs,” Kant writes, they inhibit “their citizens’ plodding efforts to shape internally
their conduct of thought [Denkungsart].”60 With this in mind, Kant is momentarily swayed by
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the despairing suspicion that “in the large everything is finally woven together from folly and
childish vanity and often even childish malice and destructiveness.”61 Kant’s theory of culture is,
much like Wordsworth’s concept of a poetic cure, occasioned by a profound sense of
disillusionment with social and historical conditions that seem to be heading towards disaster.
Figures of natural purposiveness allow Kant, however, to resist his feeling that culture is a
vehicle of “folly and childish vanity”62 just as Rousseau had suspected.
Whereas Kant argues that the psychological processes that motivate artists to create
beautiful art also support individual “conduct of thought,”63 Wordsworth makes a direct
connection between the form of aesthetic judgment that is necessary for the appreciation of the
nature poems in Lyrical Ballads and “moral feelings”: “If my conclusions are admitted….our
judgements concerning the works of the greatest Poets both ancient and modern will be far
different from what they are at present, both when we praise, and when we censure: and our
moral feelings influencing and influenced by these judgements will, I believe, be corrected and
purified.”64 Thus trained, readers will no longer look to poetry to gratify the appetite for
sensation to which the uniformity of urban life has pre-disposed them. For Kant, the end goal of
human history is not aesthetic judgment but a “universal cosmopolitan state”65 in which human
reason is fully developed so that all individuals abide by moral laws that they determine for
themselves free from sensory incentives. For Wollstonecraft, too, the purpose of aesthetic and
religious sensibility is to foster rational independence. For Wordsworth, moral feeling and
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judgments of taste are sufficient as end goals of “natural” education.66 I am suggesting, however,
that the Wordsworth of the Preface strives like Kant to dispel his disappointment with modernity
by situating art at the juncture between a teleological idea of nature and of history. Coleridge will
offer a similar argument for the possibility of intellectual progress and imaginative development
in Theory of Life and Biographia Literaria, as I show in chapters three and four.
In the Preface, poetry’s ability to act as a cure for the general evils of a mechanistic
society depends on the poet’s and reader’s capacity to reflect on nature, or on the organic and
“indestructible”67 forms of rustic life. In the Preface, the pastoral forms with which the rustic is
in daily contact are brought to bear against the modern social forces that blunt the mind. At the
same time, a poetry that expresses the “the real language of men”68 is strictly opposed to the
“outrageous stimulation”69 of novel incidents and expressions within an oversaturated literary
marketplace. The didactic goal of the Preface is to reorient public tastes that have been warped
by a highly artificial modern culture towards what is primary and elemental in universal human
nature. Wordsworth thus sets up the hierarchy between nature and modern society that green
Romanticism has recently revived. The contradictions of this argument surface, however, in his
autobiographical poetry. In the second part of this chapter, I will compare Wordsworth’s claims
in the Preface to his polemical argument on education in The Prelude. In book 5, Wordsworth
outlines a program of “natural” education that he situates, like the project of aesthetic education
charted out in the Preface, as an alternative to the mechanisms of a disastrous modernity.
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Wordsworth celebrates, however, the role of artifice in human education. Narrating his own
development, he inadvertently suggests that the essential feelings of human nature are always
already permeable to modern cultural forces.
Romance Reading and Natural Education in The Prelude
Wordsworth’s analysis of the influence of “a multitude of causes unknown to former
times”70 on human behavior and judgment is linked to his analysis in book 5 of The Prelude of
the denaturing effects on children of Enlightenment forms of education. James Chandler has
argued that, in book 5, Wordsworth launches a reactionary, Burkean critique of the vanity
underlying Rousseau’s aspiration to perfect both the moral sense and intellect of the student of
natural education. Wordsworth’s ideas on education are, however, far more indebted to Rousseau
than Chandler recognizes. His desire to wrest the natural passions of children from the control of
the modern educator recalls both Rousseau’s and Wollstonecraft’s desire to free the sensibilities
of children from the grasp of the Lockean educator. Wordsworth takes issue not with Rousseau’s
“politics of nature,”71 as Chandler suggests, but rather with the restrictions that Rousseau would
place on children’s reading. To ward against misreading, as we saw in chapter one, Rousseau
contends that children should not be permitted to read fables. He worries that the paradoxical
messages of imaginative literature might be misapplied by children. Wordsworth contends in
contrast that children should be allowed to read romantic tales at an early age. A reference to
Cervantes’ Don Quixote in the Arab Dream episode at the very beginning of book 5 announces
the speaker’s “deep entrancement” and “half-possess[ion]”72 by romance, a term that referred in
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the Romantic era to any work of fiction written in a romance language rather than in Latin. 73 In
book 5, titled “Books,” the autobiographical speaker claims to owe as much of a debt to “native
prose” as to “numerous verse.”74 He recalls how, as a boy, he wished to possess all the volumes
of The Arabian Nights. Addressing the abstract figure of the modern educator, he exclaims: “Oh,
give us once again the wishing-cap / Of Fortunatus, and the invisible coat / Of Jack the Giantkiller, Robin Hood, / And Sabra in the forest with St George!”75 The influence of romance on the
speaker’s development informs his ideas on educational reform: he argues that the “cravings for
the marvelous”76 that are fostered by romantic tales are a lesser evil than the rational discipline
that the modern educator would impose on children by “manage[ing] books, and things.”77 A
truly natural system of education should not, Wordsworth argues, restrict the canon to scientific
and didactic literature but should allow children to read a range of literary genres and forms,
even in spite of what Rousseau calls their “mixed” and “paradox[ical]”78 morals.
In the satire on modern education included as part of book 5, Wordsworth’s speaker
moralizes about the “evil” tendencies of the age in a manner that recalls his analysis in the
Preface of the evils wrought by a “multitude of causes unknown to former times.”79 Wordsworth
had carefully read Samuel Johnson’s imitations of Juvenal and he likely refers to them when, in
book 4 of The Prelude, his autobiographical speaker wonders that he did not “pen down / a satire
on myself” after returning home from Cambridge University and observing a mountain brook
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that was “boxed / within our garden” and “left to dimple down…a channel paved by the hand of
man.”80 When Wordsworth does undertake a satire on modern education in book 5, the object of
moral correction is not himself as he was formed by Cambridge life and manners but rather what
Michel Foucault would call the eighteenth-century discourse of education and early childhood
development. Traditionally, in Juvenalian satire, as M.H. Abrams and Geoffrey Harpham write,
the speaker is a “serious moralist who uses a dignified and public utterance to decry modes of
vice and error which are no less dangerous because they are ridiculous.”81 The speaker of book 5
adopts the persona of the “serious moralist” to warn his audience of the monstrous effects of the
reading practices that modern educators impose on the “children of the land.”82 Initially, the
object of the satire appears to be the student of modern education, a “monster birth” of these “too
industrious times”83 whose moral sensitivity is belied by a discourse that moves “massy and
ponderous as a prison door.”84 While the child prodigy is ridiculous, the prodigy’s educator is
dangerous. The educator exploits his subject like a “heifer” or a “stallèd ox,” working animals
that are shut out from “touch of growing grass” and the “open ground of fancy” by conditions of
“forlorn servitude.”85 The forced conditions of the student’s learning recall the “uniformity of
occupation” 86 that Wordsworth had argued in the Preface reduces the mind “to a state of almost
savage torpor.”87 The satirist bewails,
Sages, who in their prescience would controul
All accidents, and to the very road
Which they have fashioned would confine us down
80
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Like engines—when will they be taught
That in the unreasoning progress of the world
A wiser spirit is at work for us,
A better eye than theirs, most prodigal
Of blessings, and most studious of our good,
Even in what seem our most unfruitful hours?88
Here, the sage uses the student like an engine, a “machine, contraption or mechanism” 89 used for
war or torture. The sage would put all of a child’s mental activity in service of an aggressive,
even militaristic program of rational progress. Chandler considers Rousseau’s Emile the probable
target of Wordsworth’s satire on the modern educator.90 Indeed, the “monster birth” balances
sensibility with judgment in the manner of Rousseau’s ideal citizen: “he sifts, he weighs / Takes
nothing upon trust” and “dumb creatures find him tender as a nun.”91 The prodigy’s virtues are,
however, adopted in mimicry of the tutor rather than acquired in accordance with his needs. If
Wordsworth did intend that the prodigy of book 5 should refer to Rousseau’s Emile, then he
offers a highly paranoid interpretation of Rousseau’s tutor’s motivations in implementing his
program of natural education.
Rather than critiquing Emile specifically, Wordsworth’s satire targets any standardized
plan of education that relies on the technology of science—“telescopes, and crucibles, and maps”
and “terms of art”—while disallowing the reading of fiction.92 The critique of scientific reason
that is at the core of Wordsworth’s satire on modern education is also a central feature of his
critique of picturesque taste. The modern educator and picturesque viewer are trained in a
calculative reason that renders them indifferent to the “life of nature.”93 In book 11, Wordsworth
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argues that the picturesque viewer applies rules of art to things “above all art,” thus making “the
most despotic of our senses,” the eye, “master of the heart.”94 Coleridge will in Biographia
Literaria refer to the “despotism of the eye” as part of his critique of the “mechanical system” of
Hartleyan associationism.95 In less specific terms than Coleridge, Wordsworth identifies the
despotism of the eye with scientific reason and picturesque taste. Wordsworth recalls how he
first adopted the belief that reason “be nobility in man”96 when he was traumatized by the terror
and Britain’s 1792 declaration of war with France. Picturesque viewing was in that period the
“kindred spirit” 97 of the “eye of reason”98 and its privileged work of “logic and minute
analysis.”99 The analytic reason that forms the backbone of picturesque theory poses a threat, in
Wordsworth’s view, to the improvement of the “heart” as well as to the “great ends of liberty and
power.”100 Wordsworth’s argument that picturesque theory subordinates the “soul of Nature”101
to the eye of reason corresponds with Wollstonecraft’s claim that the rich turn nature into an
object of display, on the one hand, and to Coleridge’s claim that, in Hartley’s system, “the
existence of an infinite spirit, of an intelligent and holy will, must…be mere articulated motions
of the air.”102 Imaginative literature is for both Wordsworth and Coleridge crucial to an
education that would resist these reductive concepts of nature because it fosters children’s love
of that which cannot be seen or measured. In book 5, Wordsworth’s satirical speaker writes of
the infant prodigy that,
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old Grandame Earth is grieved to find
The playthings which her love designed for him
Unthought of—in their woodland beds the flowers
Weep, and the river-sides are all forlorn.103
The melancholic flowers and riversides regret the prodigy’s neglect of their highly literary
charms. The student cannot hear the flowers weep because the educator does not allow him to
stray beyond the analytic field of scientific observation and into the expansive field of fancy that
is made available by books of poetry and fiction.
In both the boy of Winander and drowned man of Esthwaite episodes of book 5,
Wordsworth’s speaker draws on his own memories of childhood to offer alternatives to the
upbringing of the monster birth. The boy of Winander, who is not yet old enough to have the
command of scientific instruments but who is old enough to mimic the vocalizations of owls, is a
foil of the child prodigy.104 The well-known memorial to the boy included within book 5 is
adapted from a poem in Lyrical Ballads. In the lyric, the boy mimics the hootings of owls so that
“they might answer him.”105 During the “pauses of deep silence” that interrupt the boy’s efforts
to elicit a response from the owls, he unconsciously receives “a gentle shock of mild surprise”
which carries “far into his heart the voice / Of mountain torrents.”106 Thomas De Quincey
described the “shock” as an internal echoing of “the sublimities of nature.”107 We can compare
the mute receptivity of the boy of Winander to the disposition of William in Expostulation and
Reply who, sitting silently on an “old grey stone,” is attuned to “powers / Which of themselves
our minds impress.”108 Within this lyrical ballad, William’s foil Matthew commands “Up! up!
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And drink the spirit breathed / From dead men to their kind.”109 The silent receptivity of the boy
of Winander is similarly defined against the verbosity and bookishness of his foil, the prodigy.
To echo internally the sublimities of nature, it seems one must set aside the goal of
enlightenment as it is urged by both Matthew and the modern educator.
Though the boy of Winander’s shock of “mild surprise”110 can be read as the origin point
of an education that entrusts more to the beauty and sublimity of the natural world than to the
command of the modern educator and his canon of approved readings, the boy dies prematurely.
The speaker announces the death of the boy thus:
The boy was taken from his mates, and died
In childhood ere he was full ten years old.
Fair are the woods, and beauteous is the spot,
The vale where he was born; the churchyard hangs
Upon a slope above the village school,
And there, along that bank, when I have passed
At evening, I believe that oftentimes
A full half-hour together I have stood
Mute, looking at the grave in which he lies.111
The enjambed “mute” disrupts the pattern of iambic feet, stopping the last line short at its very
start. The forced pause recalls the “pauses of deep silence” 112 that had disrupted the boy’s call
and response game with hooting owls. There is a recurrence of other features of the boy’s
experience in the speaker’s graveside visit: in both instances, the time is evening and the scene is
set along the banks of a lake; the “churchyard hangs” above the village school as the boy once
“hung / Listening”113 for the owls’ response. When Wordsworth first drafted the poem There
Was a Boy in Goslar, the boy stood in for his younger self. Geoffrey Hartman describes the
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episode as an “interrupted pastoral,” a form that registers childhood trauma in a temporary
moment of non-response.114 In Hartman’s reading, the “full half-hour” in which the speaker
stands by the dead boy’s grave allows him to reflect on a childhood trauma that he has
inexplicably survived. Paul de Man points to the paradox of this reading: the mute poet reflects
back on his own death, an “event that ...can only be anticipated” and “is, in fact,
unimaginable.”115 Kevis Goodman simply notes that we do not know “how one develops from
the Boy of Winander to a Poet of Grasmere.”116
It is at this impasse that the speaker of book 5 spontaneously invokes the “thronèd lady”
of Hawkshead:
Even now methinks I have before my sight
That self-same village church: I see her sit—
The thronèd lady spoken of erewhile—
On her green hill, forgetful of this boy
Who slumbers at her feet, forgetful too
Of all her silent neighbourhood of graves,
And listening only to the gladsome sounds
That, from the rural school ascending, play
Beneath her and about her.117
The “thronèd lady” affirms the similitudes between past and present, the children with whom the
poet herded and the children whose gladsome sounds can be heard at Hawkshead grammar
school now. She is, like “Granddame Earth,”118 an allegorical figure. Wordsworth very likely
had “Dame Nature” from Spenser’s The Fairie Queene in mind. 119 In Spenser’s poem, the

114

Hartman and Caruth, “An Interview with Geoffrey Hartman,” 630-652.
De Man, Romanticism and Contemporary Criticism, 81.
116
Goodman, Georgic Modernity and British Romanticism, 122.
117
Wordsworth, The Prelude 1805, 5. 399-406.
118
Ibid, 5. 346.
119
If we read the passage biographically rather than allegorically, the “thronèd lady” would stand
in for Anne Tyson, the “dame” who ran the boarding house where Wordsworth and his brothers
stayed while they were at school at Hawkshead and whose piety Wordsworth’s speaker finds
benign.
115

81

goddess of Nature appears “sitting in her throne” upon a “hill” fashioned with trees that “her own
bosom made to grow.”120 Katharine Park notes that Spenser’s “Dame Nature” is carried over
from medieval personifications of Nature as a “female figure of great dignity—majestic, clothed,
and energetic—who was delegated by the Christian God to shape individual beings through the
physical process of generation, to guide her creatures, and to maintain order in all such
matters.”121 In The Fairie Queene, “Dame Nature” ensures continuity between the processes of
physical change and of moral perfectibility. She establishes her authority over “Mutability” by
explaining that all things “by their change their being doe dilate: / And turning to themselves at
length againe, / Doe worke their owne perfection so by fate.”122 In The Prelude, Wordsworth
appropriates this medieval allegorical figure to develop his critique of forms of education that are
insensitive to the “soul of Nature”123: responsive and yet forgetful, the “thronèd lady”124 presides
over the passions and fancies of childhood, protecting a knowledge of human development that
is not, like the rational educator’s, “purchased with the loss of power.”125 Here, the
personification of an abstract idea, nature, is not a “mechanical device”126 of style, but an
expression of the autobiographical speaker’s confidence in an alternative to the exploitative
mechanisms of progress within European modernity. Wordsworth’s bookish reference to older
personifications of “Dame Nature” implicitly supports the seemingly paradoxical argument of
book 5 that nature is most “at work” for us when we stray within the “open ground of fancy,”127
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or are absorbed by the artifices of fiction and poetry. Wordsworth shares Rousseau’s and
Wollstonecraft’s view that the authority of the parent must be suspended if children’s
sensibilities are to grow and yet, for him, it is not the animal affections but figures of “fancy”
that support this process.
The contradiction between Wordsworth’s advocacy for a form of education that would
resist the visual paradigms of modern technological progress and his passionate plea for a
program of children’s reading that would include the artifices of romance and fancy emerges as
he reflects on his own autobiographical experience. In book 12 of The Prelude, Wordsworth
traces the origins of his belief that a work of his “might become / A power like one of
Nature’s”128 to the openly gothic reverie of human sacrifice that he experienced while crossing
Salisbury Plain. Wordsworth claims to have “caught” from “the vulgar forms of present things”
“a tone / An image, and a character, by books / Not hitherto reflected.”129 He nonetheless
concedes that the “groans” of men sounding “for both worlds, the living and the dead,” were
“fancied, in the obscurities of time.”130 In the drowned man of Esthwaite episode of book 5,
Wordsworth similarly traces the origins of his poetic power to an autobiographical experience in
which he subconsciously imposes a character of gothic romance onto the landscape. The
drowned man episode is more explicitly autobiographical than the elegy for the boy of
Winander. Unable to fully recognize himself in the boy of Winander, a child of nature who is too
young to read, the speaker identifies with the nine-year-old whose feeling for the natural
landscape is shaped by images from romance. He recalls how, when “first entrusted to the
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care”131 of Hawkshead valley, he came across a “heap of garments” 132 besides Esthwaite’s Lake.
When a company of boaters venture out the next day in search of the body of the owner of the
clothes, the speaker recalls that,
At length, the dead man, ‘mid that beauteous scene
Of trees and hills and water, bolt upright
Rose with his ghastly face, a spectre shape—
Of terror even. And yet no vulgar fear,
Young as I was, a child not nine years old,
Possessed me, for my inner eye had seen
Such sights before among the shining streams
Of fairyland, the forests of romance—
Thence came a spirit hallowing what I saw
With decoration and ideal grace,
A dignity, a smoothness, like the works
Of Grecian art and purest poesy.133
The boy does not feel “terror” or “vulgar fear” upon seeing the “ghastly face” of the dead man
because his “inner eye” decorates the disastrous event with sights that he has seen before. The
“inner eye” is the foil of the “eye of reason”134: while the former “sees” images remembered
from books and thus opens up a space of interiority, the latter sees only what can be measured in
the external, object world. The two are more alike, however, than Wordsworth might want to
admit, for both desensitize the viewer to the real spirit of a place. It is fitting that Wordsworth, a
poet who traces the origins of his genius to the experience of hearing groans of human sacrifice
on an empty plain, would celebrate a childhood memory in which he sees an enchanting image
on the face of a corpse. In both instances, the “inner eye” projects a romantic image of disaster
onto the rural landscape.
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In the 1851 Memoirs of William Wordsworth compiled by Christopher Wordsworth,
Wordsworth is cited recalling how, in his earliest days of school, he was free to read whatever
books he wanted: “I read all Fielding’s works, Don Quixote, Gil Blas, and any part of Swift that
I liked; Gulliver’s Travels and the Tale of the Tub, being both much to my taste.”135 Perhaps
what the boy standing beside Esthwhaite’s lake has seen before as he looks upon the face of the
dead man is an image from one of the fictions that Wordsworth retrospectively grouped together
and generalized under the category of romance. David Collings argues that the sights the boy
sees in the drowned man episode may also refer back to the Arab dream that is included as book
5’s Preface.136 In the Preface, a “friend” of the speaker recounts how he fell asleep by the sea
while reading Cervantes and subsequently dreamed of meeting an Arab on a mad errand to
protect a stone and a shell—objects that are also in the dream’s logic a book of Euclidean
geometry and an Ode “in passion uttered”—from the “fleet waters of the drowning world.”137
Collings observes that, in the drowned man episode, the child “eventually passes from seeing
nature to seeing a figure from a text, much as the reader [in the preface to book 5] passes into
dream.” 138 The textual history of the passage repeats this process of transposition from nature to
text. In the version of the drowned man passage that Wordsworth composed for the Two-Part
Prelude, the speaker suggests that the ghastly face of the drowned man was one among many
images impressed upon his mind by “distresses and disasters, tragic facts / Of rural history.”139
The speaker contends, however, that with the passage of time such images become “forms” and
“archetypes” to which “far other feelings” are attached than those that initially attended the

135

Wordsworth, Memoirs, I, 10. Quoted in a footnote to Wordsworth, The Prelude 1805, 5. 179.
Collings, Wordsworthian Errancies, 191.
137
Wordsworth, The Prelude 1805, 5. 97, 136.
138
Collings, Wordsworthian Errancies, 191.
139
Wordsworth, The Two-Part Prelude 1799, First Part, 282-283.
136

85

disaster.140 These “forms” have the “independent life”141 of a dream, or a text: though related to
the memory of distresses and disasters, they captivate like art. Wordsworth’s omission in the
1805 Prelude of any reference to the tragic facts of rural life arguably completes the process by
which, as Collings explains, a “dreamlike structure” of “sheer appearance and literary artifice” is
brought to bear on “the domain of the phenomenal world and autobiographical reminiscence.”142
The drowned man of Esthwhaite episode ostensibly supports the speaker’s argument that
children are better off when they are able to read books that offer “something loftier, more
adorned / Than is the common aspect, daily garb / Of human life.”143 Wordsworth, however,
rescues childhood from the threat of modern education by, as Collings observes, inscribing upon
it the “perverse extravagance”144 of artifice. Though Wordsworth might like to consider his
“inner eye” as subversive of the tyranny of scientific reason, his eye and imagination apply
artificial rules to a domain that ought to be “above all art”145 in much the same manner as the
modern scientist or picturesque viewer. In book 8, Wordsworth offers another, less known,
account of art’s uncanny influence on his autobiographical experience. His speaker conjectures
that, in youth, he might have fancied that a woodman languishing with disease because of
inadequate housing further suffered under the “pangs of disappointed love.”146 If he knew that
the woodman was out of doors, he might envision him,
Pining alone among the gentle airs,
Birds, running streams, and hills so beautiful
On golden evenings, while the charcoal-pile
Breathed up its smoke, an image of his ghost
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Or spirit that was soon to take its flight.147
Here, as William Richey has observed of Old Man Travelling, “the speaker cannot imaginatively
project himself onto the old man’s actual situation, but rather imposes upon the old man a more
“agreeable” image.”148 The agreeable image is in this case a trope from eighteenth-century elegy.
The melancholic rustic wanderer who pines alone among the beauties of nature is a central figure
in Thomas Gray’s canonical Elegy Written in a Country Churchyard and appears again as an
object of longing in Charlotte Smith’s Elegiac Sonnets.149 In his famous reading of Gray’s Elegy,
William Empson argues that by comparing the social arrangement that leaves the wanderer to die
to nature, Gray “makes it seem inevitable, which it was not, and gives it a dignity which was
undeserved.”150 Wordsworth similarly “naturalizes” the Woodman’s poverty and yet he does so
with some degree of retrospective self-consciousness about the arbitrariness of his imaginary
representation of the man. He describes the fiction of the pining woodman as a product of his
own “willfulness of fancy and conceit”151 and is at least retrospectively conscious of the process
by which his “inner eye” lends an artificial grace to the accidents and disasters of rural life.
While Wordsworth’s critique of picturesque viewing might prompt one to suspect that he would
be highly uneasy about this tendency of his imagination, he is in fact apologetic about it. In the
drowned man of Esthwhaite and woodman episodes, he represents as harmless and as even
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salutary his tendency to aestheticize the death and suffering that he encounters in “low and rustic
life.”152 Underlying Wordsworth’s impassioned argument to open up the canon of children’s
literature to romance is a contradiction that Wordsworth will work hard to occlude within the
poem: having enjoyed an education in which he was free to read romance, he is prone like the
child prodigy, picturesque viewer, rational scientist and urban reader to prioritize art over nature.
Though the speaker asserts at the beginning of book 5 that books are “powers” less than
“Nature’s self,”153 he recalls how his insatiable appetite for romances often took precedence over
his love of the natural landscape:
I have lain
Down by thy side, O Derwent, murmuring stream,
On the hot stones and in the glaring sun,
And there have read, devouring as I read,
Defrauding the day’s glory.154
Unsettling the speaker’s argument that nature’s plan proceeds best when children are able to read
whatever they want is the possibility that nature may actually mask an idiosyncratic fixation on
the “dead letter, not the spirit of things”155 Wordsworth actively suppresses this possibility by
denying that his interest in rural life was fixed in advance by fictional images. He insists that the
shepherds that he perceived in youth were sanctified by nature and were not the delusion of
ye who are fed
By the dead letter, not the spirit of things
Whose truth is not a motion or a shape
Instinct with vital functions, but a block
Or waxen image which they themselves have made.156
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Who is the “ye” in this passage? On a surface reading, this “ye” is a figure like the
Enlightenment educator, someone who overlooks the wonders of nature by attending primarily to
books and rational knowledge. At the same time, this “ye” might well be the autobiographical
speaker in the drowned man or woodman episodes, a person whose truth is taken from images in
books. Wordsworth’s critique of “ye” whose truth is “a waxen image” corresponds with his wellknown formulation of language as counter-spirit in the third Essay Upon Epitaphs. In this essay,
Wordsworth argues that the “tyranny of bad taste” in eighteenth-century culture is proven by the
extent to which epitaphic writing has been “thoroughly tainted by the artifices” 157 introduced
into metre by Dryden and Pope. The “general literature of the country” and unnamed “other
causes” have depraved human judgement to such a degree that a desire “to be tickled and
surprised” now takes priority over the sense of solemnity that ought to occasion the “testimony
of our love” for the dead.158 Wordsworth deems artifice the strong “adversary” of natural feeling:
“Art” weakens the feelings of “energy, stillness, grandeur and tenderness” that are “emanations
of nature.”159 Wordsworth’s concern about the artificiality of the sentiments communicated in
epitaphic writing gives rise to his claim that language must either be an incarnation of thought or
a subversive “counter-sprit” of artifice, “unremittingly and noiselessly at work, to subvert, to lay
waste, to vitiate, and to dissolve.”160 In trying so hard to deny his proximity to the modern reader
who is susceptible to the subversive force of the “dead letter” or, alternatively, the “counterspirit” of language in the lines quoted above, Wordsworth makes it visible.
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Wordsworth relies on the critical distinction between language as spirit and as dead letter
in book 8 to ward against the artificial construction of nature and of autobiographical experience
that his argument on children’s reading opens up. Collings has suggested that, by resisting the
enlightening “forces that would tame culture” in book 5, Wordsworth implies that nature is
“finally untamed and unknowable.”161 Ultimately, Collings argues, Wordsworth contains the
errancy of his fascination with the “hyperbolic textuality”162 of nature by reading the catastrophic
landscape atop Snowdon as a symbol of imagination in book 13 of The Prelude. In book 8,
Wordsworth foreshadows this final turn of the poem as he insists that his imagination is
correspondent with the “spirit of things”163 rather than with artifice. I will now turn to book 7 of
The Prelude in which Wordsworth performs a related act of containment: weary of identifying
too much with the urban spectator who thirsts for “outrageous stimulation,”164 Wordsworth
delimits the pleasures of the London stage within the category of the dead letter, manufacture, or
type.
The London Theatre and Wordsworth’s Boyish Days
In book 7, Wordsworth’s autobiographical speaker is immediately embedded in the
cityscape; he interpolates the reader as his companion on a stroll through the chaos of the city
streets. The speaker makes the forms of dramatic show at the theatres, behind the pulpit and at
parliament into materials for his spectacularly enumerative poetic performance. In the city,
everything is a representation; fronts of houses appear, for instance, like a “title-page, with letters
huge inscribed from top to toe.” 165 The speaker energetically describes the diversity of signs on
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display in London and yet these representations threaten to reduce the mind to a state of torpor.
Neil Hertz argues that the speaker is divided in book 7 between the identities of the “subject of
autobiographical experience” 166 and the “poet-impresario of the great spectacle”167 and likewise
between seeing and representing. As the book drifts more and more in the direction of an
experience of “blockage,”168 these categories become difficult to tell apart. The confusion
culminates when the speaker is lost to “all laws of acting, seeing things” 169 amidst the chaos of
the London crowd. His mind is, however, arrested as with “the might of waters”170 by the sight of
a blind beggar who wears a paper on his chest that explains who he is, a paper that the speaker
describes as a “a type, or emblem of the utmost that we know.” 171 Hertz argues that the poetimpresario is here “saved from tumbling into his text”172 because the emblem of the blind beggar
“reestablishes the boundaries between representor and represented.” 173 The speaker recognizes
in this moment the difference between the person of the blind beggar and “the story of the man,
and who he was.”174
Because Hertz reads book 7 as building towards the crisis of interpretation that is
resolved in the blind beggar episode, he overlooks the episodes in the book in which the
distinction between the poet-impresario and the autobiographical subject of experience is in fact
quite clear. Wordsworth’s speaker recalls a time after college when slim funds made the London
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theatre a regular “delight” and “yearning.”175 Initially, the theatre appears to be just another site
of representations about which the poet-impresario can generalize. We read,
The carving and the gilding, paint and glare,
And all the mean upholstery of the place,
Wanted not animation in my sight,
Far less the living figures on the stage,
Solemn or gay—whether some beauteous dame
Advanced in radiance through a deep recess
Of thick-entangled forest, like the moon
Opening the clouds; or sovereign king, announced
With flourishing trumpets, came in full-blown state
Of the world’s greatness, winding round with train
Of courtiers, banners, and a length of guards;
Or captive led in abject weeds, and jingling
His slender manacles; or romping girl
Bounced, leapt, and pawed the air; or mumbling sire,
A scarecrow pattern of old age, patched up
Of all the tatters of infirmity,
All loosely put together, hobbled in
Stumping on a cane, with which he smites
From time to time the solid boards and makes them
Prate somewhat loudly of the whereabout
Of one so overloaded with his years. 176
The “whether, or” construction of this long sentence makes each of the “living figures” seem
more or less interchangeable. The interest is not in the purposiveness of a particular “living
figure” for reflection, but in the mechanisms of representation that make each figure an easily
recognizable social type; the poet-impresario details the stagecraft, costumes, props and signs
that make each figure legible as a recognizable fictional type. The beauty of the “dame” is set off
by a “thick-entangled forest,” the greatness of the king marked by “banners,” the abjection of the
captive sounded by manacles, the physicality of the “romping girl” evinced in her animal
motions, and the old man’s infirmity represented by a cane.
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Though the manufactured quality of theatrical types is a source of lyric intensity in the
lines quoted above, the speaker goes on to suggest that what made the experience of the London
theatre “enchanting” and almost “romantic”177 were not the performances themselves, but the
bustle of human activity in between shows:
Through the night,
Between the show, and many-headed mass
Of the spectators, and each little nook
That had its fray or brawl, how eagerly
And with what flashes, as it were, the mind
Turned this way, that way—sportive and alert
And watchful, as a kitten when at play,
While winds are blowing round her, among grass
And rustling leaves. 178
The frays and brawls of the mass seem as natural as winds in a pastoral landscape. Comparing
himself to a kitten at play “among grass / And rustling leaves,” the speaker suggests that there is
something vital to be found in the life of the urban crowd. The “many-headed mass” does not
threaten what Hertz calls “blockage” or what Wordsworth calls “savage torpor”179 because the
interval between shows marks off the life of the crowd from the manufactured life of the stage.
The speaker notes that the pleasure he experienced attending the London theatre survived,
“handed down”180 from an even earlier experience in which the “glimpse / Of daylight”181
through the fractured wall of a country playhouse reminded him of where he was. The speaker’s
delight in the show is enhanced by its clear differentiation as a fiction from ordinary life. In this
earlier memory, it is the spatial rather than temporal marking off of what lies inside from what
lies outside the theatre that contributes to the speaker’s delight. Wordsworth’s discussion of the
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London theatre upholds the distinction between the interest of nature and of literary artifice that
is crucial to his theory of taste in the Preface to Lyrical Ballads and to his official representation
of his own imaginative genius in The Prelude. Here, however, nature is not associated with the
rural landscape but is defined negatively as that which is not a theatrical fiction or social type.
Wordsworth thus reiterates in book 7 a correspondence between his imagination and the vital
“spirit of things”182 even amidst the “din of town and cities.”183
To conclude this chapter, I argue that Wordsworth complicates the terms of his guiding
analogy between poetic taste and imagination and the constitutive spirit of rural nature by prizing
in the last verse paragraph of Tintern Abbey passions that transpire in a liminal space between
natural passion and representational effect. In the poem, Wordsworth’s autobiographical speaker
sits down beside a sycamore five miles remote from the gothic edifice of Tintern Abbey to
meditate on how he has changed over time. The poem is set on the occasion of the author’s
second tour of the Wye river valley, a tourist location in Wales made famous in the eighteenth
century for its picturesque scenery and ruined gothic abbey. The site occasions the speaker’s
recollection of his first visit to the spot; that memory occasions in turn the recollection of more
distant “boyish days”:
Though changed, no doubt, from what I was when first
I came among these hills; when like a roe
I bounded o’er the mountains, by the sides
Of the deep rivers and the lonely streams
Wherever nature led: more like a man
flying from something he dreads than one
who sought the thing he loved. For nature then
(The coarser pleasures of my boyish days
And their glad animal movements all gone by)
To me was all in all--I cannot paint
What then I was, the sounding cataract
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haunted me like a passion: the tall rock
The mountain, and the deep and gloomy wood,
Their colours and their forms, were then to me
An appetite; a feeling and a love
That had no need of a remoter charm
By thought supplied, nor any interest
Unborrowed from the eye184
The sounds, colors and forms of nature were a passion that the speaker is unable from the point
of view of the present to “paint.” The speaker’s reference to visual art is not incidental: paint is
an appropriate medium in which to represent the passion of days when nature had no need of
“any interest / Unborrowed from the eye.” Wordsworth offers another description of the
pleasures of the eye as part of his critique of picturesque taste in book 11 of the 1805 Prelude:
was I often greedy in the chace,
And roamed from hill to hill, from rock to rock,
Still craving combinations of new forms,
New pleasure, wider empire for the sight,
Proud of its own endowments, and rejoiced
To lay the inner faculties asleep. 185
Here, “new forms” do not animate the “inner faculties,” but make the speaker greedy for “wider
empire for the sight.” In much the same way, the forms of nature in Wordsworth’s “boyish days”
are an “appetite.” Wordsworth is “haunted” by the endless prospect of visual novelty in both the
memory recalled in book 11 of The Prelude and in Tintern Abbey. These passages describe the
picturesque viewing experience in the idiom of the gothic: like Godwin’s Caleb Williams,
Wollstonecraft’s Maria or Coleridge’s ancient mariner, the speaker is “chace[d]”186 by unknown
forces, “flying from something he dreads.”187 The forms of nature that haunt the speaker in
Tintern Abbey—"the sounding cataract,” “the tall rock / The mountain and the deep and gloomy
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wood”—are sublime in the sense that Edmund Burke gives to objects that are of undetermined
bounds. They are also novelties of the kind that Wordsworth sought in the period when he
looked on the landscape as a picturesque spectator. In the Biographia Literaria, Coleridge
develops a critical language for talking about such objects: he derides paintings in which “the
main interest of the landscape is thrown into the background, where mountains and torrents and
castles” and other “novelty of subject” substitutes for the “beauty and harmony of the colours,
lines and expression.”188
Images of Tintern Abbey from the period anticipate the gothic mood and “sublime”
meditations on time and mortality that are characteristic features of Wordsworth’s poem.
William Gilpin pictures a dark and gloomy wood in the fore and middle-grounds of his sketch of
the site for the 1782 tourist guidebook Observations on the River Wye (figure 1). In Gilpin’s
aquatint drawing, a tree in the foreground provides a dark frame for the Abbey, the Abbey itself
is surrounded by trees and bushes and dramatic hills provide a rugged background for the scene.
Gilpin added these sublime features which are not present within the landscape around Tintern
Abbey itself. Mortality is the theme of Philippe-Jaques de Loutherbourg’s 1790 painting A
Philosopher in a Moonlit Churchyard (figure 2), in which a philosopher stands before an open
grave contemplating the resurrection of Christ. In the background, the ruined edifice of Tintern
Abbey is surrounded, as in Gilpin’s sketch, by a “deep and gloomy” wood. In de Loutherbourg’s
painting, the mood of the gothic sublime coalesces around the philosopher’s desire to raise the
dead, a desire that has a metaphorical equivalent in Wordsworth’s autobiographical speaker’s
desire in the final verse paragraph of Tintern Abbey to reanimate the “half-extinguished” picture
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of who he once was.189 Tom Ford has pointed out that the atmospheric language that
Wordsworth’s speaker uses in Tintern Abbey—his reference to “wreaths of smoke,” “the living
air” and “the misty mountain winds”—seems to disallow “the interpretive discriminations
between true poetry and bad taste [Wordsworth] so often called for elsewhere.”190 Ford
concludes that, “for Wordsworth, the life of things would seem to include the life of non-living
things, not least the life of language itself—even language in its deadened and deadening
apparition as counter-spirit,” 191 the term that Wordsworth uses in the third Essay Upon Epitaphs
to describe the “tyranny of bad taste.”192 I want to suggest that Wordsworth’s gothic presentation
of the visual pleasures of his boyish days works like his atmospheric language to suspend the
distinction between living and non-living things, lyric expression and picturesque representation.
The speaker’s desire to recuperate the pleasures of boyhood in the final verse paragraph
of Tintern Abbey undoes the “natural” developmental trajectory sketched out in the first part of
the poem, one in which a sensory experience of the landscape is displaced by expansive
meditations on the constitutive power of nature as a “motion and a spirit.”193 The speaker claims
for the loss of his boyhood sight “abundant recompense” in the gain of “all the mighty world / Of
eye and ear, both what they half create / and what perceive.”194 In Biographia Literaria,
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Coleridge refers to this turn in Tintern Abbey to describe Wordsworth’s acquisition of the style
characteristic of his genius: in the poems of Lyrical Ballads, Coleridge recalls, “manly reflection
and human associations had given both variety, and an additional interest to natural objects,
which, in the passion and appetite of the first love, they had seemed to [Wordsworth] neither to
need nor permit.”195 Coleridge here reiterates the fundamental balance between “human
associations” and “natural objects” which Wordsworth takes pains to reiterate in the Preface and
in The Prelude. Like Coleridge, Meyer Abrams reads Tintern Abbey as a poem about a genius’
contemplative response to the natural landscape and thus overlooks the more generic features of
the poem’s language. In Abrams’ canonical reading, Wordsworth’s speaker achieves the
emotional resolution that is crucial to “the greater Romantic lyric” 196 through the recognition of
a correspondence between the beautiful forms of nature and the “moral being”197 that is the sober
foundation of his poetic genius. Frances Ferguson has observed, however, that Wordsworth’s
concluding address to Dorothy undermines the idea that he can anchor his “moral being” in
relation to the landscape alone.198
Though the speaker projects the moral resolution typical of what Abrams terms the
Greater Romantic Lyric onto Dorothy’s future, Dorothy’s gaze simultaneously prompts a return
to the past. Addressing her, he says:
in thy voice I catch
The language of my former heart, and read
My former pleasures in the shooting lights
Of thy wild eyes. Oh! yet a little while
May I behold in thee what I was once,
My dear, dear Sister! 199
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The exclamatory “Oh!” interrupts the metrical patterning of iambs, marking the speaker’s
emotion with an irregular caesura. The “Oh” hints at the gravity of the speaker’s wish to keep
hold of the “glad animal motions” reflected in his sister’s eyes for “yet a little while.” Dorothy’s
wild eyes recall the eye of reason or the inner eye of gothic romance that possess Wordsworth
from the time of boyhood into the 1790s. Here, much as in the drowned man and woodman
episodes, Wordsworth associates the pleasures of the eye with the passions of youth that poetry
ought to preserve. Dorothy’s eyes may also recall the alert eyes of the kitten at play or the turns
of the mind in view of the crowds at the London theatre. While the interval between shows
differentiates the life of the crowd from the manufactures of the theatre, however, Dorothy
captures as if in a mirror the charm of former pleasures that erase for “yet a little while” the
antagonism between the passion in natural forms and the novelties of an artificial modern
culture. She may be compared in this respect to the “thronèd lady”200 who appears as both a
monitor of the passions of the “herd” of children at play at Hawkshead grammar school and as a
bookish personification of an abstract idea. Like the “thronèd lady,”201 Dorothy mitigates the
speaker’s fear that the pleasures of childhood may be irretrievably lost.
Anne-Lise François has recently argued that the consolatory promise of a little while in
which to avail oneself of one’s environment before passing beyond it is essential to Geoffrey
Hartman’s designation of Wordsworth’s nature as a paraclete, or surrogate figure for Christ.
François observes that, in the New Testament, Jesus’ promise to send his disciples a surrogate
when he is gone is accompanied by news of his immanent departure; he says, “little children, yet
a little while I am with you. Ye shall seek me: and as I said unto the Jews, Whither I go, ye

200
201

Wordsworth, The Prelude 1805, 5. 401.
Ibid.
99

cannot come.”202 The paraclete appears in the span of a “little while” in which revelation may be
“capable of delaying”203 an “otherwise traumatic break with the growing subject’s indeterminate
environs.”204 Importantly, for François, the figure of nature as paraclete is “not the static figure
of nature as a primal Eden, to which humans can have only a protective or corrupting relation, a
fantasy that recurs within the popular environmentalist imagination.”205 Wordsworth is
admittedly drawn to this “fantasy” of an unspoiled nature: in the Preface to Lyrical Ballads he
aligns rural nature with forms of human expression that may be preserved by a reform in the
popular taste, but which are already being corrupted by an artificial modernity. I have shown in
this chapter that Wordsworth’s analogy between poetic expression and nature is not new with
him but resonates with similar formulations of aesthetic experience in Kant. In The Prelude,
Wordsworth works to uphold this analogy and to suppress his text’s exposure of the artificiality
of his perceptions of rural life and nature. I am arguing, however, that this contradiction is visible
to us as readers and is in fact crucial to the ephemeral comforts that the figures of the “thronèd
lady” and Dorothy provide.
Key to Wordsworth’s poetry of natural education are female figures who provide
consolation in the manner of a paraclete. In Tintern Abbey, Dorothy’s voice and eyes promise
“yet a little while”206 in which the speaker may wholeheartedly partake in the environment. The
“thronèd lady”207 of book 5 of The Prelude deflects Wordsworth’s sense that the pastoral nature
of his childhood is irrecoverably lost. By allowing the speaker to “catch” for a moment a
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language of the heart that is pitched between natural passion and picturesque and gothic novelty,
or between pastoral nature and medieval allegory, these key figures call attention to the
artificiality and thus also the short-lived temporality of natural education in a manner that
contrasts with Wordsworth’s and Kant’s teleological views of nature and culture. They also
make available a more nuanced understanding of the experience of nature in modern life than
that which is articulated in “green” Romanticism. In Romantic Ecology: Wordsworth and the
Environmental Tradition (1991), Bate presents Wordsworth’s attention to the systematic
economy of nature in Guide to the Lakes as a corrective to “the evolving and increasingly
disruptive influence of man on his environment.”208 For Bate, Wordsworth’s nature represents a
harmony that we must revive if we are to be cured of the disruptive effects of modern life. As
guardians of a nature that is implicated with sensational artifice, Dorothy and the “thronèd lady”
provide temporary assurance against a “loss of power”209 without promising a return to the
unspoiled world of Romantic ecology. They retroactively reinforce faith that the passions of
childhood may be sustained for some time longer by means of picturesque novelty, romance and
an expanded canon of children’s literature.
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Figure 1:

William Gilpin, 1782 Aquatint of Tintern Abbey, from https://romanticcircles.org/gallery/tintern-abbey
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Figure 2:

Philip James de Loutherbourg, A Philosopher in a Moonlit Churchyard, 1790 oil on canvas,
from https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Philippe-Jacques_de_Loutherbourg__A_Philosopher_in_a_Moonlit_Churchyard.jpg
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CHAPTER THREE: Coleridge, Irritability and the Analogy between Nature and Human
Education
Like Wollstonecraft and Wordsworth, Coleridge advocates for a form of education that
would revive in children the moral sensibility that is blunted by an overly didactic, empirical age.
Coleridge’s strong claims for the value of imaginative literature in children’s education resemble
Wordsworth’s. He shares, however, Wollstonecraft’s belief in the importance of religious
sensibility for moral independence. For Coleridge, the goal of education should not be to dictate
the terms of right and wrong, but to strengthen children’s aesthetic and religious sensibility so
that they might become rational moral actors. The term sensibility is crucial not only to
Coleridge’s ideas on children’s education but also to his ideas on the history of life, or the
progress of “Nature.” In this chapter, I bring the Romantic-era discourse on children’s education
into conversation with Romantic science by tracking the role of sensibility and its correlate
irritability in Coleridge’s evolutionary theory and poetics. The chapter begins with Coleridge’s
account of animal evolution in Theory of Life but turns to his gothic poem Christabel to draw out
the human stakes of the problems that vex his scientific theory. In Idea for a Universal History
with a Cosmopolitan Purpose, as we saw in chapter two, Immanuel Kant draws an analogy
between the teleology of nature and that of human history. The trajectories of nature and human
history are not the same in Kant’s view: the teleology of nature is biological and concerns the
preservation of organized life through generation, while the teleology of human history is social
and concerns the realization of moral principles. Kant’s hope for progress proceeds from the
premise that it is possible to consider human history as if it were continuous with natural history.
Coleridge, who was a student of Kant’s, draws a similar if underdeveloped analogy between
natural history and human education in Theory of Life. In this work, he attempts to narrate the
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history of life in terms of a progression from animal individuation to human self-government.
Coleridge’s central concern in Theory of Life is not with human education, however, but with the
respective roles of irritability and sensibility in animal evolution. By focusing on the import of
both sensibility and irritability in Coleridge’s scientific and poetic writings, I bring into view the
promise as well as the doubts that attend Coleridge’s guiding analogy between natural and
human history.1
Coleridge set to work on Theory of Life the same year that he finally published
Christabel. A letter of 31 August 18162 shows that he was thinking about natural history at the
same time that he was struggling with the question of how to resolve Christabel, a poem in
which irritable phenomena—nightmares, physical ailments, negative feelings and passions—
disrupt the peace of an aristocratic family. Coleridge’s poem makes a subject of the terrifying
nightmares and nervous symptoms that he made record of in his notebooks beginning in the
winter of 1800 and that he later came to understand as a side effect of opium use. Once he was
fully in the throes of addiction, Coleridge’s symptoms haunted his belief, articulated in the
Theory of Life and also in Biographia Literaria, in the continuity between the purposes of
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biological life and of the human will.3 While Coleridge proposes in Theory of Life that the
refinement of sensibility in human animals is a necessary foundation for the social, moral and
intellectual progress of human beings, his guiding analogy between purposive natural and human
processes is troubled by the emergence in mammals and human animals of unprecedented
intensities of sensibility and, with it, nervous irritability. Coleridge suppresses evidence of the
sheer force of irritability in mammalian life in order to uphold his philosophical and religious
argument that the human will represents a divine culmination of all the advances in animal
sensibility that had gone before.
The contradictions that trouble Coleridge’s analogy between human progress and natural
evolution become visible in his nightmare poem Christabel. Here, Coleridge brings the
biological questions raised in Theory of Life into the dysfunctional world of an aristocratic
family. He asks: can the moral value of “sensibility” be recognized and reproduced within
Christabel’s “clan”?4 The answer is hardly promising: in Christabel, religious sensibility
devolves into irritability, prayer into nightmare, compassion into envy, rage and fear. Though
doubts about the moral significance of feeling were a feature of Coleridge’s experience of
addiction, he covered over them in Theory of Life and intended to do so in Christabel too.
Coleridge suggested at several points over the course of his career that he had a plan for how to
resolve the problems posed by irritability within the poem. He was never able to follow through
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with his intention, however. The poem he did produce fails to establish a unified moral point of
view from which to view the force of irritability in human life. Recently, Tilottama Rajan has
called attention to the metaphoric significance within the Godwinian novel of “irritability” as a
“form of negativity” that turns the self against imperatives of improvement and social
reproduction in commercial society.5 In Christabel, irritability stands in the way of an
aristocratic family’s ability to reproduce the moral values represented by Christabel’s dead
mother and to thus legitimize inherited privilege by way of “natural education.”
“As far as the analogy permits”: Reading Nature According to Human Ends
Before publishing Critique of Judgment (1790), Immanuel Kant wrote an essay discussing
the application of teleological principles to the study of natural history. In the third Critique, the
teleological principle allows open-ended reflection on the purposes that seem to lie behind
products of nature. In On the Use of Teleological Principles in Philosophy (1788), Kant argues
that the concept of a natural purpose is necessary to the study of natural history but not to the
systematic “description of nature.”6 Teleological principles do not apply, for instance, to
Linnaeus’ system for the classification of plants, which has “all the splendor of a great system.”7
Instead of systematically explaining natural systems, natural history provides in Kant’s definition
a speculative narrative of the progressive unfolding over time of the natural purposes of plants,
animals, and/or human beings. Analogies give historical force to the idea of a natural purpose
insofar as they suggest that beings across the continuum of life share common goals. Kant asserts
that the narrative of nature’s history would appear to be “for the Gods” were it not based in
analogy. The study of natural history is the activity of
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tracing back, as far as the analogy permits, the connection between certain present-day
conditions of the things in nature and their causes in earlier times according to the laws of
efficient causality, which we do not make up but derive from the powers of nature as it
presents itself to us now.8
Kant notes that this is the method that scientists have used to posit histories of the earth. Such a
method can “only ever remain a silhouette” because the “ultimate ground” of analogy, the law
that links the observable condition of things in nature to their “causes in earlier times” with
“sufficient determination for all ends,” both natural and human, cannot be provided by empirical
conditions alone but must be derived from the idea of an “intelligent being.”9 In Critique of
Judgement, Kant will attribute the power to represent nature as if “the manifold of its empirical
laws”10 were grounded in a single understanding to reflective judgement.
Coleridge would have been familiar with the Critique of Judgement but there is little
evidence that he read On the Use of Teleological Principles. This second essay nonetheless set a
precedent for Coleridge’s theory of natural history as, here, Kant shows how scientific
conjectures about the possible unity of empirical laws hold together the analogies of natural
history.11 It was not just Kant, however, who argued for the use of analogy in science. Analogies
were, as Devin Griffiths has shown, enormously important in the nineteenth century to a range of
“scientific fields, including geology, comparative anatomy and botany, which relied on
description and imagination to elucidate natural pattern.”12 The question of how analogies were

8

Ibid, 8: 161-162.
Ibid, 8: 182.
10
Kant, Introduction to Critique of Judgment, IV, 5:181.
11
Coleridge owned a copy of The Critique of Judgment and the book was, as Raimonda
Modiano has argued, his main source for the concept of “genial criticism” he outlines in Essays
on the Principle of Genial Criticism. See Modiano, “Coleridge as Literary Critic.” Another likely
influence on Theory of Life is Kant’s Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, which
Coleridge had read and studied intensively. (Coleridge, Marginalia, 3. 269-303)
12
Griffiths, The Age of Analogy: Science and Literature between the Darwins, 11.
9

108

to be used was at the heart of the public debate on the “true idea of Life” that divided the Royal
College of Surgeons beginning in 1814.13 Coleridge first introduces analogy as a methodological
principle in Theory of Life in a commentary on the debate between John Abernethy and William
Lawrence about the significance of John Hunter’s legacy. While Abernethy claims that Hunter
meant something like electricity when he talked about the principle of life, Lawrence argues that
Hunter did not attempt to explain life by way of “barren a priori speculations, or by the illusory
analogies of other sciences.”14 Coleridge is, like Abernethy as well as Kant, convinced of the
importance of analogy to the explication of life. He warns, however, against a mechanistic
misconstruction of the analogy that Abernethy proposes between life and electricity. Coleridge
argues that to posit an equivalency between life as it subsists in organized bodies and electricity
is to misunderstand that “it is the sameness of the end, with the difference of the means, that
constitutes analogy.”15 We can’t liken organized life to electricity because, as Coleridge puts it,
“no man in his senses, philosopher or not, is capable of imagining that the lightning which
destroys a sheep, was a means to the same end with the principle of its organization.”16 Coleridge
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appeals to common sense to discredit the idea that the life of living organisms can be understood
by analogy with electrical processes. A productive “as if” upholds, however, his theory that all
living beings are produced through an interaction between polarized “powers” of life.
In Theory of Life, Coleridge considers the evolutionary processes in the fields of mechanics,
geology, zoology and physiology as if they were governed by a single system of laws. He posits
that electricity is neither identical with organized life nor is life, as Abernethy posited, a power
that God supplies to bodies after the fact of their organization to make them go “in the same
manner as the steam becomes the mechanic power of the steam-engine.”17 Instead, electricity is
just one among several “powers,” both mechanical and organic, that interact to produce “vital
forms.”18 Life is in Coleridge’s philosophy a continuous effort to synthesize from two powers a
third that is “different and greater.”19 He defines “the unceasing polarity of life, as the form of its
process, and its tendency to progressive individuation as the law of its direction.”20 In the course
of natural history, the production of more intensive powers of life is counterbalanced by the
limitations of preexisting form. The unceasing polarity of life does not, then, describe a process
that is merely abstract: the vital process of polarization must be made manifest in particular
material forms. In this way, life tends towards individuation, a term that Coleridge defines as
“the inmost principle of the possibility, of anything as that particular thing.”21 The polarizing
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form of life’s process gains historical significance only insofar as analogy lends a sense of
continuity between the purposes of particular vital forms and, ultimately, between the purposes
of animals and of human beings. In the second part of this chapter, I will propose my own
analogy between the natural teleology posited in the Theory of Life and Coleridge’s ideas on the
“natural” education of children.
In Theory of Life, Coleridge uses analogy to establish a connection between mechanical and
organic processes as well as between animal life and the much older history of the earth. He
refers readers to biblical myths of creation and findings of contemporary geology to give
scholarly legitimacy to the idea that life began as “one vast homogenous drop” of fluid chaos
was rent asunder by a magnetic polarity between the elements of earth and air.22 He stipulates
that the metals that constitute the “universal base of the planet” are produced by a power that is
“correspondent, in the world of the senses, to the magnetic axis.”23 The process of animalization
begins as the magnetic power pulls corals from the earth giving them an individuated form. The
likeness of corals with the rocks from which they emerge and upon which they sink back
suggests the origins of organic in inorganic life, zoology in geology. Coleridge offers other, more
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far-reaching analogies between geologic and organic forms: he suggests that the “tranquil
deposition of crystals” prefigures the tendency towards “independent existence” in vegetable and
animal life and that the “rude semblances” of “twigs” in copper crystals manifest a “dim and
obscure prophecy” of the ensuing process of vegetation in trees.24 Analogy is needed here
because the relationship between the history of the earth and the history of plants and animals
appears from the perspective of “theory,” or empirical understanding, inexplicable. There is a
disciplinary gap between geology and botany as well as between geology and zoology that
experiment alone cannot overleap. In Coleridge’s Essays on Method from the 1818 edition of
The Friend, he argues that “theory” understood as the observable relation between empirical
facts cannot describe the relation between fields of knowledge.25 As “an attribute of the supreme
Being,”26 “Law” accounts for the causes of empirical phenomena and must be the primary source
of knowledge about the relation between theoretical systems. While analogy provides for the
possibility of an evolutionary tie across discrete fields of scientific research, Coleridge has
doubts, as I will show, about the extent to which analogy attains to the status of divine law.
Coleridge’s history of animal life is layered with more empirical detail than his history of the
earth and is accordingly fraught with more difficulties. He insists that analogy is needed only
when the relation between different classes of animals appears discontinuous to the eye of
scientific understanding: “no one would say the lungs of a man were analogous to the lungs of a
monkey, but any one might say that the gills of fish and the spiracular of insects are analogous to
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lungs.”27 Coleridge uses the respiratory analogy here to configure the differences between the
animal classes of insects, fish and mammals temporally; the human lung becomes intelligible
through the lens of analogy as an organ derived from the gills of the fish, which are in turn
derived from the “spiracular” of the insect. Coleridge places stronger emphasis on the
progressive character of this series when he claims that fish gills present at “the intermediate
state between the spiracular of the grade next below, with the lungs of the step one above, both
extremes of which seem combined in the structure of birds and of their quill-feathers.”28 His
point is that the parts of organisms that emerge at an earlier “state” prefigure and are fulfilled in
organisms that come later. In this way, analogy supports Coleridge’s hypothesis that animal
individuation is a progressive process in which “Nature” is from stage to stage advancing
towards more complex forms of inward organization.
Coleridge’s analogies are selectively chosen to make the ascent from animals that are defined
by the power of irritability (mollusks, insects) to animals defined by the “higher” power of
sensibility (birds, mammals) the primary feature of the process of animal individuation.
Coleridge asserts that mollusks possess “the rudiment of nerves, as the first scarce
distinguishable impress and exponent of sensibility.”29 However, because sensibility in mollusks
and insects flows into irritability, “the nerves appertaining to the senses…are indistinct, and
relatively unimportant.”30 Insects have feeling but not a sense of touch which is, according to
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Coleridge, “a supervention to the feeling, a perfection given to it by the reaction of the higher
powers.”31 For Coleridge, feeling is the “least ideal” of all the senses—the least intelligent
sense—because it entails “absolute contact.”32 The eyes of insects are not fashioned to conduct
light, but to be “its ultimate recipient”; they “constitute, rather than subserve, their sensorium.”33
Insect eyes prove that feeling rather than touch or sight, irritability rather than sensibility is
predominant in them. The convex eye of the fish seems by contrast to unify a manifold of
feelings: the fish eye “collect[s] in one powerful organ, the hundred-fold microscopic facettes of
the insect’s light organs.”34 Between the eye of the insect and that of the fish, Coleridge posits,
“the intention of Nature is repeated”35 at a higher level of complexity; new in fishes is a reaction
that perfects feeling, allowing organs of sense to modify the sensorium. Coleridge identifies fish
rather than mollusks or insects with Nature’s first large-scale display of sensibility because he
associates the fish with sight and the mollusk and insect with a comparatively amorphous
feeling.
In much the same way as the transition in natural history from geology to zoology cannot be
explained in terms of an empirical law or system, the historical relationship between irritability
as a feeling over which animals have little control and sensibility as an inward response to
feeling cannot be explained by a system of natural description. Coleridge posits that it is in fish
that “Nature” first exhibits on a “large scale” the power of sensibility and yet adds this
parenthetical aside: “I pretend not to control the freedom, in which the necessity of Nature is
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rooted, by the precise limits of a system.”36 In claiming freedom as the ground of the necessity of
Nature, Coleridge steps beyond the position of Kant, who presents the question of freedom and
necessity as one of the “antinomies,” or irresolvable questions of reason in the third critique. For
Kant, human nature can be considered from the perspective of freedom or necessity, but not from
both at once. Coleridge roots natural law in divine intuition and, in so doing, overleaps the
bounds of Kant’s transcendental philosophy. Coleridge’s claim that the ultimate driving force of
nature is divine law is at odds, however, with his use of analogies drawn from post-Kantian
Naturphilosophie to show how one form of life gives rise to another. The contradiction between
scientific and religious accounts of evolution will emerge as even more of a problem when
Coleridge attempts to describe human beings’ relation to nature, as I will show. For now,
however, I want to emphasize that the divine “freedom” of animal life creates problems for
Coleridge’s scientific effort to track the origins and progress of sensibility. Coleridge proposes
that the image of an insect’s flight over and above a flower is a metaphor for the relative freedom
of animal as compared to vegetable life.37 He posits that, beginning with insects, “Nature seems
to act with a sort of free agency, and to have formed the classes from choice and bounty.”38
Because Nature freely forms each animal class, sensibility seems to originate with mollusks, then
again with insects and then again with fishes. To complicate matters even further, Coleridge
contends that sensibility only really “assume[s] her due place and rank” in mammals.39 It is
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impossible, really, to say for sure when sensibility begins to definitively overpower irritability;
Coleridge nonetheless makes every effort to fit such transitions into a continuous progression.
The question of sensibility’s “progress” in relation to irritability is crucial to the narrative of
life’s evolution and is also, as I will show, central to the narrative of natural education that
unfolds in Christabel.
Coleridge hints at the connection between natural history and natural education when, in
Theory of Life, he personifies Nature as an agent—a she —possessed of intelligence and a
capacity to learn. He suggests, however, that Nature can be forgetful and can thus lose the
attributes of sensibility that “she” has so far cultivated. Nature’s propensity to forget is evident
where advances in animal organization are accompanied by regressions. Though fish have a
convex eye that insects lack, they are no more sophisticated in their manner of reproduction. In
fact, the weight and “number of [fish] eggs” suggests a “fall back” to a “lower ground” than that
occupied by insects.40 Fish furthermore lack the “fabricative instincts”41 that allow insects to
construct nests of “geometric regularity.”42 There are parallels, as I will show in the second
section of the chapter, between the personified figure of Nature and Christabel. Though she is
initially introduced as an exemplar of moral sensibility, Christabel finds that she is subject in
sleep to forces that cause her to forget what she knows. In Theory of Life, Coleridge sidesteps the
problem of evolutionary regression by postulating that, in the long term, sleep and forgetting
help Nature learn. Though fishes’ primitive mode of reproduction suggests that Nature forgot as
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much as “she” learned by forming the insect class, Coleridge insists that Nature’s lapses are
purposive of a greater progress in individuation that is to come. About Nature, Coleridge writes:
She often drops a faculty, but never fails to pick it up again. She may seem forgetful and
absent, but it is only to recollect herself with additional, as well as recruited vigour, in
some after and higher state; as if the sleep of powers, as well as of bodies, were the
season and condition of their growth.43
The building instinct that was lost in fish reemerges in birds, who furthermore possess an instinct
for melodic articulation. Coleridge writes: “that all languages designate the melody of birds as
singing (though according to Blumenbach man only sings, while birds do but whistle)
demonstrates that it has been felt as, what indeed it is, a tentative and prophetic prelude of
something yet to come.”44 The “rudiments of modulation” in the “melody of birds” make
available an analogy between animal sensibility and human language. 45 This trajectory
reinforces in Coleridge’s view the idea that, despite “her” lapses, Nature undergoes one long
“awakening” of sensory intelligence.46
To complete the narrative of Nature’s progress, Coleridge compares the relation of inside
to outside, bone structure to “covering” of birds, mammals and human beings:
In the birds the bones have become hollow; while…their exterior presents an actual
vegetation. The bones of the mammalia are filled up, and their coverings have become
more simple. Man possesses the most perfect osseous structure, the least and most
insignificant covering. The whole force of organic power has attained an inward and
centripetal direction.47
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Nature’s last step from birds to mammals completes a movement from outwardly to inwardly
directed organization. Emphasizing mammals’ combination of a “perfect osseous structure” with
a relatively “insignificant” bodily surface, Coleridge makes inner organization the final goal of
Nature’s “progressive individuation.”48 The fact that humans are born “naked and helpless” into
the world is a sign of complex inner organization and is also, paradoxically, “the connate mark of
our sovereignty.”49 Sovereign, human beings are capable of taking charge of Nature’s tendency
to “progressive individualization”: unlike the rest of the animal world, “man” is “referred to
himself, delivered up to his own charge.”50 Though Coleridge regards “he who stands most on
himself” as the truest summation of the whole tendency of life, “inter-dependence in social and
political life” and “genius” in “intellectual life” are accompanying goals of human history.51
A hierarchy is built into Coleridge’s idea of sexual difference in animals and so too into his
proposal that “Man and Nature,” a he and a she, stand together at the “apex of the living
pyramid.”52 Coleridge figures female and male animals of the same species as inverted images of
each other: he asserts that “the female is characterized by quicker irritability, and the male by
deeper sensibility.”53 He extrapolates that claim from evidence of the “superiority in strength and
courage of the female birds of prey.”54 Noting that female birds are more advanced in some of
their attributes than males of the same species, Coleridge seems to neutralize the hierarchy
between male and female animals. He has nonetheless already stipulated that, as a feeling,
irritability lacks the built-in intelligence of sensibility. The quickness of female nature is
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superseded by the depth of feeling in male natures in much the same way as Nature, a “she,” is
superseded by “Man” at the conclusion of Coleridge’s history of life. Human progress is the goal
of all of Nature’s learning and yet Coleridge asserts that “Man” is endowed with a soul and a
capacity for self-government that comes not from Nature but from the divine. Nature remembers
only to be forgotten in the end by “her sovereign Master, who made Man in his own image, by
superadding self-consciousness and self-government, and breathed into him a living soul.”55
There is an underlying contradiction between Coleridge’s belief that “Man” is a being who
has been endowed by God, not Nature, with a rational soul and his claim that Man is a “syllepsis,
a compendium of Nature.”56 The term “syllepsis” derives from the Greek sullēpsis
(σύλληψις), meaning “taking together,” while a compendium is the end result of an act of
collection and organization. Humans take together, or collect in one volume, the purposes of
life’s mechanical, geological and physiological processes.57 That figure might imply a materialist
view wherein self-consciousness is the result of the organizing processes that individuate bodies
all along the scale of life.58 A thoroughly materialist hypothesis of life would be inconsistent,
however, with Coleridge’s religious beliefs. While human language fulfills the prophecy heard in
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the bird’s song, human beings are individualized in ways that exceed natural tendency and that
can only be disclosed by the divine: Man is for Coleridge “a Revelation of Nature!”59 Raymond
Williams explains that “a great complexity arose” when the personified figure of Nature had “to
coexist, as it were, with another singular, all-powerful force, namely a monotheistic God. It was
orthodox in medieval European belief to use both singular absolutes but to define God as
primary and Nature as his minister or deputy.”60 Coleridge invokes this idea of Nature as
minister only to deny it; he asserts that “Nature” has no role at all—not even that of a
“handmaid”61—in the creation of human beings. At the last step of nature’s process, Coleridge
confronts directly a contradiction between theological and modern, scientific accounts of human
origins. Submerged in the Theory are several hints that it was not only Coleridge’s commitment
to religious orthodoxy, but also his knowledge of neurological disorder that informed his
assertions about the separation between human life and Nature’s processes.
The quick nerves of mammals demonstrate, as Coleridge observes, an “intensity of life”62
that approaches that of the human brain. Coleridge derisively refers to the brain as a “mass of
marrow in the skull”63 to suggest that its electrochemical functions are as at odds with the divine
purposes of the soul as the mechanic power of electricity is at odds with the principle of a
sheep’s organization. He finds that the principle of the brain’s individuation is as unintelligible
as the principle of individuation in corals, which are more like a dispersed “network” than like
differentiable, self-regulating individuals.64 The emergence of a fast-acting nervous system in
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mammals thus unsettles Coleridge’s argument that “progressive individuation”65 is the form of
life’s process. Instead of prefiguring human self-government, the emergence in mammals and
human beings of “a nervous system [that] unites absolutely, by instantaneity of time”66 marks a
regression away from that goal. Coleridge would have known about the difficulties of
distinguishing humans as a class from other hominids from Linnaeus. Aware of a relation
between mammals and humans that is too close for comfort, Coleridge asserts that the majority
of mammals do not resemble moral persons at all; the dog is an “estimable philanthropist” but,
otherwise, mammals are a mirror of “our vices, our follies, and our imperfections.”67 At this
impasse, Coleridge shifts the focus of his discussion of the relation between mammals and
human beings from the problem of the nervous system to the “inward and centripetal direction”68
of mammalian organization which seems, as I have shown, to prefigure human sovereignty. That
analogy does not work to establish continuity where it cannot be scientifically observed, as do
Coleridge’s analogies between different species of animal life; instead, Coleridge uses analogy to
secure an anthropocentric view of human beings’ distinction from mammals where proximity
would seem too degrading.
One can detect in Coleridge’s comments on the human brain and on the nervous system of
mammals a distrust of the mechanisms of the human brain that was deepened by his ongoing
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efforts to cure himself of bodily reliance on opium. In a note of December 1803, Coleridge
expresses hope that he may explain to himself the cause of the “streamy nature of association”
and thus of the “Bad Passions in Dreams.”69 By 1814, however, he has given up hope that he will
ever be able to explain the “evil” that burdens him in his dreams and so relies on prayer for his
salvation; “O! only for the merits, for the agonies, for the cross of my blessed Redeemer.”70 Here
and in Theory of Life, Coleridge moves away from a scientific emphasis on the materiality of
cognition in order to uphold a religiously grounded distinction between the nervous system and
human consciousness. Tilottoma Rajan argues that Coleridge’s knowledge of neurophysiology
“profoundly threatens the ascent of knowledge about life. It also endangers the development
from reproduction to sensibility, by disclosing in Mind a hypersensibility that returns sensibility
to irritability. It is as if there is something uncontrollable in life: an excess, a ‘resistance of Life
to Life.’”71 Rajan, who reads the Theory as a “highly affirmative text” which “parallels Hegel’s
Encyclopedia in its ascension from nature to spirit,” contends that Coleridge chooses not to
publish the Theory because it “contains the seeds of its own unworking.”72
Coleridge retains an affirmative perspective by stipulating that his theory is premised on a
suspension of doubt. He admits that it was not possible to deduce his history of life in such a way
that the goal of one “chapter” of life’s progress would reappear as the “starting-post” of the
succeeding chapter.73 He writes:
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Positions arranged in my own mind, as intermediate and organic links of administration,
must be presented to the reader in the first instance, at least, as a mere hypothesis. Instead
of demanding his assent as a right, I must solicit a suspension of his judgment as a
courtesy; and, after all, however firmly the hypothesis may support the phenomena piled
upon it, we can deduce no more than a practical rule, grounded on a strong
presumption.74
Coleridge here recognizes the tenuous relation of analogy, which goes beyond the
experimentally provable as it provides “links of administration” across different scientific fields,
animal classes and across the separate domains of nature and human history, to judgement,
which is ever in search of a law. The “hypothesis” of life’s progressive movement towards
individuation and self-government can only ever stand as a “rule” for how the evolutionary
scientist should go about studying natural phenomena; the hypothesis does not necessarily attain
to the status of a law. Here, Coleridge is in accord with Kant, who maintains that reflective
judgement can only ever present a “silhouette”75 of possible relationships between present and
past. Coleridge solicits from the reader a “suspension of judgement,” a phrase that verbally
echoes “that willing suspension of disbelief for a moment which constitutes poetic faith.”76 In
Biographia Literaria, Coleridge regards the suspension of disbelief as a choice that the reader of
supernatural poetry can withdraw at will; the “suspension of judgement” in the study of natural
history is likewise the companion of skepticism. Analogies support a “strong presumption” that
lower and higher classes of beings share a common aim, but we ought not to mistake the
speculative for the constitutive. The “intermediate and organic links of administration” that
sustain Coleridge’s narrative of the progressive unfolding of sensibility into intelligence remain
convincing only so long as the reader is like Coleridge willing to suspend doubts.
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I’ve outlined in this section several doubts that Coleridge had about his hypothesis that
life can be narrated as a progression from the refinement of animal sensibility to the production
of the self-governing human individual: first, it is difficult to say when and where exactly
sensibility definitively presides over irritability; second, animals like mammals that represent
new intensities of sensibility are endowed with attributes that make them more analogous to
animals defined by irritability and/or reproduction than to the self-governing individual; and
finally, the intensity of sensibility in the human nervous system makes the principle of its
organization impossible to trace and thus threatens to undo the progress toward inward
organization that is the physiological sign, or prophecy of human sovereignty. In the next section
of this chapter, I turn to Christabel, a fragmented supernatural poem that Coleridge composed for
Lyrical Ballads but which he finally published the same year he set to work on Theory. My own
hypothesis, grounded in a “strong presumption,” is that the doubts about the progressive
idealization of sensibility within natural history that Coleridge suppresses in Theory lie at the
forefront of this poem’s representation of the way in which irritable physical and psychological
phenomena usurp the human will.
“The vision of fear, the touch and pain!”: Irritability and Christabel’s Education
Christabel begins in the middle of the night in the woods where the “lady” Christabel has
gone to pray for the “weal of her lover that’s far away.”77 The narrator describes the uncanny
atmosphere that sets the mood of the first part of the poem:
'Tis the middle of night by the castle clock,
And the owls have awakened the crowing cock;
Tu—whit! Tu—whoo!
How drowsily it crew.
And hark, again! the crowing cock,
77
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How drowsily it crew.
Sir Leoline, the Baron rich,
Hath a toothless mastiff bitch;
From her kennel beneath the rock
She maketh answer to the clock
Four for the quarters, and twelve for the hour;
Ever and aye, moonshine or shower,
Sixteen short howls, not over loud;
Some say, she sees my lady’s shroud.78
Marking four quarters in each hour, the mastiff’s howls mirror the precision of the poem’s meter,
which keeps to four accents each line. The punctuality of the dog’s howls and of the poem’s
stressed syllables is, however, consistent with superstition: in the final line, the narrator refers the
reader beyond empirical conditions to the superstition that the dog sees “my lady’s shroud.”
Mary Favret observes that, in Part I of Christabel, “an insistence on measurable empirical
evidence actually predicts mystery: it pushes us beyond empirical reality.”79 In another passage
of the poem, the narrator arrives at gothic superstition through obsessive, repetitive questioning.
After the stranger Geraldine enters the castle, the narrator turns attention once again to the house
mastiff:
Outside her kennel, the mastiff old
Lay fast asleep, in moonshine cold.
The mastiff old did not awake,
Yet she an angry moan did make!
And what can ail the mastiff bitch?
Never till now she uttered yell
Beneath the eye of Christabel.
Perhaps it is the owlet’s scritch:
For what can ail the mastiff bitch?80
The narrator implies that the dog’s utterance may be an unconscious response to the demonic
presence of Geraldine. Instead of stating this superstition directly, however, the narrator proposes
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that the source of the mastiff’s “angry moan” is the “owlet’s scritch.” The logic of that
hypothesis is circular: the cause of an animal’s cry is another animal’s cry. Once again, the
narrator’s insistence on empirical detail reveals the inadequacy of observation alone to solve the
problem at hand. The narrator stubbornly repeats the question “what can ail the mastiff” as if
asking again might elicit a better answer.
The angry moans of the dog signal a problem that scientific understanding cannot solve, a
problem of the kind that requires the concept of a natural purpose. Coleridge speculates about the
relationship between amorphous animal feeling and sensory intelligence in Theory of Life; the
same relationship becomes an irrational obsession of the narrator of Christabel. We’ve seen that,
in Theory of Life, the concept of a natural purpose is applicable to observable phenomena only as
long as assertions of law are suspended. In Christabel, the narrator’s fixation on empirical
conditions suggests a perverse unwillingness to suspend judgement on a matter that cannot be
scientifically explained--the relation of animal feeling to intelligence, the mastiff’s howl to
communicable knowledge. That strategy points in its obvious inadequacy to superstition. The
narrator’s response to the howl of the mastiff raises a set of questions that I take to be at the
center of Christabel: can animal irritability be regarded as purposive? How do we distinguish the
idea of a natural purpose from the ungrounded claims of neurotic superstition? Hazlitt is a
paradigmatically bad reader of Christabel because he takes for granted the validity of the
narrator’s superstitious perspective. In his 1816 Examiner review of the poem, Hazlitt argues that
Geraldine’s supernatural status is key to the interpretation of the whole. Having misremembered
a line from Sarah Stoddart’s 1804 transcript of an 1800 manuscript of Christabel written in
Coleridge’s hand, Hazlitt argues that the revelation of Geraldine as a hag, “hideous, deformed
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and pale of hue,”81 is crucial to the aesthetic value of the poem and woefully left out of the
published text. Coleridge was thinking of Hazlitt’s review when, in February 1819, he wrote in a
flyleaf to the 1816 edition that “Geraldine is not a Witch, in any proper sense of that word.”82
In response to the pressure placed on him to provide a supernatural explanation of the
events of Christabel, Coleridge added revisions and footnotes in 1824 that together corroborate
the narrator’s suspicion that Geraldine is “a supernatural being with the stamp of the Evil Ones
on her.”83 The gloss of the 1824 published poem is inflected with the kind of didacticism that
Coleridge distrusted, as we will see, in both children’s literature and anonymous criticism.
Unlike the 1824 poem with footnotes, the poem of 1816 neither confirms nor refutes
superstitious explanations of Geraldine; this was what was so frustrating to Hazlitt. The 1816
poem affiliates Geraldine on more certain grounds, as I will argue, with the mystery of irritable
feelings, passions, nightmares, pains and ailments. Geraldine communicates irritability to other
bodies like a contagion; the mastiff’s “angry moan”84 suggests as much. The irritable symptoms
that extend outwards from Geraldine are troubling in their incomprehensibility but are not
necessarily evil: the reader may reject the narrator’s superstitious posture and embrace instead
Bard Bracy’s intuition that irritable feeling is simply a part of life. The important question of the
poem is not whether or not Geraldine is evil or a witch but whether the symptoms of irritability
that are made worse by her presence can be overcome in such a way as to support the education
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and social betterment of Christabel’s “clan.”85 In Theory of Life, Coleridge does not directly
address questions of human virtue. He asserts, however, that the emergence of “man” is
accompanied by a “new series” in the progress of life.86 Education transpires as part of this
“series” in which human self-government passes beyond “the appropriate limits of
physiology,”87 making progress in social and political life possible. Coleridge does not offer
much in the way of an explanation about what this process might look like or what problems
might trouble it in Theory of Life. For this reason, it is productive to turn to Christabel. In this
gothic poem, Coleridge leaves the question of natural education unresolved and communicates
his intense skepticism about the hypothesis that life ascends from irritability to sensibility to
human self-government.
The narrator’s preoccupation with the mastiff’s “angry moan”88 displaces, as I have
already suggested, a more primary concern about the nature and purpose of Geraldine. Not
coincidentally, Geraldine’s presence is first indicated by a moan. At the start of the poem,
Christabel’s dreams of her “lover that’s far away”89 carry her outside of her father’s castle to the
wood to pray in the middle of the night. Christabel discovers Geraldine behind a tree when a
moan interrupts her silent prayer:
The lady sprang up suddenly
The lovely lady, Christabel!
It moaned as near, as near can be,
But what it is she cannot tell.—
On the other side it seems to be,
Of the huge, broad-breasted, old oak tree.90
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It is possible that what Christabel hears here is herself.91 Christabel soon identifies the moan,
however, with Geraldine. She cries out in fear—“Mary mother, save me now!”92—when she
finds Geraldine on the other side of the oak tree. When Geraldine requests that she have pity on
her “sore distress,”93 however, Christabel responds with sympathy, commanding Geraldine to
“stretch forth thy hand, and have no fear.”94 When Geraldine tells Christabel that she has been
kidnapped from her father’s house by warriors, Christabel offers her refuge for the night. In
psychoanalytically oriented readings of the poem, Geraldine seems to promise fulfillment of the
wishes that Christabel “cannot tell” she has for romance and love.95 Christabel is, accordingly, a
bad reader of the story that Geraldine tells about herself: Christabel takes for granted that
Geraldine is who she says she is, even as elements of Geraldine’s story are clearly borrowed
from terror fiction, Scottish balladry and Spenserian allegory.96 To speculate that Christabel is
unconscious of her own desires and a bad reader of Geraldine’s intentions is, however, to give
too little credit to Christabel for extending hospitality to Geraldine, a figure who is left in the
wood “a weary woman, scarce alive.”97 Christabel responds to Geraldine’s animal cry with what
Rousseau would call moral sensibility, trusting that she can help, even as the causes of
Geraldine’s suffering remain obscure.
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In the first two chapters, I showed how, beginning with Rousseau, natural education
depends on the premise that human sensibility has a built-in social purpose; sensibility supports
moral community and/or the making of the rational, independent moral actor. The actual
achievement of such aims is made difficult by the artifices of gendered education, as
Wollstonecraft shows, and by the artifices of print culture, as Wordsworth demonstrates. For
Coleridge in Christabel, the obstacle to natural education lies with irritability, an at once
biological and psychological term that is defined in opposition to its more purposive correlate,
sensibility. At the opening of Christabel, Coleridge prompts the reader to ask what the
significance of Geraldine’s moan might be for Christabel’s education. The poem as a whole
leaves the reader ambivalent about whether the irritability that Geraldine carries with her is
productive of moral sensibility or whether it is a phenomena without didactic significance.
Ultimately in Christabel, Geraldine’s irritability will vex the idea, basic to Romantic-era
schemes of natural education and to the second series of evolution, that sensibility serves a social
purpose. At first, however, Christabel’s charity to Geraldine suggests that she possesses a
temperament and character that has been strengthened by natural education. To better establish
this connection, it will be productive to turn to Coleridge’s statements on children’s education.
Coleridge entered into the conversation on the meaning of Rousseauian natural education
in his 1808 lecture on education delivered at the Royal Institution. Here, Coleridge echoes
Wordsworth’s critique in book 5 of The Prelude of educators’ careful management of what
books children read. Instead of drawing a caricature of the modern educator who would “manage
books and things”98 as Wordsworth does, Coleridge targets popular didactic literature for
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children. He specifically decries the “goodyness” 99 of the characters in Maria Edgeworth’s tales
of education for children. Asserting that “‘The Seven Champions of Christendom’, [and] ‘Jack
the Giant Killer’”100 instill more true virtue in children than the moral fictions of Edgeworth,
Coleridge reiterates his belief, first expressed in his 1797 letters to Thomas Poole, that children
should “be permitted to read Romances, & Relations of Giants & Magicians, & Genii” because
“I know no other way of giving the mind a love of “the Great”, & “the Whole.””101 Warning
against outright didacticism, Coleridge recommends that educators proceed with the precept that
if you “stimulate the heart to love, and the mind to be early accurate,…all other virtues will arise
of their own accord and all vices will be thrown out.”102 Though Coleridge directly criticizes
Rousseau’s system of natural education for giving too much freedom to children, he reiterates
Rousseau’s as well as Wollstonecraft’s and Wordsworth’s opinion that a too early instruction in
the difference between right and wrong will impede the development in children of the
sensibilities that are the true fountain of human virtue. In Biographia Literaria Coleridge again
raises his concern that modern reading practices do not support the natural unfolding of
education. He aligns the “improved pedagogy” of the age with new practices of literary
reception, lamenting that training in the “impudence, of anonymous criticism” stifles the
admiration for great authors that makes up “the natural and graceful temper of early youth.”103
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Christabel acts as a model student of Romantic education by extending hospitality to
Geraldine and not subjecting her story to too much moral or critical scrutiny. This act of charity
is motivated by a hope that Geraldine’s mysterious signs of animal irritability will be alleviated
by care and attention. Geraldine is not fully capable, however, of communicating the causes of
her suffering. There are many gaps in the story that Geraldine tells about her past: she does not
know why she was kidnapped from her father’s house or “what men they be”104 who kidnapped
her; she does not know how long she was carried on the back of a horse while men rode behind
her; and she does not know where the men went after leaving her under the oak tree where
Christabel finds her. What Geraldine does know is that the men stifled her speech: they “chock’d
my cries with force and fright.”105 In so doing, they prevented her from being fully present as a
witness of her own experience; she notes in an aside that “I have lain in fits, I wis.”106 If we refer
Geraldine’s narrative to the extraordinary kidnap plot of Ann Radcliffe’s popular gothic novel
The Italian (1797),107 then it may seem false and artificial. If we place ourselves, however, in the
role of the student of Coleridgean natural education who responds to stories with naïve love and
wonder rather than with a desire to find a moral or a flaw, then Geraldine’s narrative does not
betray her falsity but is instead an indicator of the trauma she has suffered.
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As Geraldine and Christabel cross the threshold of the castle gate, Geraldine’s motions
become erratic:
The lady sank, belike thro’ pain,
And Christabel with might and main
Lifted her up, a weary weight,
Over the threshold of the gate:
Then the lady rose again,
And mov’d, as she were not in pain.
So free from danger, free from fear,
They cross’d the court: right glad they were.
And Christabel devoutly cried,
To the lady by her side,
Praise we the Virgin all divine
Who hath rescued thee from thy distress!
Alas, alas! Said Geraldine,
I cannot speak for weariness.108
The verbal emphasis of the last line of the first stanza falls on the word “mov’d,” the stress of
which puts an abrupt stop to the metrical lethargy of the anapestic feet that make up the previous
line. Here, the rhythm of the poem slows and quickens as irregularly as Geraldine herself passes
from weakness to strength. At other moments in the poem, she will pass just as mysteriously
from youth to age, beauty to ugliness; the “bosom old”109 that Geraldine exposes to Christabel
during their night spent together does not belong, for instance, to the youthful body with
“heaving breasts” 110 that Christabel sees upon waking. These abrupt transitions contribute to a
nightmarish atmosphere of confusion, one in which both Christabel and the reader are alike
immersed. In the endnote that Coleridge added to the end of the above stanza in 1824, he
specified that “the strange Lady may not pass the threshold without Christabel’s help and

108

Coleridge, Christabel, 124-137.
Ibid, 445.
110
Ibid, 368.
109

133

will.”111 Coleridge refers, as the editors of the Norton edition explain, to the Gothic superstition
that an evil being cannot enter a sanctified place unaided. Coleridge thus uses the note to plant in
the reader’s mind the superstition that Geraldine is a “supernatural Being with the stamp of the
Evil Ones on her.”112 Coleridge added an additional annotation that falsifies Geraldine claim “I
cannot speak for weariness” upon passing the threshold: he wrote, “The strange Lady makes an
excuse, not to praise the Holy Virgin.”113 Christabel does not, however, read Geraldine’s
weakness in this way. If we leave Coleridge’s gloss to the side, it is not in fact clear whether
Geraldine refuses to praise the Virgin because she serves the “Evil Ones,”114 or whether she is in
earnest when she says, “I cannot speak for weariness.”115 Perhaps Geraldine’s abrupt transitions
between states of physical strength and weakness are an effect of the trauma she has suffered.
Certainly, Geraldine is in thrall to some other power than that of the Virgin, but whether that
power is one that we can pinpoint as good or evil, natural or supernatural is not totally apparent.
We become as obtuse as Hazlitt and the student of didactic fiction if, empowered by the gloss,
we jump to the conclusion that Geraldine is an evil demon, witch, or monster.
John Beer has argued that Geraldine stands in for “vital powers of nature” that have no
discernable organizing principle.116 I want to make a more specific argument that Geraldine is
associated with “natural” physical and psychological mechanisms that undermine the sovereignty
of the human subject and thus approach what Coleridge calls in Theory of Life irritability. In his
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scientific theory of evolution, as we’ve seen, irritability is affiliated with an uncontrollable
feeling while sensibility is more closely associated with human individuation and selfgovernment. Geraldine’s sudden and inexplicable physical regressions from strength to weakness
and from beauty to ugliness hint at the difficulty of identifying her as a self-regulating or selfgoverning individual; we certainly cannot say what is the inmost principle that makes her the
particular thing that she is. Possessed of contradictory voices, moods and physical attributes,
Geraldine appears less like an individual who acts according to moral or religious principles and
more like a thing come of accident, chance, or trauma. By contrast with Geraldine, Christabel
would channel the intentions of the “Virgin,”117 a figure who is vivified in her imagination by
approximation with the memory of her dead mother. Christabel shares the story of her mother’s
death with Geraldine:
She died the hour that I was born.
I have heard the grey-haired friar tell
How on her death-bed she did say,
That she should hear the castle-bell
Strike twelve upon my wedding-day.
O mother dear! that thou wert here!
I would, said Geraldine, she were!
But soon with altered voice, said she—
‘Off, wandering mother! Peak and pine!
I have power to bid thee flee.’118
In a Notebook entry written in the summer of 1800, Coleridge makes a plan for a poem that was
to be titled “The Pleasures of Religion”: “Introduction My Mother—prayer in the Lap—prayer
by the bed side—prayer in the great Hall at evening / Church—Cathedral / Mother associated
with God—”119 Citing this note, J. Robert Barth remarks that, in Christabel too, “the mother is
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the mediator of the transcendent”: Christabel’s “link with her mother’s spirit” is how she
accesses “divine reality.”120 I’d add that Christabel associates the spirit of her mother with the
pleasures of religion and friendship; Christabel offers Geraldine her mother’s “wild-flower
wine”121 in a kind of act of communion. Though Geraldine receives the wine, she soon wishes to
shake off the influence of Christabel’s mother. In an alien voice, Geraldine tells the spirit of
Christabel’s mother “this hour is mine— / Though thou her guardian spirit be.”122 During the
hour of Geraldine’s power, her actions are at odds with the intentions of Christabel’s “guardian
spirit”123 and perhaps too with the very idea of a divine reality that would give purpose to human
life. Geraldine weakens Christabel’s religious and moral sensibility by passing on to her negative
feelings and passions—an irritable sense beyond the power of modification.
The friendly, even erotic energy of the bedroom scene evaporates when Geraldine shows
her naked, though only partly visible body—“her bosom and half her side”124—to Christabel. In
the most prominent instance of evasive narration in the poem, we are told that Geraldine’s body
is “a sight to dream of, not to tell!”125 Her physical form is, in other words, unspeakably
grotesque. It is all the more horrid, then, when she lies down beside Christabel to work through
the “touch of [her] bosom”126 an overpowering spell. The spell, which afflicts Christabel with
what Geraldine calls “this mark of my shame, this seal of my sorrow,”127 limits Christabel’s
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speech, making her as unreliable a narrator of her own experience as Geraldine. The narrator
next sees Christabel
With open eyes (ah woe is me!)
Asleep, and dreaming fearfully,
Fearfully dreaming, yet I wis,
Dreaming that alone, which is—
O sorrow and shame! Can this be she,
The lady, who knelt at the old oak tree?
And lo! the worker of these harms,
That holds the maiden in her arms,
Seems to slumber still and mild,
As a mother with her child.128
The image of Christabel in Geraldine’s arms recalls the iconography of the Virgin and child and
yet denotes a more disturbing intimacy. Geraldine’s arms are “still and mild” like a mother, but
all is not well with the “child” in her arms. Anya Taylor observes that the dreaming girl is an
“altered being” and “a broken being.”129 Geraldine and the Virgin are, like irritability and
sensibility, polar opposites; the feelings of sorrow and shame that possess Christabel in her openeyed dream are correspondingly opposed to the moral and religious feeling that motivates her
initial acts of kindness and communion towards Geraldine. While Christabel’s religious feeling
is affiliated with the divine intentions of the Virgin, a paradigmatic exemplar of maternal
independence, the irritable feelings that she experiences in her nightmare and in subsequent
trance states come from Geraldine, a being who is not evidently mistress of her own actions and
whose accidental appearance in the wood outside the castle defies all narrative logic. To better
understand the link the poem traces between Geraldine, nightmare and the loss of personal
autonomy, it will be worthwhile to explore Coleridge’s notes and ideas on dream life.
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Beginning in 1804, Coleridge uses the terms double touch and single touch to theorize a
difference between the body’s “internal” feeling of itself and the feeling of external objects.
Coleridge posits that the images to which the mind is subjected in nightmares express the
imagination’s unconscious interpretation of the inward, “double” touch of the body.130 In
nightmare states, the inner sensations of the body influence mental life in a manner that is, like
the irritable sense that Coleridge describes in Theory of Life, beyond the shaping power of the
will or self-conscious imagination. Given Coleridge’s association of irritability with female
animals, it is not surprising that he finds himself subject in nightmare to the unwanted touch of a
predatory female agent. In a notebook entry of November 1800, Coleridge makes record of
a most frightful Dream of a Woman whose features were blended with darkness catching
holding of my right eye & attempting to pull it out—I caught hold of her arm fast—a
horrid feel—Wordsworth cried out aloud to me hearing my scream—heard his cry &
thought it cruel he did not come/but did not wake till his cry was repeated a third time—
the Woman’s name Ebon Ebon Thalud--When I awoke, my right eyelid swelled—131
There are several parallels between “Ebon” and Geraldine: Ebon’s features are covered over by
darkness as is Geraldine’s side; Ebon’s touch is “horrid” in much the same way as the touch of
Geraldine’s bosom is unspeakably awful. In a Freudian analysis, the “horrid feel” of these
womens’ touch might be a displaced signifier for Coleridge’s unspoken fear that he has lost his
poetic vision, a fear that was amplified by Wordsworth’s August 1800 decision not to include
Christabel in Lyrical Ballads. If we read Geraldine and Ebon as sexual threats, then they may
indicate his repressed fears of lesbianism, miscegenation and the “feminine” energies of the
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body.132 Alan Richardson has argued that Coleridge’s early poetic practice was informed by
contemporary, Romantic-era theories that the suspension of the will in dreams made the mind a
“theatre of instincts, emotions, and desires.”133 The display of such vital energies did not,
however, serve a repressive function in the materialist theories of dreaming that influenced
Coleridge.134 Coleridge found nightmares significant not because they revealed hidden truths
about the self, but because they attested to the power of feelings, associations and images to
which the conscious will or intelligence could not respond. We may of course identify repressed
fears about gender and sexuality in Coleridge’s nightmare poem, but I am more inclined to focus
on the problems of feeling and of the will that were at the forefront of his thinking about dreams.
In nightmares, Coleridge thought, the mind is unable to track the images that appear
before it to their source within the body. Confusing “double touch” with “single touch,” the
imagination represents the body’s pain as if it were caused by something outside of it. In a note
of 1811, Coleridge posits that, when the body’s circulation is disrupted in sleep, the “deadened”
body part “transmits double Touch as single Touch: to which the Imagination therefore, the true
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inward Creatrix, instantly out of the chaos of the elements <or shattered fragments> of Memory
puts together some form to fit it.”135 In the dream described above, Coleridge does not perceive
that the horror that he associates with the touch of the woman has a source in the swelling of his
own eye. In Christabel, this confusion is inverted: Christabel cannot tell in her nightmare and
trance states that the passions that she experiences as her own—“sorrow and shame”136 and,
later, “dull and treacherous hate”137—have an external source in Geraldine’s touch. Geraldine’s
power over Christabel resembles the power that the “double touch” of the body and the
unconscious associations of the imagination have over the conscious will in dreams. Her power
is in this way analogous with the biological power of “irritability” that Coleridge would define
the same year that he published Christabel as a feeling over which the organism has little
control.
Geraldine has nearly as complete a hold on Christabel in the daylight as during the
midnight hour. Coleridge told Henry Nelson Coleridge in 1833 that he couldn’t finish the poem
because its idea was “the most difficult, I think, that can be attempted in Romantic Poetry—I
mean witchery by daylight.”138 When Christabel first sees Geraldine the morning after their night
spent together, she cannot shake the shame and “perplexity of mind”139 she experienced in her
lively nightmare. A key question of part II is: will Christabel be able to “leave behind”140 the
irritable feelings that Geraldine has freighted her with and act upon the moral and religious
sensibility that she displays at the beginning of the poem? Geraldine continues to hold Christabel
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captive to bad feelings after they enter the “presence room”141 of Christabel’s father. The baron
Leoline, who discovers that Geraldine’s father is an estranged childhood friend, embraces her,
promising hospitality and help. The narrator observes:
Fair Geraldine, who met the embrace,
Prolonging it with joyous look.
Which when she viewed, a vision fell
Upon the soul of Christabel,
The vision of fear, the touch and pain!
She shrunk and shuddered, and saw again—
(Ah, woe is me! Was it for thee,
Thou gentle maid! such sights to see?)
Again she saw that bosom old,
Again she felt that bosom cold,
And drew in her breath with a hissing sound:
Whereat the Knight turned wildly round,
And nothing saw, but his own sweet maid
With eyes upraised, as one that prayed.142
The “vision of fear, the touch and pain” has the physicality of irritability or double-touch: the
memory of Geraldine’s bosom falls bluntly “upon the soul of Christabel.” Weakened in body and
in will, Christabel becomes a vector of animal irritability: she inhales with a “hissing sound.”
The snake is of course associated in the book of Genesis with humankind’s fall into sin, guilt,
and shame. In the passage above, Christabel is possessed by the shame that Geraldine originally
claimed as her own. Their exchange of gazes works like the double touch of dream to make it
impossible to tell the difference between affects that come from within and those that come from
without, or between affects that belong to Geraldine and those that belong to Christabel. That
problem coincides with a failure of communication; instead of speaking to Leoline, Christabel
hisses. The second time Christabel is held captive by Geraldine’s gaze, her whole appearance is
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transformed. Geraldine’s eyes metamorphose into “shrunken serpent eyes”143 and Christabel’s
“forced unconscious sympathy”144 with Geraldine impels her to passively “imitate / That look of
dull and treacherous hate!”145 When Leoline catches Christabel’s gaze, he suspects that she is
jealous of his attentions to Geraldine.
It is prayer, finally, that empowers Christabel to invoke her mother to Leoline:
the maid
Paus’d awhile, and inly pray’d
Then falling at her father’s feet,
“By my mother’s soul do I entreat
“That thou this woman send away!”
She said; and more she could not say,
For what she knew she could not tell,
O’er master’d by the mighty spell.146
Christabel calls upon the memory of her mother to command her father to send Geraldine away
but Geraldine’s “mighty spell” ultimately consigns her to muteness.147 Geraldine thus divides
Christabel from the moral and religious sensibility embodied by the figures of her mother and the
Virgin. Prayer is presented as a possible means of Christabel’s reconnection to the intentions of
the divine, but her voice and will remain suspended at the end of the poem. This suggests that
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she is ultimately unable to subsume feelings of irritability under a divine moral principle.
Coleridge contends in his evolutionary theory that human beings are distinct from animals
because they are a revelation of the divine will. At the same time, he posits a possible analogy
between animal sensibility and the “rational and responsible soul”148 that is made in God’s
image. To make this argument, he must suppress evidence of the proximity of human beings to
mammals, who demonstrate new intensities of irritable feeling. I am arguing that Geraldine acts
like the power of irritability to undermine faith that the sensibility of animals may be made
consistent with the purpose of a higher intelligence. While prayer is the means by which
Christabel tries to make sense of irritability, poetry is Bard Bracy’s means to that same end.
When Leoline requests that Bracy travel to Geraldine’s father’s hall to deliver the
message that she is safe, Bracy protests that he has been “warned by a vision” that a thing
“unblest” may be loitering in the woods around the castle.149 Bracy describes how, the night
before, he had a dream in which he saw a dove bearing Christabel’s name “fluttering, and
uttering fearful moan / Among the green herbs in the forest alone.”150 The bard is unable at first
to make out “what the sweet bird’s trouble meant.”151 However, as he approaches the bird, he
finds a green snake wrapped around the dove’s body, camouflaged by the herbs. The vision is
revelatory:
I stooped, methought, the dove to take,
When lo! I saw a bright green snake
Coiled around its wings and neck.
Green as the herbs on which it couched,
Close by the dove’s its head it crouched;
And with the dove it heaves and stirs,
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Swelling its neck as she swelled hers!152
The dream recalls the earlier image of Christabel in Geraldine’s arms, but encodes a different
symbolic message. In the New Testament, the dove is a symbol for the holy spirit. While the
snake is associated with sin, the devil and the expulsion from paradise in a Christian context, the
pre-Christian image of the snake eating its own tail symbolizes rejuvenation, metamorphosis and
the eternity of natural cycles. Bracy’s vision captures this double significance of the snake as
both an agent of evil and a sign of natural rejuvenation: the abundance of green in Bracy’s
vision—the grass, herbs and snake itself—suggest that it is natural, though perhaps “unholy,”153
for the snake to be thus coiled around the body of the dove. The vision is revelatory because it
suggests that the spirit and, with it, the will are naturally susceptible to the hold of a “thing
unblest.”154 The grasp of the snake, the double touch of nightmare and the feelings of irritability
are simply a part of life. Instead of offering superstitious conjectures about the trouble that
haunts Christabel, Bracy suspends judgement about the problem, proposing to transform his
dream vision into a poetic cure. Bracy explains to Leoline that he can’t travel to Geraldine’s
father’s hall because he has vowed to wander “with music strong and saintly song”155 through
the forest “lest aught unholy loiter there.”156
Mary Favret notes a “shift from (female) bodies to (male) poetic authority” between parts
I and II of Christabel.157 I argued above that Christabel’s charity to Geraldine raises the reader’s
hope that the goals of natural education may be fulfilled; perhaps Christabel will promote
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interdependency within her dying “clan.”158 Instead of sowing the seeds of moral community,
however, Christabel’s sympathy devolves into irritability, her religious sensibility into
nightmare, sorrow and shame. Though Christabel continues to be held speechless at the end of
the poem, Bracy comes very close to a meaningful interpretation of Christabel’s suffering. His
effort in this direction would seem to reinforce Wordsworth’s and Coleridge’s argument that the
poet has a crucial role to play in upholding “natural” education amidst uncertain times. At the
same time, the contrast between Christabel and Bracy reinforces the idea that female irritability
is superseded by male poetic vision.159 The division between female nightmare and male genius
that emerges in part II corresponds with the gendered division between female irritability and
male sensibility in Theory of Life: in both instances, Coleridge suggests that men are more
capable of modifying their feelings than women and are thus better emblems of the goals of
evolution and/or education. Coleridge does not, however, exclusively attribute the problem of
irritability to women in Christabel. At the conclusion of the poem, Coleridge subverts the
gendered hierarchy that he sets up as natural in his poetics and evolutionary theory in order to
call attention to the artificiality of patriarchal family systems.
At the end of part II, the narrator shifts focus from the troubling exchanges between
Geraldine and Christabel to the irritable disposition of Leoline, a baron who “seldom sleepeth
well.”160 When Leoline discovers that Geraldine is the daughter of his old friend the “Lord
Roland de Vaux of Tryermaine,”161 he imagines bringing her kidnappers to court where “there
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and then / I may dislodge their reptile souls / From the bodies and forms of men!”162 Motivated
to action by a “heart swell’d high with rage,”163 Leoline does not respond kindly to Christabel’s
request that he send Geraldine away. Citing Christabel’s mother’s prayer that “the babe for
whom she died, / Might prove her dear lord’s joy and pride,”164 the narrator laments that:
Within the baron’s heart and brain
If thoughts, like these, had any share,
They only swelled his rage and pain,
And did but work confusion there.
His heart was cleft with pain and rage,
His cheeks they quivered, his eyes were wild,
Dishonoured thus in his old age;
Dishonoured by his only child,
And all his hospitality
To the wronged daughter of his friend
By more than woman's jealousy
Brought thus to a disgraceful end—
He rolled his eye with stern regard
Upon the gentle minstrel bard,
And said in tones abrupt, austere—
'Why, Bracy! dost thou loiter here?
I bade thee hence!'165
Leoline’s response attests to the corrosive effects of grief: the rage and pain that attend the
thought of Christabel’s dead mother work against the ends of love and care that had been her
dying wish. Leoline’s personality has, like Geraldine’s and Christabel’s, been destabilized by
trauma. Much as Geraldine’s “dull and treacherous hate”166 alters the appearance of Christabel’s
face, the intensity of Leoline’s “pain and rage” forces a change in his expression: “his checks
they quivered, his eyes were wild.” While it is tempting to view Geraldine as the agent that
introduces irritability into the family, in fact, she only exacerbates the unhappiness that precedes
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her. In the end, Bracy fails to put his poetic cure to action because Leoline, who has long been
disordered in “heart and brain,”167 sends him away in an angry passion. The problem that
Geraldine poses cannot be recognized or resolved in part II because Leoline, who is as much a
prey to irritability as Geraldine, ignores Christabel’s and her mother’s prayers and misinterprets
Bracy’s vision. While Leoline’s passion undermines the assumption that women are more prone
to irritability than men, Bracy’s failure to follow through with his intention to carry “music
strong and saintly song”168 through the forest destabilizes Coleridge’s association of moral
sensibility and genius with men.
Tim Fulford has argued that Coleridge’s thinking about gender in Christabel is
influenced by Matthew Lewis’ gothic novel The Monk (1796). In Lewis’ novel, the androgynous
character Mathilda emasculates the male hero and encourages him to reassert his masculinity
through violence. Mathilda reveals, as Fulford argues, the violence at the foundation of
masculinity understood as a “sublime” category and, correspondingly, the violation invited by
norms of feminine modesty and chastity. In Fulford’s reading of Christabel, Geraldine is
reminiscent of Mathilda. She calls attention to taboo gender roles and desires that must be
repressed for the patriarchal family structure to reproduce itself.169 Though I agree with Fulford
that Christabel offers a critique of the gender roles proscribed by the aristocratic family, I am
more inclined to affiliate Geraldine with irritable feeling and the uncontrollable passions of
hatred, rage and shame that go unchecked within the aristocratic family structure than with the
incestuous desires repressed by it. Coleridge was not, as Nicholas Halmi has argued, a Freudian:
he was more likely to attribute the unsettling images and associations that appeared in his dreams
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to physical sources than to repressed emotion.170 In my view, Coleridge questions the legitimacy
of the gender positions enforced by aristocratic and patriarchal systems in a manner that is more
consistent with the professional-class morality of Samuel Richardson than with the nihilist
subversions of Matthew Lewis.
Things begin to go wrong in Richardson’s tragic novel Clarissa when Mr. Harlow asserts
control over his daughter’s marriage choice, ignoring Clarissa’s pleas to refuse marriage to the
abhorrent Mr. Solmes. Hina Nazar has argued that, because the novel “renders strikingly
unpalatable the putatively “natural authority” that parents exercised over their children,” 171
Clarissa is forced to rely on her own judgement. Coleridge admires as much as Richardson the
moral independence of a daughter who challenges the will of her despotic father. In Christabel,
he calls attention to the artificiality of an outdated, aristocratic standard of parental authority by
highlighting Leoline’s passion and prejudice. When Christabel entreats Leoline to send
Geraldine away, he accuses her of failing to honor his authority. He dismisses her request as an
indication of “more than women’s jealousy”172 and yet his own commands are inspired by the
hardly less credible passion of rage. In August 1800, Wordsworth declined to publish Christabel
with the second edition of Lyrical Ballads.173 Discouraged by Wordsworth’s rejection, Coleridge
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did not complete the poem but sent an aborted Conclusion to part II to Southey on 6 May of
1801.174 Instead of offering closure to the family tensions of part II, the Conclusion reflects on
the causes of an unnamed father’s bitter words to his child:
A little child, a limber elf,
Singing, dancing to itself,
A fairy thing with red round cheeks,
That always finds, and never seeks,
Makes such a vision to the sight
As fills a father's eyes with light;
And pleasures flow in so thick and fast
Upon his heart, that he at last
Must needs express his love's excess
With words of unmeant bitterness.
Perhaps 'tis pretty to force together
Thoughts so all unlike each other;
To mutter and mock a broken charm,
To dally with wrong that does no harm.
Perhaps 'tis tender too and pretty
At each wild word to feel within
A sweet recoil of love and pity.
And what, if in a world of sin
(O sorrow and shame should this be true!)
Such giddiness of heart and brain
Comes seldom save from rage and pain,
So talks as it's most used to do.175
The two sentences that begin with “perhaps” turn the sure fact that the father’s bitter words are
“unmeant” into a probability in need of explanation: perhaps the father’s words “mutter and
mock” a break in the infant’s habitual charm, or maybe he recoils from his words with
intensified feelings of “love and pity.” The “what if” of the final sentence introduces an entirely
new interpretation of the scenario: the father’s words might be the effect of a “giddiness of heart
from the sensationalism that the public associated with supernatural poetry. (Gamer,
Romanticism and the Gothic, 90-126) Duncan Wu suggests that the decision was an expression
of Wordsworth’s long suppressed resentment at Coleridge for forcing The Recluse project on
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and brain” that has more to do with “rage and pain” than with paternal love. The narrator thus
raises doubts about whether the perception of the infant that is initially attributed to the father is
in fact his. The passage suggests by analogy that Leoline’s habitual nervous irritability prevents
him from accurately perceiving Christabel’s needs.
The Conclusion of part II can be placed in conversation with the ideas on infant
perception that Coleridge developed observing his sons Derwent and Hartley in the late 1790s.176
In a Notebook entry of January 1800, Coleridge recalls that, in his lectures on “The Laws of
Nature and Nations,” James Mackintosh talked “a great deal of Nonsense about judgement &
used a most false example of a Parent’s Love to a worthless Infant—might as well have talked of
the love to unroasted meat.”177 Having followed John Locke in doing away with both innate and
abstract ideas, Mackintosh views an infant as lacking in experience and as therefore “worthless.”
Coleridge implies in the same entry that Mackintosh is unable to understand an infant’s worth
and, with it, a parent’s love because he has “not applied his metaphysics to real objects.”178 A
philosopher should begin, Coleridge asserts, with the perception of an actual infant to avoid
“talking nonsense”179 about morality. Coleridge was himself a careful observer of his sons in
their infancy. Several of the most canonical conversation poems that Coleridge wrote during the
1790s conclude in moments of infant wonder that reflect in turn a parent’s love. In Frost at
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Midnight (1798), a hanging icicle incites in the speaker’s son a feeling of awe that prefigures his
sense of the oneness in all of life’s processes. In the opening lines of the Conclusion to
Christabel, the narrator presents a similar, if less specific, paternal vision of a child who “always
finds and never seeks.”180 The subsequent lines suggest, however, that physiological and
specifically nervous phenomena—“giddiness of heart and brain”181—may stand in the way of the
flourishing of moral sensibility in both father and son, Leoline and Christabel. The concern that
the intensity of the human nervous system undermines morality is precisely what drives
Coleridge to insist on an absolute separation between animal and human life in Theory of Life.
Coleridge supplements Rousseau’s, Wollstonecraft’s and Wordsworth’s critiques of
enlightenment education by representing the figure of the overbearing educator as an irritable
aristocrat. At the end of part II of Christabel, he reimagines the problem of excessive didacticism
as a problem of unearned patriarchal and aristocratic authority. The system that grants so much
weight to Leoline’s irritability is an obstacle to the goals of natural education and human
evolution as Coleridge conceived them; it stands in the way of a family’s ability to achieve
“inter-dependence in social…life.”182 It’s not clear, however, that Coleridge meant for the poem
to end with this message. In the Preface that Coleridge composed for the 1816 publication of
Christabel, he promised to complete the poem soon: “I trust that I shall be able to embody in
verse the three parts yet to come, in the course of the present year.”183 Coleridge continued for
the rest of his life to assert that he had a plan for the ending. He claimed, for instance, that the
highly ambiguous encounter between Geraldine and Christabel was to be the first part of a longer
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story in which Christabel’s sufferings “were to be represented as vicarious, endured for ‘her
lover far away.’”184 Her “dark night of the soul” would prove to be as redemptive as Christ’s
suffering on the cross.185 Coleridge wanted to resolve the poem in such a way as to affirm that
even the most wayward tendencies of human and animal life can be considered as if they were
directed towards a divine purpose. He had a much harder time, however, suppressing evidence of
the disruptive force of irritability here than in Theory of Life. The fragment as it is written
exposes the contradiction between life and the human will that Coleridge suppresses in Theory of
Life in order to foreground the progressive trajectory of both natural and human life. In place of a
satisfying affirmation that the professional-class values of “natural” sensibility and moral
independence will be socially reproduced, Christabel calls attention to the way in which that
process is inhibited by the force of irritability. The poem thus evinces uncertainty about whether
an innate moral purpose can be ascribed to the nature of human beings.
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CHAPTER FOUR: Materialism and Imagination in Coleridge’s Biographia Literaria and
Shelley’s Frankenstein
In the 1831 Preface to Frankenstein, Shelley recounts how the idea for the story first
occurred to her after hearing Percy Shelley and Lord Byron discuss the experiments of Dr
Darwin “who preserved a piece of vermicelli in a glass case, till by some extraordinary means it
began to move with voluntary motion.”1 Shelley raises more questions about her engagement
with the scientific discourses of her day than she answers with this anecdote. Erasmus Darwin is
a well-known theorist of evolution, but the vermicelli experiment concerns the origin of a body’s
motion, an issue that was more central to galvanism. While it is clear that the origins of Shelley’s
novel lie in the scientific conversations of the Romantic era, there is no consensus about which
conversations she addresses. Scholars of the history of science have foregrounded the questions
that Shelley’s novel raises about scientific authority as it was conceived in fields ranging from
galvanism to evolution, chemistry, physiology, obstetrics and embryology.2 In this chapter, I
shift focus from the ethics of scientific practice and towards the ethical implications of the theory
of the self that emerges from modern science’s materialist concept of life. To this end, it is
productive to place Shelley’s Frankenstein in conversation with Coleridge’s analysis of
materialist philosophy in Biographia Literaria. Shelley and Coleridge are both responding to the
eighteenth-century emergence of life science as an extension of mechanics. In The Order of
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Things, Foucault gives voice to the form of rationality that accompanied this epistemological
shift:
Since it had proven possible, by means of experimentation and theory, to analyse the laws
of movement or those governing the reflection of light beams, was it not normal to seek,
by means of experiments, observations, or calculations, the laws that might govern the
more complex but adjacent realm of living beings?3
If the laws governing living beings are like the laws governing the Newtonian universe, then the
scientist can know life through the empirical methods of experiment, observation and
calculation. Coleridge and Shelley turn this assumption of scientific mastery on its head to reveal
a self whose development is disrupted by the physical causes that assume privileged validity
within materialist discourse. They bring into focus the way in which what Wordsworth calls the
“eye of reason”4 disrupts the flourishing of “natural” moral feeling.
This chapter elaborates on the problems that a materialist viewpoint poses to human
education while also returning to the question, central to Wordsworth’s Preface to Lyrical
Ballads and The Prelude, of whether imagination can remedy the disorders caused by modern
life. Though Coleridge and Shelley agree that materialism poses a problem of moral
development, they differ in their thinking about how imagination might be used to address this
problem. In Percy Shelley’s 1818 Preface to Frankenstein, he writes that “however impossible as
a physical fact,” Victor’s creation of a being from lifeless matter “affords a point of view to the
imagination for the delineating of human passions more comprehensive and commanding than
any which the ordinary relations of existing events can yield.”5 Percy’s description of the
imagination’s “point of view” recalls Coleridge’s description in Biographia of Wordsworth’s
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imagination as “the original gift of spreading the tone, the atmosphere, and with it the depth and
height of the ideal world around forms, incidents, and situations, of which, for the common view,
custom had bedimmed all the lustre, had dried up the sparkle and the dew drops.”6 On the one
hand, the Shelleys agree with Coleridge that imagination can establish a unified point of view
from which to regard the workings of passion and custom. While Coleridge is confident that the
imagination can transcend custom, Shelley adopts a more modest hope that the imagination
might establish enough of a distance from it to enable reading. In the last chapter, I showed how,
in Christabel, natural education fails because the “power” of “irritability” takes predominance
over moral sensibility. In Biographia Literaria, the mechanisms of a materialist universe pose a
similar threat to the affective community of natural education. Here, however, the problem of
materialism can be overcome by an imagination that is founded in a direct intuition of divine
law. Shelley, who does not share Coleridge’s vision of the absolute knowledge of philosophic
imagination, calls upon imagination to represent within Frankenstein a self whose education is
compromised by empirical science.
Coleridge warns that the study of philosophy will undermine the moral feelings at the
heart of “natural” education if it activates the understanding alone. In Frankenstein, Shelley
unfolds a story about which Coleridge only hints in Biographia Literaria, one in which moral
agency is compromised by the preeminence of materialist theory. At the University of Ingolstadt,
Victor is encouraged by “the improvement which every day takes place in science and
mechanics”7 to assemble a living being from lifeless matter. Shelley identifies the consequences
of modern scientific and technological progress as much with the associative psychology of
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Victor as with the supernatural giantism of the creature. Coleridge argues in Biographia
Literaria that mechanistic science refers us to a mind that is helpless against the “chaos of
association.”8 Victor comes to resemble this subject as, again and again, he instinctively reacts to
the sight of the being he has created with ideas of inherent evil. The creature, too, becomes a
helpless victim of his associations: the murders he commits make manifest the violence that is
continually directed against him. Alienated at the end of Frankenstein from one another, Victor
and the creature expose the contradiction between modern science’s concept of the mind and the
moral community that is the goal of “natural” education. For Coleridge, as we saw in the last
chapter, human social progress is only natural by way of analogy; humans realize the moral goals
of education as beings who the divine has bestowed with a special capacity for self-governance.
In Biographia Literaria, Coleridge makes organic development a symbol for the imagination’s
direct intuition of this divine connection. While Coleridge and Shelley offer comparable
treatments of the problem that materialism poses to an education that aims at moral autonomy,
Shelley does not reinstate the autonomous human subject by way of a concept of imagination as
the constitutive core of the self. In Frankenstein, imagination supports non-mechanistic acts of
reading and of sympathetic response that do not depend on an anthropocentric concept of human
beings as bearers of divine law. In Frankenstein, such acts of reading give rise to a sense of self
and of community that remains exempt from pure mechanism, but which is nonetheless fragile
and only ever partly achieved.
Hartleyan Materialism and the Organic Imagination in Biographia Literaria
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Coleridge’s epigraph to the Biographia Literaria, translated for English readers from
Goethe’s introduction to the periodical Propyläen (1798), foregrounds the social dimensions of
the form of education to which the author aspires:
Little call as he may have to instruct others, he wishes nevertheless to open out his heart
to such as he either knows or hopes to be of like mind with himself, but who are widely
scattered in the world: he wishes to knit anew his connections with his oldest friends, to
continue those recently formed, and to win other friends among the rising generation for
the remaining course of his life. He wishes to spare the young those circuitous paths on
which he himself had lost his way.
Any instruction the book may provide will depend on the author’s success in winning or
renewing a friendly “connection” with the reader. Coleridge’s wish to “spare the young” recalls
the Savoyard Vicar’s and Maria’s hope that, by telling their own story, they may help their
younger auditor live a life free of prejudice. Coleridge appropriates this form of private and
epistolary instruction to address a wider reading public. He follows the lead of Goethe, Schiller,
and Wordsworth, who place the development of the artist and critic at the center of a concept of
“natural” education which expands outwards from the autobiographical self to the “rising
generation.” Coleridge’s Biographia Literaria is not, however, just an autobiography of his life
as poet and critic. It is also importantly a philosophic treatise. Coleridge claims in chapter one
that the narration of his life in print is an “introductory to the statement of my principles in
Politics, Religion, and Philosophy, and the application of the rules, deduced from philosophical
principles, to poetry and criticism.”9 Jerome McGann writes that the biographical frame of
Biographia Literaria reveals “a person whose work was steadfast in its principles…from the
beginning, but who only grew into his developing self-conscious grasp of the operation of these
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principles in his own life’s work and practice.”10 In the role of philosopher, Coleridge unearths
the roots of the educational project glossed in the epigraph and further explored in his
autobiographical account of his early education. When Coleridge goes astray in early life, it is
because he has not yet become conscious of the philosophic principles that might strengthen
rather than disfigure the feelings of the heart.
In the first chapter of Biographia, Coleridge advocates for a model of education based in
“genial”11 ties between reader and writer rather than in the “dirty passions” of an “improved
pedagogy” that trains children “to dispute and decide; to suspect all but their own and their
lecturer’s wisdom.”12 Coleridge is here reacting against disputatious practices of anonymous
criticism that, like the pedagogies of reading that Wordsworth targets in book 5 of The Prelude,
narrow the imagination of the pupil. Coleridge proposes that students should be taught to
recognize “excellence in style” so that they might admire great poets.13 He credits the rigors of
his grammar master at Christ’s Hospital for teaching him to regard poetic language not as “mere
ornamentation and the paint of rhetoric” but as the “natural flush and genuine warmth of the
blood flowing from the matter itself.”14 On this view, figurative language does not represent
things, but embodies their life. Wordsworth makes a similar claim about poetic language when,
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in the Preface to Lyrical Ballads, he asserts that poetry ought to keep the reader “in the company
of flesh and blood.”15 Wordsworth’s gambit in the Preface is that the “real language of men in a
state of vivid sensation”16 might draw the reader out of the deathly state of “savage torpor”17 that
is induced by modernity. Coleridge emphasizes in the Biographia that poems that “assume the
properties of flesh and blood”18 connect reader with writer in a bond of friendship that is crucial
to the education of the young and to the formation of the affections of the literary critic. When, in
chapter two, Coleridge argues that a “calm and tranquil temper”19 is a requisite of genius, he
further promotes the standard of education and criticism elaborated in the epigraph and first
chapter, one that would displace the fanatic “impudence”20 of anonymous critics with a sense of
the obligations owed to writers as real people.
Coleridge supposes that “the productions of contemporary genius” have a more “vivid
effect” on the “youthful mind” than the work of geniuses of past times because reader and writer
have been “surrounded by the same circumstances and disciplined by the same manners.”21 The
writings of a contemporary may thus “possess a reality…and inspire an actual friendship as of
man for man.”22 Coleridge considers friendship high among the priorities of education because
he was often lonely as a student at Christ’s hospital. He recalls how he sought conversation in his
“friendless wanderings on…leave- days”23 with strangers who might discuss with him his
favorite topics of metaphysics and theology. Here, notably, Coleridge does not find purpose in
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philosophic study: quoting Milton, he asserts that, in the difficult concepts “of providence, foreknowledge, will, and fate,” he “found no end in wandering mazes lost.”24 Coleridge’s claim to
have been led astray by a desire to understand what is meant by “will and fate” anticipates his
argument in chapter 6 that a mechanical system of philosophy must inevitably “bewilder” all
who would “pierce into the adyta” or “innermost sanctuary” of causation.25 Like the
Wordsworthian student of modern education who is shut out from the “open ground of fancy,”26
Coleridge finds during his period of intensive metaphysic study that “poetry itself, yea novels
and romances, became insipid to me.”27 He was set on a better track, however, after he was
introduced to an “amicable family”—the family of his schoolmate William Evans—and to the
“tender” sonnets of William Lisle Bowles.28 Coleridge sets the “blessed interval”29 in which he
was nurtured by the poetry of Bowles and the hospitality of the Evans family apart in time from
the lonely and “friendless” period when he was absorbed in the “preposterous pursuit”30 of
metaphysical studies.
Coleridge foreshadows his return to questions of metaphysics even as he fondly recalls
the friendships that turned him away from that pursuit for a time:
Well were it for me perhaps, had I never relapsed into the same mental disease; if I had
continued to pluck the flower and reap the harvest from the cultivated surface, instead of
delving in the unwholesome quicksilver mines of metaphysic depths. But if in after time I
have sought a refuge from bodily pain and mismanaged sensibility in abstruse researches,
which exercised the strength and subtlety of the understanding without awakening the
feelings of the heart; still there was a long and blessed interval, during which my natural
faculties were allowed to expand.31
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Here, it is not the students of “the improved pedagogy”32 of the age but Coleridge himself whose
affections are stifled by his course of study. The phrase “abstruse researches” that Coleridge uses
to describe his “relapse” into philosophy in the quote above turns up in Dejection, an Ode, a
poem in which Coleridge worries that metaphysics has destroyed the “shaping spirit” of his
imagination along with his sensitivity to nature.33 The figure of philosophic study as an
unhealthy and unnatural pursuit links Coleridge to Shelley, who identifies Victor’s studies at the
University of Ingolstadt as a mental disease and unwholesome labor. When Victor becomes
absorbed in the study of natural philosophy, he abandons the friendships that had been crucial to
his early education in Geneva. Such friendships are precisely what saves Coleridge from the
“mental disease” of philosophic education.
In Theory of Life, as we have seen, Coleridge stipulates that education is the end goal of
the “new series”34 in natural history that begins with the emergence of human beings. Coleridge
argues that progress in human genius, liberty and social interdependence unfolds in a process
that is analogous in form to that of animal individuation. He asserts:
Nor does the form of polarity, which has accompanied the law of individuation up its
whole ascent, desert it here [with the emergence of “man”]. As the height, so the depth.
The intensities must be at once opposite and equal. As the liberty, so must be the
reverence for law. As the independence, so must be the service and the submission to the
Supreme Will! As the ideal genius and the originality, in the same proportion must be the
resignation to the real world, the sympathy and the inter-communion with Nature. In the
conciliating mid-point, or equator, does the Man live, and only by its equal presence in
both its poles can that life be manifested!35
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In the case of genius, the “intensities” of life express themselves in “ideal” originality on the one
hand and sympathy with “Nature” on the other. These poles must be brought into balance if
genius is to, as Immanuel Kant puts it, “give the rule to art.”36 Insofar as that synthesis takes the
same form as the polarizing process which produces sensibility in animals, genius can be said to
undergo an “organic” process of development. However, in Biographia Literaria, Coleridge
clarifies that there is not one but “two Polar sciences”; “the act of self-duplication” which
initiates the “second series” of natural history and which is essential for genius, liberty and
independence lies exclusively in the terrain “of transcendental philosophy” and not “natural
philosophy.”37 The limitations of an education that proceeds by means of natural philosophy
alone becomes evident in the autobiographical frame of Biographia Literaria when Coleridge
represents his early philosophic study as a turn away from the intrinsically social processes of
“natural” education.
Coleridge’s reference to a system of philosophy that exercises the understanding to the
exclusion of the “feelings of the heart”38 corresponds with his description of materialist
psychology as a system that degrades “every fundamental idea in ethics or theology.”39 In
chapter 5 of Biographia, Coleridge offers a genealogy of the psychological law of the association
of ideas, which he defines as the “mechanism of the reproduction of impressions.”40 Coleridge
contests James Makintosh’s claim that associationism originated with Thomas Hobbes. He traces
the law of association back to Aristotle so as to leave open the possibility of the will’s
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intervention in the habitual, mechanistic process by which the mind reproduces impressions. In
Hobbes’ system as in David Hartley’s, the psychological laws of association are “material and
mechanical” and are thus no different from the laws of “motion and impact.”41 Under these
premises, ideas can only be associated by proximity in time: Coleridge asks “to what law can the
action of material atoms be subject, but that of proximity in place? And to what law can their
motions be subjected, but that of time?”42 Aristotle, who does not explain association by way of
“fiction[al]”43 analogies with the motion of nerves or animal spirits, admits of more causes of
association than “connection in time.”44 Aristotle’s thinking on association forms the backbone
of Coleridge’s claim that the memory may be stirred by “whatever makes certain parts of a total
impression more vivid or distinct than the rest.”45 If “the will by confining and intensifying the
attention may arbitrarily give vividness or distinctness to any object whatsoever,”46 then
mechanical laws need not wholly determine the processes of association. Coleridge believes that
the will must be able to intervene in mental processes if moral action is to be possible. Hartley’s
and Hobbes’ theories are inadequate because they describe the will as a product of “blind
mechanism” and thus set the mind adrift in the “phantasmal chaos of association.”47
In Hartley’s philosophy, the will becomes the mirror of an infinitely complex set of
material relationships. Coleridge complains that “the existence of an infinite spirit, an intelligent
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and holy will, must on [Hartley’s] system be mere articulated motions in the air.”48 Coleridge
further emphasizes the absurdity of Hartley’s concept of the will by suggesting that, in the
universe that he posits, the text of the Biographia Literaria would be the effect of
the mere motion of my muscles and nerves; and these again are set in motion from
external causes equally passive, which external causes stand themselves in
interdependent connection with everything that exists or has existed. Thus the whole
universe co-operates to produce the minutest stroke of every letter, save only that I
myself, and I alone, have nothing to do with it.49
In a world arranged according to Hartley’s system, the concept of the author has no place. Texts
are passive effects of a network of nervous and atmospheric motions as diffuse as the “whole
universe.” Coleridge contends that this absurd view of authorship arises from materialism’s
attempt to demystify a basic problem in “the system of DUALISM introduced by Des Cartes.”50
The Cartesian system cannot explain how “an affection from without can metamorphose itself
into perception and will” or how “being can transform itself into a knowing.”51 By attributing all
thoughts and perceptions to material causes, Hartley turns the Cartesian mystery into the
“comprehensible absurdity”52 that is captured by the idea that “everything that exists or has
existed” authored Biographia rather than Coleridge himself.
Coleridge had long been developing the critique of materialism that he offers in chapter 8
of Biographia in his notebooks. In a note of 1801, he writes: “materialists unwilling to admit the
mysterious of our nature make it all mysterious—nothing mysterious in nerves, eyes, &c: but
that nerves think &c!!—Stir up the sediment into the transparent water, & so make all opaque.”53
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The assumption that nerves think is symptomatic of a failure to admit the mysterious of our
nature. From this point of view, “metaphysical systems…become popular, not for their truth, but
in proportion as they attribute to causes a susceptibility of being seen, if only our visual organs
were sufficiently powerful.”54 Far from clarifying the Cartesian problem of the relation of being
to thinking, the assumption that metaphysical causes are visible to the eye of physical science
and thus “unmysterious” makes the relationship even more “opaque.”55 Coleridge uses the same
metaphor of stirred-up sediment in Biographia Literaria to clinch his critique of “Hylozoism,”
which he glosses as the idea that “every atom of our bodies has a soul of its own.”56 Coleridge
contrasts Cartesian dualism with Hylozoism thus: “there is a sediment indeed at the bottom of
the vessel, but all the water above it is clear and transparent. The Hylozoist only shakes it up, and
renders the whole turbid.”57 Quoting the sixteenth-century theologian Richard Hooker, Coleridge
warns his reader that “because men are not accustomed to [philosophy], the pains we take are
more needful a great deal, than acceptable; and the matters we handle, seem by reason of
newness (till the mind grow better acquainted with them) dark and intricate.”58 The perception,
here projected onto the uninitiated reader, of philosophy as a handling “dark and intricate” matter
might be comprehended within the frame of Coleridge’s frustration with materialists who “make
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all opaque.”59 However, Coleridge implies that the pains that the philosopher takes are in fact
needed. In chapter 9, Coleridge presents Kantian and post-Kantian philosophy as a clarification
of the matters of thought, perception and will that the materialist philosopher leaves in darkness.
Coleridge credits the writings of Kant along with those of Jakob Böhme and Baruch
Spinoza for helping him out of the endless intricacies of a system of philosophy grounded in
mechanical laws. He credits these writers with giving him “an indistinct, yet stirring and working
presentment, that all the products of the mere reflective faculty partook of DEATH, and were as
the rattling twigs and sprays in winter, into which a sap was yet to be propelled, from some root
to which I had not yet penetrated.”60 What Coleridge here calls the “reflective faculty” is
comparable to the “I” of Hartleyan theory, which Coleridge refers to as the “causeless and
effectless beholding” of an action once it is done, “the mere quick-silver plating behind a
looking-glass.”61 We may also compare the “reflective faculty” to what Coleridge sometimes
calls understanding. In volume 1 of the 1818 The Friend, Coleridge explains that “the
Understanding, wherever it does not possess or use the Reason, as another and inward eye, may
be defined [as] the conception of the Sensuous, or the faculty by which we generalize and
arrange the phaenomena of perception.”62 The understanding must be accompanied by an “organ
of inward sense” if it is to comprehend the “essential properties of things by means of the Laws
that constitute them.”63 Without this “organ” of inward sense, the understanding is a mere
cataloguer of sensuous impressions. Just as the understanding requires the inward eye of Reason
to understand the essence of things, the reflective faculty requires a “root” if it is to partake of

59

Coleridge, Notebooks, 1, 920.
Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, 152.
61
Ibid, 119.
62
Coleridge, “Reason and Understanding,” 555.
63
Ibid, 557.
60

166

life. Coleridge will identify this source of the vitality of reflection with the “higher ground” of
transcendental reason that Immanuel Kant assumes as the basis of his “moral system.”64
Coleridge argues in an unmarked translation of Schelling that “there is a philosophic (and
inasmuch as it is actualized by an effort of freedom, an artificial) consciousness, which lies
beneath or (as it were) behind the spontaneous consciousness natural to all reflecting beings.”65
All objects of human knowledge exist on one or the other side of “spontaneous consciousness”
or, alternatively, the “reflective faculty.”66 Coleridge goes on to assert that the realm of “PURE
philosophy” is separated from the realm of “mere reflection and re-presentation” as if by a
mountain range.67 This division recalls Kant’s distinction between the phenomenal and noumenal
realms. It would seem that philosophic consciousness pertains, like the Kantian moral law, to an
invisible realm set apart from that of the sensuous. Coleridge proposes, however, that
philosophic consciousness can be developed through an effort of will that is not possible or
necessary for all “men,” a possibility that is not apparent in Kant, who derives the moral law a
priori. Coleridge asserts that knowledge on “the other side of consciousness” is only a “land of
darkness, a perfect Anti-Goshen” of “lifeless and sightless notions” for thinkers who have not
disciplined their “ulterior consciousness.”68 Those philosophers who rely on the mechanical
operations of the reflective faculty and the understanding alone will be met with “ghost[ly]”69
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abstractions and “rattling twigs and sprays in winter”70 when they inquire into the nature of
things. For the thinker who unites reflection with the “ulterior consciousness”71 or “inward
eye”72 of reason, philosophic consciousness is a “sacred power of self-intuition.”73 Rei Terada
observes that: “no sooner has [Coleridge] parted ways with those who rest content with given
data [of reflection]…than he recasts consciousness as a unity of intellect and intuition in
immediate form.”74 Coleridge’s understanding of philosophic consciousness comes from
Schelling, who identifies the “I AM,” or the willful action of constituting the self from a
transcendental point of view as at once subject and object, intuition and intellect as the living
principle of his philosophical system.75 For Coleridge unlike for Schelling, this act of will places
the self in immediate connection with the divine, or the “absolute self.”76
Michel Foucault has argued that, at the end of the eighteenth century, a classical
knowledge of natural history was displaced by a new critical philosophy of life. While the
natural history of Locke and Linnaeus, Buffon and Hume established “relations of identity or
difference against the continuous background of similitudes,” Kant’s critical philosophy of
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nature brought “into prominence the inverse problem of the synthesis of the diverse.”77 After
Kant, according to Foucault, it became possible to see life as correspondent with a transcendental
idea expressing the “a priori coherence of empirical multiplicities.”78 Foucault’s description of
this epistemic transition bears comparison with Coleridge’s account of the differences between
Hartleyan and post-Kantian philosophy. In Hartleyan psychology, thought is the passive effect of
interactions across an endlessly diffuse field of similitudes, or impressions linked by contiguity
in time. As we’ve seen, Kantian philosophy supplies Coleridge with the concept of a “higher
ground”79 from which the mind may synthesize the empirical multiplicities of Hartleyan
reflection. Foucault’s description of how Kant redefined the study of natural history can help us
to see the otherwise occluded implications for the life sciences of Coleridge’s engagement with
Kant in Biographia Literaria. Coleridge turns to Kantian and post-Kantian critical philosophy
for the living principle of a unified system of scientific knowledge. What Coleridge calls
philosophic consciousness in Biographia is comparable to the form of “scientific reason”80 that
views, as Coleridge explains in The Friend, the laws governing the object world of nature
through the lens of the “Absolute” law that determines “in what way [objects] are possible.”81
For Coleridge, this absolute principle of the possibility of things is not simply an idea, but is an
expression of living, divine law. Coleridge thus attributes a moral significance to the postKantian idea of life that Foucault, whose archeological method is non-teleological, disregards.
Coleridge’s ostensive aim in publishing Biographia is to supply a philosophical basis for
the distinction between imagination and fancy that Wordsworth had appropriated as an
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organizing principle in the 1815 Preface to his Poems. Coleridge is better suited to this task than
Wordsworth because Kantian philosophy has inspired him to search for the “root”82 of reflective
knowledge. Coleridge characterizes his effort to distinguish imagination from fancy as another
effort to arrive at the root of things: “my friend has drawn a masterly sketch of the branches with
their poetic fruitage. I wish to add the trunk, and even the roots as far as they lift themselves
above ground and are visible to the naked eye of our common consciousness.”83 Coleridge’s
definition of fancy is drawn from his analysis of the shortcomings of Hartleyan associationism.
He writes that “equally with the ordinary memory, the fancy must receive all its materials ready
made from the law of association.”84 The fancy plays only with “fixities and definites”85 just as
the law of association catalogues visible, sensuous phenomena. By contrast with the fancy,
imagination bears relation to the “great eternal I AM”86 that unifies subject and object and
thereby synthesizes all reflective knowledge. The relationship between the imagination and the
divine is destabilized, however, by Coleridge’s two-fold definition of imagination. Famously,
Coleridge defines the “primary imagination” as “a repetition in the finite mind of the eternal act
of creation in the infinite I AM.”87 The secondary imagination echoes the primary but is
combined with the “conscious will”; it “dissolves, diffuses, dissipates in order to re-create; or
where this process is rendered impossible, yet still at all events it struggles to idealize and to
unify.”88 The secondary imagination must dissolve the “fixities and definites"89 constructed by
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fancy and the law of association in order to recreate the “infinite I AM”90 in the work of art. This
is precisely what Coleridge sees Wordsworth doing when he describes his gift for spreading the
atmosphere of the “ideal world”91 around forms and incidents deadened by custom. It is possible,
however, that, having shorn apart the relations of identity and difference established by fancy,
the artist may find it “impossible” to “re-create” the ideal unity of the first act of Creation.92 This
is not, admittedly, a possibility on which Coleridge dwells; he proposes that the secondary
imagination “still at all events…struggles to idealize and to unify.”93 Alexander Schlutz notes
that Coleridge passes over “the rather disturbing possibility that the…faculty under so much
pressure to realize the project of unification, despite all empirical obstacles, might ultimately
bring about its failure.”94 I will argue in the second part of the chapter that it is this buried
possibility that Shelley’s Frankenstein brings to the fore.
The tension between empirical dissolution and ideal unity that surfaces in Coleridge’s
two-fold definition of the creative act resurfaces in his poetic accounts of the “organic”
development of the imagination. As philosophic consciousness can, for Coleridge, be acquired,
so too can imagination be grown. Twice in Biographia Literaria, Coleridge compares the
development of imagination to the process by which a caterpillar metamorphosizes into a
butterfly. In the first instance, Coleridge compares Wordsworth’s development of genius to the
movement by which the butterfly breaks free from the “earthly frame”95 of the caterpillar. He
charges critics of Lyrical Ballads with treating the few poems by Wordsworth that were
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unsuccessful as “so many plague-spots on the whole work”96 rather than as early demonstrations
of “the natural tendency, and consequently, the proper direction of the author’s genius.”97
Acknowledging that the “struggling crowd” of imagery and “heterogeneous elements” within
Wordsworth’s Descriptive Sketches justified critics’ charges of “obscurity,” Coleridge reads
those faults as expressions of an “impatient strength” and “ferment” of energy that would
eventually burn off, leaving Wordsworth with an organic style.98 He reminds the reader that the
“poetic PSYCHE, in its process to full development, undergoes as many changes as its Greek
name-sake, the butterfly.”99 Coleridge was fascinated, as the editors of the Norton edition note,
with “the convulsive agonies of the Caterpillar in its laborious”100 transformation into a butterfly,
a process that he likened in a notebook entry in spring 1809 to a disease.101 He compares the
“heterogenous elements” of Wordsworth’s style to “some diseases, which must work on the
humours, and be thrown out on the surface, in order to secure the patient from their future
recurrence.”102 Raimondo Modiano argues that, by placing Wordsworth’s development “inside
the frame of the agonizing, sacrificial transformation of a caterpillar into a butterfly…Coleridge
casts a dark shadow over Wordsworth’s emergence as a fully developed genius.”103 Coleridge’s
description of Wordsworth’s metamorphosis also, however, reveals the dissatisfaction with
empirical conditions that is built into his concept of the imagination more generally.
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Coleridge cites an 1808 poem as a footnote to his discussion of the butterfly as a symbol
for poetic “PSYCHE”104:
The butterfly the ancient Grecians made
The soul’s fair emblem, and its only name—
But of the soul, escaped the slavish trade
Of mortal life! For in this earthly frame
Ours is the reptile’s lot, much toil, much blame,
Manifold motions making little speed,
And to deform and kill the things whereon we feed.105
The em dash that follows the speaker’s assertion that the butterfly is the “soul’s fair emblem, and
its only name” cues the reader to pause before moving onto the “But” of the next line. The
typographically enforced silence dramatizes a movement towards clarification: the butterfly is
only the symbol of the poetic psyche insofar as it has escaped the conditions of mortal life that
are the “reptile’s” and, implicitly, the caterpillar’s “lot.” The emphasis that the speaker places on
the butterfly’s freedom is consistent with Coleridge’s assertion in Theory of Life that “Nature”
acts more freely within the history of life beginning with the evolution of the insect. In Theory of
Life, Coleridge invites the reader to “indulge a Darwinian flight” and “imagine the life of insects
[as] an apotheosis of the petals, stamina, and nectaries, round which they flutter.”106 At work
here is both the Latin sense of apotheosis as a spiritual departure from earthly life and a more
secular sense of the same term as “the best or most highly developed example of something.”107
The flying insect can be seen as both a deity to the plant and as a better organized iteration of it.
We can read a similar tension in Coleridge’s representation of the relationship between the
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butterfly and the earth-bound caterpillar that “deforms and kills”108 the plants whereon it feeds.
On the one hand, Coleridge employs the metaphor of metamorphosis to celebrate the butterfly’s
spiritual freedom. We can nonetheless detect within the poem traces of anxiety about the
psyche’s continuity with mortal life. The travails of earthly life are more vividly evoked in the
poem than the liberty of spiritual life: sound evokes sense as the reader stumbles over the
alliterative “manifold motions making little speed”109 while the liberated life of the butterfly is
principally defined negatively, in terms of what it is not. Coleridge suppresses the connection
between the poetic psyche and the bleak conditions of “mortal life” in much the same way as he
suppresses the close connection between human beings and mammals in Theory of Life. He
passes the 1808 poem off in a footnote and argues that Wordsworth quickly overcame the
“disease”110 that marked his early style. After throwing off the excessive energies of his youth,
Wordsworth came into full possession of his imaginative “gift.”111
When, in chapter 12, Coleridge uses the metaphor of the caterpillar’s metamorphosis to
attribute a developmental trajectory to the “philosophic imagination,”112 he makes no reference
whatsoever to the violence and futility that he associates earlier in Biographia Literaria with the
caterpillar’s life. He writes that:
They and they only can acquire the philosophic imagination, the sacred power of selfintuition, who within themselves can interpret and understand the symbol, that the wings
of the air-sylph are forming within the skin of the caterpillar; those only, who feel in their
own spirits the same instinct, which impels the chrysalis of the horned fly to leave room
in its involucrum for antennae yet to come. They know and feel, that the potential works
in them, even as the actual works on them! In short, all the organs of sense are framed for
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a corresponding world of sense; and we have it. All the organs of spirit are framed for a
correspondent world of spirit: tho’ the latter organs are not developed in all alike.113
Coleridge compares the development of philosophic imagination to the process by which the
wings of a butterfly actualize the potential inborn in the being of a caterpillar. Imaginative
metamorphosis is figured here as a continuation of rather than an escape from mortal life. The
“wings of the air-sylph” and, with it, the idea of freedom, are already present within the “skin of
the caterpillar,” or within the “earthly frame.”114 The process of continuous metamorphosis is a
symbol for the act of imagination that brings intellect and intuition into unity and, in so doing,
gives coherence to the data of the understanding. This unity of consciousness is established in
Coleridge’s view over time: as an “organ of spirit,” the philosophic imagination can be
developed in much the same manner as “organs of sense” are perfected in an evolutionary
process of development.115 Philosophic consciousness is not, however, equally developed in
everyone. Coleridge claims that the first appearance of philosophic imagination discloses itself in
the “moral being,” or in the person who contemplates the “man” of simple and disinterested
goodness with “pity and respect.”116 Monika Class has argued that, in Coleridge’s The Friend,
the moral law involves both feeling and thought and is not strictly opposed, as in Kant’s
Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, to the impulse of the heart.117 As an “organ of
spirit,”118 the philosophic imagination awakens to self-consciousness the “moral being”119 innate
but undeveloped in feelings of pity and admiration. Coleridge thus brings the social affections
that he argues ought to be a part of both children’s education and literary criticism into the fold
113
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of a philosophical “system, the first principle of which it is to render the mind intuitive of the
spiritual in man.”120
In chapter 10, Coleridge makes even more obvious the social import of philosophical
knowledge. He recalls how he “retired to a cottage in Somersetshire at the foot of Quantock” to
devote his “studies to the foundations of religion and morals”121 after becoming disillusioned as a
journalist with the fanaticism of the parties disputing the significance of the French Revolution.
Coleridge, who feels that his moderate political and religious opinions were misunderstood by
thinkers on both sides of the political divide, prizes the rare experience of finding a community
coalesce around his work. He recalls the “heart-felt” pleasure of seeing familiar faces show up at
the opening of his play Remorse; “the pit and boxes were crowded with faces familiar to me,
though of individuals whose names I did not know, and of whom I knew nothing, but that they
had attended one or other of my courses of lectures.”122 Defending himself against detractors
who claim he has wasted his talents, Coleridge writes:
would that the criterion of a scholar’s utility were the number and moral value of the
truths, which he has been the means of throwing in the general circulation; or the number
and value of the minds, whom by his conversation or letters he has excited into activity
and supplied with the germs of their aftergrowth.123
The scholar in this conjectural scenario is unquestionably Coleridge himself. His reference to the
“aftergrowth” of minds recalls his account of the organic development of philosophic
imagination. Coleridge is here suggesting that the value of the retired philosopher’s work can be
located in those he has helped to discover for themselves “the moral being”124 that is latent in the

120

Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, 243.
Ibid, 200.
122
Ibid, 221.
123
Ibid, 220.
124
Ibid, 242.
121

176

feelings of their heart. Coleridge’s experience of finding a community of readers and friends
form around his work allows him to hope that the Biographia might promote moral autonomy in
individuals and in society more broadly. Shelley, as I will show, narrates the difficulties of
achieving the goal of moral autonomy and yet she locates a residue of the imaginative potential
for natural education in the act of reading.
I posited in the last chapter that Coleridge’s regular experience of awful nightmares and
other side effects of opium use caused him to doubt that the purposes of life were continuous
with those of the divine. In Biographia Literaria, Coleridge’s doubts about this continuity are
communicated in hints; first, that the imagination recreates the “living principle” of the “eternal I
AM”125 in a discontinuous, doubly mediated process, and, second, that the imagination must free
itself from the sufferings of the “earthly frame”126 if it is to turn “natural” feeling into the
principled thought and action of a “moral being.”127 These hints suggest that the imagination
may be borne down by the mechanisms of a “dead,” materialist universe even as it strives to
unify the data of fancy and reflection. This is precisely what happens in Frankenstein, as I will
show. Coleridge, unlike Shelley, suppresses the possibility that the imagination will fail to unify
its array of empirical materials under the sign of the divine. Coleridge’s symbolic presentation of
the imagination as an “organ of spirit”128 assures the reader of the inherence of the “Eternal”
being of the divine within the empirical world.129 Those who, like Coleridge in the lonely days of
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childhood or Wordsworth in Descriptive Sketches, are constrained by the mechanisms of a dead
materialist universe, may yet develop organs of spirit. I will now turn to Frankenstein, a novel in
which the act of imaginative creation is associated less with “absolute self” than with a self that
is susceptible to the violence and contingency of earthly life.
Frankenstein, Modern Science and the Failure of Natural Education
The link, implicit in Biographia, between materialist psychology and a scientific concept of
life is more explicit in Frankenstein. Noting that Percy Shelley owned a copy of Observations on
Man, several scholars have analyzed Frankenstein through the lens of Hartleyan psychology.130
In the second part of this chapter, I compare the problem of the will that Coleridge discovers in
Hartley’s philosophy to the problem of moral agency and development that Shelley allies with
modern, experimental science. In Frankenstein, modern science discloses a monstrous self in
whom “nature” is divided against intention. This monstrous subject displaces the sovereign
“moral being”131 that Coleridgean natural education aims to produce. To understand Shelley’s
thinking about natural education, it makes sense to turn to her representation of Victor
Frankenstein’s childhood. Victor learns in youth to see himself as part of a domestic community
held together by “mutual bonds”132 of sympathy. Like Mary Wollstonecraft, Shelley considers
women the principal guardians of the domestic affections. Victor frames the story of his early
education by telling the history of two orphaned women—his mother Caroline and his cousin
Elizabeth—who become models within his family of moral feeling. Elizabeth exemplifies the
learning practices that also define the early education of Victor and his friend Henry Clerval.
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Victor recalls, “Elizabeth was not incited to apply herself to drawing, that her companions might
not outstrip her; but through the desire of pleasing her aunt, by the representation of some
favourite scene done by her own hand.”133 Like Rousseau’s ideal pupil, Elizabeth acquires
knowledge in an effort to secure the affection of the adults upon whom she is necessarily
dependent. This form of learning inspires a social sensibility so perfect that it obviates the need
for external authority: Victor recalls that “the voice of command was never heard amongst us;
but mutual affection engaged us all to comply with and obey the slightest desire of each
other.”134 Here, there is no struggle between individual emotion and the collective good because
mutual affection is the “natural” or subconscious voice of moral law. At this stage of Victor’s
education, social emotion prefigures principled action in much the same way as the natural
inclinations that flourish during the “blessed interval”135 of Coleridge’s early life prefigure his
philosophic and religious principles.
Victor does not, however, become the autonomous moral subject that his early education sets
him up to become. His affections are eroded almost entirely when his mother dies and he is
transplanted from the domestic community of Geneva to the male dominated world of
University. Caroline’s death has a very different effect on Elizabeth, who finds that the
“imperious duty”136 of rendering her uncle and cousins happy falls to her. Victor recalls, “I never
beheld her so enchanting as at this time, when she was continually endeavoring to contribute to
the happiness of others, entirely forgetful of herself.”137 While Elizabeth forgets herself in
attending to the feelings of others, Victor becomes possessed by a “resistless, and almost frantic
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impulse”138 to discover the secret of life. We might be inclined to read Elizabeth’s highly
gendered absorption in the feelings of others as a threat to her selfhood. The opposite is
apparently the case: the ties of domestic community are not coercive but become the foundation
of Elizabeth’s independence. In her new role as the family’s primary caregiver, her mind
acquires “firmness and vigour.”139 In contrast, the frenetic energy that subsumes Victor manifests
physiologically, leaving him “nervous to a most painful degree.”140 There is very little character
or subjectivity in the bodily impulse that drives Victor’s studies. He describes his sensations after
he discovers the secret of life as if they were a disastrous natural force: “no one can conceive the
variety of feelings which bore me onwards, like a hurricane, in the first enthusiasm of
success.”141 Though Frankenstein is popularly known as a cautionary tale about the scientist who
would “play God,”142 Victor’s initiation into the study of modern science is accompanied by a
loss rather than a gain of God-like autonomy.
Shelley brings forward what Coleridge implies in Biographia: that an education in natural
philosophy can work against the purposes of a “natural” education that aims to turn inborn
affections into principled moral action. After Victor achieves the fantastic goal to which all his
efforts had been directed, his health gets worse: he enters a manic state, suffers from a
debilitating nervous fever and cannot bear to look at his scientific instruments. He retrospectively
identifies his turn away from “feminine” moral feelings with transgression; addressing Robert
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Walton, he warns that, “if the study to which you apply yourself has a tendency to weaken your
affections, and to destroy your taste for those simple pleasures in which no alloy can possibly
mix, then that study is certainly unlawful, that is to say, not befitting the human mind.”143
Scientific study is immoral when it weakens the social sense that natural education awakens
within the self. This lesson upholds Anne Mellor’s feminist reading of Frankenstein as a story
about the catastrophic consequences of the elision of feminine values from the masculine terrain
of scientific ambition.144 That moral is necessarily partial, however, as Victor does not reflect on
why scientific study was in his case so disastrous for the affections. In Biographia Literaria,
Coleridge contends that materialist philosophy is in conflict with the goals of education because
its premises are at odds with metaphysical concepts like the moral will. In Frankenstein, Shelley
calls attention to that same contradiction by showing that Victor is at the mercy of violent
passion as he struggles to apply metaphysic principles to materialist science.
At University, Victor’s interest in science is narrowed and disciplined by an intellectual
culture in which, as Coleridge puts it, “metaphysical systems…become popular, not for their
truth, but in proportion as they attribute to causes a susceptibility of being seen.”145 Coleridge
refers here to the popularity of Hartleyan psychology, which explains “invisible”146 operations of
mind by way of a mechanical system of vibrating matter. Arguably, Victor resembles Hartley as
he tries to discover the invisible “secret” of life by observing a mechanical system of minute
causes. Victor makes his great discovery while looking at corpses:
I saw how the fine form of man was degraded and wasted; I beheld the corruption of
death succeed to the blooming check of life; I saw how the worm inherited the wonders
of the eye and brain. I paused, examining and analysing all the minutiae of causation, as
143
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exemplified in the change from life to death, and death to life, until from the midst of this
darkness a sudden light broke in upon me—a light so brilliant and wondrous, yet so
simple, that while I became dizzy with the immensity of the prospect which it illustrated,
I was surprised that among so many men of genius who had directed their inquiries
towards the same science, that I alone should be reserved to discover so astonishing a
secret.147
In the moment of discovery, Victor surpasses the “men of genius” who studied “the same
science” of “minute” causes and yet failed to discover a secret so “simple.” He cannot explain
how he arrived at knowledge of the secret of life except by reference to the miraculous, to “a
light…brilliant and wondrous.” Immanuel Kant argues that genius “cannot itself describe or
indicate scientifically how it brings its products into being.”148 The art of genius is thus set apart
from principles of natural philosophy which can be acquired through “diligence and learning.”149
Coleridge argues along similar lines that genius transcends the associative processes of memory,
understanding and reflection. Unlike Kant, however, Coleridge connects genius to divine
inspiration, or to a “sacred power of self-intuition”150 that unifies empirical multiplicities.
Though Victor partakes of genius in the moment of discovery and in the eventual moment of
creation, it is not entirely clear that his genius can be brought to bear as a foundation of what
Coleridge calls “scientific reason.”151 Simply put, Victor is not fully in control of the divine or
creative power that his genius identifies as the secret of life. Genius is for Shelley as for Kant a
power of nature without rule or precept. As such, it lies outside the control of rational
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consciousness.152 Motivated by the “supernatural enthusiasm”153 of genius to recreate the
“secret” of life, Victor nonetheless remains ensconced in the messy physicality of what he refers
to as his “workshop of filthy creation.”154 The practices of seeing and beholding, examining and
analyzing do not become more purposive after his discovery: Victor recalls “my eyeballs were
starting from my sockets in attending to the details of my employment.”155
Assembling the creature, Victor recalls the “monster birth”156 of Enlightenment education.
Like Wordsworth’s satirical caricature, Victor exercises visual mastery over nature, becomes
desensitized to natural beauty and frames his endeavors within a narrative of progress passed
down to him by his teachers. If Coleridge and Wordsworth wish to see the imagination freed
from a disciplinary regime that would suppress it, Shelley shows that the discipline of modern
science is all too consistent with the arbitrary turns of an unregulated imagination. The writings
of the medieval alchemists Cornelius Agrippa, Albertus Magnus and Paracelsus form Victor’s
imagination in childhood. His interest at the University of Ingolstadt in a “secret” that could
“renew life where death had apparently devoted the body to corruption”157 is a modification of
his youthful fascination with the alchemist’s belief in an “elixir of life” that would “banish
disease from the human frame.”158 He attributes “the birth of that passion [for modern science],
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which afterwards ruled my destiny”159 to the “wild fancies”160 of the “lords of imagination.”161
Shelley uses the terms imagination and fancy more or less interchangeably; she does not, like
Coleridge, distinguish imagination from fancy by way of the former’s intuitive connection with
moral law or scientific reason.
Richard Sha argues that Victor’s imagination is finally “what prevents him from doing
science that might prove useful.”162 Victor fails as a scientist not only because the alchemists
“warmed”163 his imagination in early life, but because modern science intensifies his “powers of
analysis and application,”164 leading him to believe that it is possible to realize the ambitions that
remained illusory for the alchemists. The idea of animating a lifeless being takes “irresistible
hold of [Victor’s] imagination”165 after M. Waldman gives a stirring lecture on modern science:
‘The ancient teachers of this science’ said he, ‘promised impossibilities and performed
nothing. The modern masters promise little; they know that metals cannot be transmuted,
and that the elixir of life is a chimera. But these philosophers, whose hands seem only
made to dabble in dirt, and their eyes to pour over the microscope or crucible, have
indeed performed miracles. They penetrate into the recesses of nature, and shew how she
works in her hiding places. They ascend into the heavens; they have discovered how the
blood circulates, and the nature of the air we breathe. They have acquired new and almost
unlimited powers; they…mock the invisible world with its own shadows.166
The ancient scientists’ ambition to transmit metals and discover “the elixir of life” is replaced in
M. Waldman’s lecture by modern scientists’ equally ambitious desire to attain knowledge of the
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“invisible world.” Waldman uses a language of both sexual violation and humility to represent
the advances of modern science: scientists “penetrate” the remote “recesses of nature” because
they are willing to “dabble in dirt.” Richard Sha contends that Victor “deliberately aligns himself
with the ancients over the moderns.”167 Waldman’s vision of scientific progress obviates,
however, the need for Victor to choose between ancient and modern, metaphysical and empirical
systems. Referring to Agrippa and Paracelsus, Waldman explains that “these were men to whose
indefatigable zeal modern philosophers were indebted for most of the foundations of their
knowledge. They had left to us, as an easier task, to give new names and arrange in connected
classifications the facts which they in a great degree had been the instruments of bringing to
light.”168 Victor is led astray not by the chimerical ambitions of the alchemists, but rather by the
presumption that a systematic classification of the static “facts” of the physical universe (of “the
heavens” and the “air we breathe”) can reveal how the whole of nature, a personified “she,”
works.
After hearing Waldman’s lecture on modern science, Victor directs the enthusiasm first
inspired by the “lords of [the] imagination”169 to the acquisition of a systematic knowledge of
nature. Victor commits a number of moral transgressions as he instrumentalizes knowledge of
chemistry, comparative anatomy and physiology to give birth to life. He exploits burial grounds
and living animals.170 He makes his creature a “being of gigantic stature” for the purposes of
efficiency, or because, as he puts it, the “minuteness of [human] parts formed a great hindrance
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to my speed.”171 He differentiates the dispiriting quality of his work from that of an artist: “my
enthusiasm was checked by my anxiety, and I appeared rather like one doomed by slavery to toil
in the mines, or any other unwholesome trade, than an artist occupied by his favourite
employment.”172 Coleridge warns, as we have seen, that the metaphysician will get lost in
“unwholesome quicksilver depths”173 if his study occupies the understanding alone. While
Coleridge safeguards education from this risk by grounding the philosophic imagination in a
sacred power of self-intuition, Shelley doubts that the problem of materialist science can be so
easily solved. She brings into focus the oppressive quality of a scientific perspective that refers
the question of life to the fixities of understanding and at the same time warns that the
imagination might not offer a more transcendent perspective.
The question of the relation of metaphysics to modern science was put to a point in the
vitalism debate that transpired between William Lawrence and John Abernathy at the Royal
College of Surgeons from 1814-1819. While Abernathy proposed that the “superadded” principle
of life might resemble electricity, Lawrence rejected Abernathy’s analogy and, with it, all a
priori conceptions of life. In Theory of Life, as I showed in the last chapter, Coleridge sides with
Abernathy against Lawrence’s secular, materialist understanding of life. Coleridge rejects,
however, the implication that electricity is the same thing as life, a position that is consistent with
his rejection in Biographia Literaria of the “fiction” that mental processes are like vibrations or
animal spirits. Marilyn Butler has argued that Shelley sides with Lawrence in Frankenstein,
criticizing Abernathy’s “spiritualized vitalism.”174 Like Nick Groom, I would resist reading
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Shelley’s novel as “a manifesto for either vitalists or materialists.”175 I do, however, think that
Shelley shares Coleridge’s weariness of Abernathy’s analogy between mechanics and life. Victor
is inspired by Waldman to use his knowledge of science to, as Shelley put it in her 1831 Preface,
“mock the stupendous mechanism of the Creator of the world.”176 Victor considers the
difficulties he may encounter animating a “being like [him]self”:177 “my operations might be
incessantly baffled, and at last my work be imperfect, yet when I considered the improvement
which every day takes place in science and mechanics, I was encouraged to hope my present
attempts would at least lay the foundations of future success.”178 Mechanics is reassuring insofar
as it suggests to Victor that the laws of life can be systematically learned and “mocked.”
Coleridge shows, however, that mechanics in fact mystifies “our nature” by opening action out
onto a decentered network of cause and effect. Shelley, for her part, suggests that Victor’s
confidence that he can imitate the mechanisms of the Creator is misguided: the scene of the
creature’s birth turns out to be a “catastrophe.”179
In the Introduction to the 1831 edition of Frankenstein, Shelley writes, “invention, it
must be humbly admitted, does not consist in creating out of void, but out of chaos; the materials
must, in the first place, be afforded: it can give form to dark, shapeless substances, but cannot
bring into being the substance itself.”180 Coleridge’s two-fold definition of imagination accounts
for the element of invention in the creative act: the secondary imagination does not, like the
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primary, repeat a divine principle, but willfully dissolves the empirical laws of nature in order to
recreate an echo of the divine in the finite world. The artist creates, then, out of the chaos of the
material that the secondary imagination has wrecked. As Victor assembles the creature from
body parts that have been deformed by death, he resembles both the Shelleyan inventor and the
Coleridgean artist. He succeeds in giving life to the creature and yet the creature’s appearance as
an assembly of wrecked parts serves as a reminder of Victor’s role as a mechanical maker. The
product of the imagination is not a butterfly but a deformed creature that Victor compares to a
“vile insect!”181 Victor recalls the birth of the creature thus:
By the glimmer of the half-extinguished light, I saw the dull yellow eye of the creature
open; it breathed hard, and a convulsive motion agitated its limbs.
How can I describe my emotions at this catastrophe, or how delineate the wretch whom
with such infinite pains and care I had endeavoured to form? His limbs were in
proportion, and I had selected his features as beautiful. Beautiful!—Great God! His
yellow skin scarcely covered the work of muscles and arteries beneath; his hair was of a
lustrous black, and flowing; his teeth of a pearly whiteness; but these luxuriances only
formed a more horrid contrast with his watery eyes, that seemed almost of the same
colour as the dun white sockets in which they were set, his shriveled complexion, and
straight black lips.182
The creature’s “watery eyes,” “yellow skin,” “shriveled complexion” and “straight black lips” do
not appear to amount to something greater than a set of decaying features that have been sutured
together, albeit proportionally. Denise Gigante writes that Coleridge would have condemned this
assembly of parts “as a ‘mechanical art,’ one inherently unable to transform the artist’s materials
into a harmonious whole.”183 She argues that what bursts forth at the scene of creation is “the
brute fact”184 of an existence that exceeds all representation. I would emphasize instead that, as a
combination of parts that fails to cohere into a unified whole, the creature’s appearance
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metaphorizes an empirical method like that which Foucault attributes to classical natural history,
one which arranges, systematizes and classifies but fails to express the “a priori coherence of
empirical multiplicities.”185 I would specify, however, that it is the creature’s physical
appearance and not his existence that resists unified representation. In his confessional narrative,
the creature represents himself as whole and thus demonstrates that his being is not entirely
mechanical. The contradiction between the creature’s appearance and his self-representation
parallels Victor’s paradoxical position as a mechanical maker whose genius nevertheless
discovers and creates life.
Though Victor succeeds in bringing the creature to life, Shelley does not thus concede
that mind is the product of a systematic arrangement of matter. She confesses in an 1823 letter to
Walter Scott: “I own I have a great respect for that faculty we carry about us called Mind—and I
fear that no Frankenstein can so arrange the gases as to be able to make any combination of them
produce thought or even life—However happy conjectures must always instruct even if they fail
from entirely attaining their object.”186 Shelley here echoes Coleridge’s skepticism of materialist
theories that attribute thought to “mere articulated motions of the air.”187 Shelley differs from
Coleridge, however, in her belief that it can be instructive to explore the implications of the
“conjectures” of materialist science. As a figure of the empiricist imagination, the creature’s
appearance forcibly alerts all who he encounters of the mechanism at the origins of his being
and, by extension, of the mechanistic components of the human. The creature’s appearance is all
the more horrific for approaching to that of a human being: addressing Victor, the creature
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asserts “my form is a filthy type of yours, more horrid even from the very resemblance.”188
Timothy Morton accurately observes that what makes Frankenstein disturbing is “not the
Creature’s difference from but his similarity to human beings.”189 It is perhaps on account of this
similarity that early readers associated Frankenstein with “aggressive materialism”190 and an
attack on Christianity. Shelley is not entirely a materialist, however. While she points to the
dangers of imagination and genius by showing how Victor is carried away by enthusiasm, she at
the same time suggests that it is possible for the artistic imagination to establish a stable,
instructive position from which to view the problems posed by modern science.
Though he is capable of education, the creature is excluded from human society because
of the form he bears. Consistently, he is deemed a wretch, deamon and savage rather than a
rational person. When Victor encounters the creature in the mountains of Jura, his “gigantic
stature” and the “deformity of its aspect” signal his essential evil: Victor suspects that the
creature murdered William Frankenstein because “nothing in human shape could have destroyed
that fair child.”191 Though the creature’s gigantic shape makes it impossible for characters within
the novel to see him as either human or good, the reader occupies a fundamentally different
position with respect to the creature. We recognize his capacity for goodness because we read
rather than see him. Even Victor becomes a sympathetic reader after the creature unfolds his
narrative of self-education. By scholarly consensus, the creature resembles the “natural man” of
Rousseau’s Discourse on the Origins of Inequality Among Men during the period in which he

188

Shelley, Frankenstein, 91.
Morton, The Ecological Thought, 112.
190
Butler, “Frankenstein and Radical Science,” 407-408. Butler observes that both William
Lawrence’s Lectures and Shelley’s Frankenstein “were associated with materialism, and this
seems to be the main reason why both became causes célèbres.”
191
Shelley, Frankenstein, 50. (emphasis added)
189

190

survives solitary and self-sufficient in the woods.192 Like Rousseau’s natural man, the creature
only experiences sensations that correspond to physical needs during the early days of his life.
He perfects the other-directed emotions of pity and compassion that Rousseau regards as the
basis for natural education while living with the De Lacys. David Marshall has argued that, as he
watches the “drame bourgeois” of the De Lacy family, “the monster plays the role of the ideal
sympathetic spectator in a theatre.”193 Importantly, however, the creature learns sympathy not
only by observing the De Lacys but also by reading books.
In book 4 of Emile, Rousseau’s tutor recommends that the student of natural education
“begin the study of the human heart”194 by reading Plutarch’s Lives. The tutor gives preference to
books of history that place the reader “backstage” where it is possible to observe details of
private life that are generally concealed from public view.195 Crucially for Rousseau, reading and
observing go together; the signifier ought not to be separated from the signified. Reading about
the men of history, Rousseau’s student becomes better able to “observe men well”: “if he sees
discord reigning among his comrades, he seeks to reconcile them; if he sees men afflicted, he
informs himself as to the subject of their suffering.”196 The creature acquires compassion in
much the same way as the student of Rousseauian natural education. After he observes a scene in
which, feeling “the pangs of hunger very poignantly,” “the two younger cottagers…[placed] food
before the old man, when they reserved none for themselves,”197 the creature abstains from
stealing the family’s food. His admiration for virtuous acts is reinforced by his reading of Lives:
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“I read of men concerned in public affairs, governing or massacring their species. I felt the
greatest ardour for virtue rise within me, and abhorrence for vice.”198 By showing that the
creature is adept at reading and responding to the needs of others, Shelley invites us to reassess
Victor’s assumption that he is innately a “wretch”199 who lacks the goodness of humanity. The
compassion that the creature shows in early life does not become, however, the basis of a strong
moral will or tie to community.
The creature is excluded from society and the bonds of mutuality that are necessary for
natural education. As the creature shows compassion to the De Lacys, he longs to receive
compassion from them in return: “I…loved the gentle manners and amiable qualities of my
cottagers; but I was shut out from intercourse with them, except through means which I obtained
by stealth, when I was unseen and unknown, and which rather increased than satisfied the desire
I had of becoming one among my fellows.”200 The creature is not satisfied to continue interacting
with the De Lacys in the role of an anonymous benefactor; he wants to be seen by them as a
friend. The blind patriarch is hospitable to him when the creature approaches him alone. The rest
of the cottagers are, however, so horrified by the creature’s appearance that they move out of
their residence the next day. In a kind of vicious circle, the violent passion that the creature’s
appearance incites in the de Lacys makes a monster of him, awakening passions of “rage and
revenge”201 that overpower the feelings of compassion he had cultivated as a reader and observer
of their lives. Percy Shelley commented in a review that wasn’t published until 1832 that the
moral of Frankenstein is “treat a person ill, and he will become wicked…..divide him, a social
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being, from society, and you impose upon him the irresistible obligations—malevolence and
selfishness.”202 The “society” to which Percy Shelley refers may well be the domestic society
that is the end goal of Rousseauian natural education. With this moral, Shelley suggests that the
affective community modelled by both the Frankensteins and the de Lacys produces monsters
rather than autonomous moral actors. The harmony between individual emotion and the social
good breaks down when “malevolence and selfishness”203 erupts from the exclusions built into
the social structure of natural education. By calling attention to the consequences of the
creature’s exclusion from moral community, Shelley reformulates Wollstonecraft’s account in
Wrongs of Woman of the consequences of women’s exclusion from Rousseau’s androcentric
project of natural education.
After the de Lacys reject the creature, he demands that Victor satisfy his need for
companionship. He contrasts his position to that of Adam in John Milton’s Paradise Lost: “he
had come forth from the hands of God a perfect creature, happy and prosperous, guarded by the
especial care of his Creator; he was allowed to converse with and acquire knowledge from
beings of a superior nature, but I was wretched, helpless, and alone.”204 The creature thus
charges Victor with having neglected a Creator’s obligation of care. He urges Victor to build him
a female companion because “the human senses are insurmountable barriers to to our union.”205
Though Victor is swayed by this request, he destroys the body of the female companion after
catching sight of the creature’s “ghastly grin.”206 Not coincidentally, the sense which had seemed
such a promising foundation for scientific progress while Victor was building the creature
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becomes a mechanism of violence and alienation. While many readers have blamed Victor for
his failure to parent the creature, scholars have recently contested analyses that read the creature
as a figure for a failure of individual sympathy.207 Nancy Yousef observes that the testimonies of
the monstrosity of the creature’s body are “so unvaried and unrelenting as to amount to the
proposition that this is a creature that cannot be seen as a human being.”208 I would add that the
creature cannot be seen as a being who shares humans’ origins in the benevolence of a divine
Creator; his “ghastly grin” suggests to Victor that he is capable of “the utmost extent of malice
and treachery.”209 By showing that the creature is invariably regarded as less than human,
Shelley levels a critique of human exceptionalism, or of what Derrida describes as the
“anthropomorphic reinstitution of the superiority of the human order over the animal order.”210
She insists that the creature has a capacity for imagination and compassion even though his
mechanistic origins make it impossible for humans to view him as a companion equal in
complexity to themselves.
When, in the Alps, the clouds cover over the mountain peaks, giving Victor a
“melancholy impression,” he questions why “man” “boast[s] of sensibilities superior to those
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apparent in the brute.”211 He laments that “man” is “moved by every wind that blows, and a
chance word or scene that that word may convey to us.”212 Shelley signals the importance of this
thought by quoting lines from Percy Shelley’s poem “Mutability” on the disturbing power of
associative thought processes: “We rest; a dream has power to poison sleep / We rise; one
wand’ring thought pollutes the day.”213 The speaker of the poem goes on to suggest that all
emotional and cognitive states are “the same” because “naught may endure but mutability!”214
The prose that follows seems to confirm the truth of the psychology described: as the clouds
clear and the peaks of the mountains become visible, Victor recalls how “my heart, which was
before sorrowful, now swelled with something like joy.”215 His happiness is quickly overturned,
however, by the appearance of the creature. Shelley makes the mind’s vivid susceptibility to
impressions a paradoxical mechanism of human exceptionalism. The creature recalls the de
Lacys’ response to his appearance in their cottage: “Agatha fainted, and Safie, unable to attend to
her friend, rushed out of the cottage. Felix darted forward, and with supernatural force tore me
from his father, to whose knees I clung, in a transport of fury, he dashed me to the ground and
struck me violently with a stick.”216 Reacting to the creature with spasms of horror, the de Lacys
are also reacting to something that they do not wish to see in themselves: Agatha’s loss of
consciousness, Safie’s flight and Felix de Lacy’s violence disclose as their own the susceptibility
to mechanism that marks the creature as visibly different. Felix de Lacy’s violence is in no way
unique but is programmatic, consistent with Victor’s reaction to the creature’s ugliness. Victor
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has nearly completed work on a female companion when the impression of the creature’s
“malice and treachery”217 moves him to dismember her frame: Victor recalls “I thought with a
sensation of madness on my promise of creating another like to him, and, trembling with passion,
tore to pieces the thing on which I was engaged.”218 The syntax of the sentence leaves us
uncertain whether Victor thinks he was mad when he promised to make the female creature or
when he tore her apart. He acts not on the basis of a determination of what is right to do (it’s not
clear that he knows), but rather in reaction to the horrific chain of associations called up by the
creature’s impression. Coleridge claims in Biographia that action in Hartley’s system is an effect
of external causes rather than of the will; Victor’s and Felix de Lacy’s destructive actions are an
automatic response to an external impression of evil. These violent reactions make visible a selfdifference within the human.
At times, it seems that Victor’s friendship with Henry Clerval might save him from his
poisonous thoughts and violent passions. Much like the Wordsworth of The Prelude, Clerval
becomes absorbed in early life in “books of chivalry and romance.”219 He invents “tales of
wonderful fancy and passion”220 to nurse his friend back to health. The creature is forced,
however, to murder Clerval and all the other people who support, as Frances Ferguson remarks,
Victor’s “sense of home, his sense of school.”221 In the end, Victor becomes a monster like the
creature. He anticipates this as he recounts his travels with Clerval:
my enjoyment was embittered both by the memory of the past and the anticipation of the
future. I was formed for peaceful happiness. During my youthful days discontent never
visited my mind, and if I was ever overcome by ennui, the sight of what is beautiful in
nature or the study of what is excellent and sublime in the productions of man could
217
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always interest my heart and communicate elasticity to my spirits. But I am a blasted tree;
the bolt has entered my soul; and I felt then that I should survive to exhibit what I shall
soon cease to be—a miserable spectacle of wrecked humanity, pitiable to others and
intolerable to myself.222
Victor interrupts the narrative to affirm from the point of view of the present that misery is
unavoidably his destiny. He sums up his story of education, beginning with a claim of origins
that recalls the Creature’s description of Adam—“I was formed for peaceful happiness” —and
ending with an arresting turn to the present tense—“But I am a blasted tree.” He ventures no
explanation of why he has become a spectacle of “wrecked humanity.” The figures of the
“blasted tree” and the “bolt” in the soul recall, however, the thunderstorm that first attuned
Victor to the science of electricity. These images communicate the problem of agency and of
education that emerges alongside the mechanistic viewpoint of empirical science: the “natural”
feelings that might otherwise seem to be the seed of autonomy and organic growth are displaced
by physical accident. We might be tempted to read this passage as evidence of Victor’s
characterological weakness: he is unable to take responsibility for his own fate. I prefer,
however, to read the question of responsibility raised in the passage alongside that posed by the
creature’s form. In a world in which all action is the passive effect of a material cause, Victor
cannot modify his violent response to the creature or his own wretched destiny. This is, as
Shelley insists, the troubling implication of modern science’s representation of life.
By the end of Frankenstein, Victor and the creature share a passion for vengeance that
overpowers all their more virtuous feelings. Recounting his murder of Elizabeth, the creature
tells Robert Walton “I recollected my threat and resolved that it should be accomplished. I knew
that I was preparing for myself a deadly torture, but I was the slave, not the master, of an impulse
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which I detested yet could not disobey.”223 Like Victor in the moment in which he dismembers
the female creature, a violent impulse drives the creature to murder Elizabeth. In Frankenstein,
Shelley turns the scientist’s assumption that mastery of “all the minutiae of causation”224 will
lead to social progress inside out to disclose a society riven apart by passive causes. The creature
goes on to refer to himself as “an abortion, to be spurned at, and kicked, and trampled on.”225
Like a medical abortion, he is brought into the world and yet cannot survive within it; he
promises Robert Walton at the end of the novel that he will take his own life. The creature also,
however, calls attention to the imperfection of the society of natural education: the biological
definition of abortion is the “arrested or imperfect development of a structure.”226 Within the
critical history of the novel, the creature’s story of aborted development has been read as an
allegory for the alienation of the proletariat and the horror of the diasporic subject who must see
himself through the lens of Western racial stereotypes.227 Arguably, the creature’s story is an
adaptation of Wollstonecraft’s narrative of Jemima, a poor woman and “female bastard” who is
hardened by social neglect.228 I have been pursuing the argument, however, that the creature
figures the incompatibility of a materialist conception of life with a program of natural education
that aims to balance individual freedom with social responsibility. Positioned within
circumstances that prevent the flourishing of autonomy, the creature resembles Wollstonecraft’s
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barren flower, Wordsworth’s “monster birth”229 and Coleridge’s Christabel. Together, these
figures demonstrate that the hopes that Romantic writers invested in a human “nature” analogous
with moral feeling, reason and/or divine law is matched with a concern that human nature as
depicted by eighteenth-century systems of education and empirical science is synonymous with
the oppression of mechanism and artifice.230
In Coleridge’s Biographia Literaria, the philosophic imagination overcomes the fixities
of empirical science to recreate a living echo of the divine within the work of art. Shelley
suggests, in contrast, that the imagination can help us come to terms with a nature disjointed
from the idea of human divinity. As a work of imagination, Frankenstein calls attention to the
attenuation of moral agency in a materialist world. Daniel Stout claims that Frankenstein is “not
a morality tale but something like the opposite: a testament both to the manifest pointlessness of
trying to apply moral limits to a materialist world and, at the same time, to the stickiness of our
commitment to our human evaluations and categories.”231 It is difficult, as Stout observes, to
figure out who is responsible for the many deaths that follow the creature’s birth. While I agree
with Stout that Shelley engages in Frankenstein with the ethical problems raised by scientific
knowledge, I would not entirely discount the book’s function as a “morality tale.” In her
extradiegetic commentary on the novel, Shelley counterbalances the pessimism of her narrative
with her hope that readers may find it instructive. The possibility of instruction is glimpsed in the
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novel’s narratives of aborted education.232 Victor and the creature are not fully in control of their
own actions, but they nonetheless develop an imperfect form of moral agency during periods of
intensive reading. Victor’s bond with Clerval is strengthened by a shared passion for literature
and the creature’s kindness to the De Lacys is reinforced by his course of reading. Perhaps most
importantly, the idiom of Paradise Lost brings Victor into an understanding with the creature,
even though he cannot see the creature as an “absolute self”233 bearing an immediate connection
with the divine. The compact between Victor and the creature makes temporarily visible an
ethics of trust that is not reliant on an anthropocentric concept of human sovereignty.234
Shelley shares Coleridge’s distrust of empirical science’s application of mechanistic
principles to the understanding of life, morality and human behavior. In Frankenstein, the study
of natural philosophy alienates Victor from the domestic affections in much the same way as
Coleridge’s “abstruse researches”235 in metaphysics alienate him from nature and natural feeling.
Shelley does not, however, share Coleridge’s belief that the problems of mechanistic materialism
can be resolved by an imaginative intuition of the divine principle that constitutes the life of
material objects. Victor, who conceives of himself as a mechanical maker, is not in selfconscious control of the process by which his genius produces life from an assembly of dead
materials. Though the creature proves capable of reason, he is marked by Victor’s empirical
method. Shelley nevertheless sets store in the idea of a sympathetic imagination that achieves
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distance from mechanistic cause-effect processes in the act of reading. In Frankenstein, the
practice of reading is not the exclusive possession of human beings; the creature is persistently
seen as other than human and yet he proves to be a proficient reader of the de Lacys’ needs.236
Things do not go well, however, for the creature. There is no guarantee that the reader of the
novel will fare any better than the creature, particularly as he or she is aligned with Walton’s
sister, a character who shares initials with Mary Shelley. Even if Margaret Saville receives her
brother’s letters, we can assume that she will encounter the same problems as the female
characters in Wollstonecraft’s Wrongs of Women who must realize their “natural” potential in a
society that excludes them on the basis of gender. If the creature’s narrative explicitly critiques
an anthropocentric conception of the moral community posited by natural education, Mrs.
Saville’s silence tacitly alerts us to the erasure of women from the didactic programs of natural
education and creative genius.237
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In this way, Shelley seems to predict the claims of Haraway, who attributes sensory response
and choice to animals. The biologist Lynn Margulis extends this potential to all self-regulating
life forms. She writes that “it is clear that locomotion, sensory behavior and response, predation,
multicellularity, and even programmed death of differentiated cells are features of the
microcosm; all are found in the miocrobial predecessors to animals.” (Essays on Gaia, Symbiosis
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scholarship’s focus in the 70s and 80s on the curious absence of the feminine from Shelley’s
consideration of questions of creation, whether literary or biological. Ellen Moers argued in her
canonical reading that Shelley works through her ambivalent feelings about biological
procreation by narrating the gothic fiction of the creature’s birth (Female Gothic: The Monster’s
Mother). The focus of feminist critique shifted in the 80s from Shelley’s biography to
androcentric concepts of literary creation and language. Ellen Cronan Rose argues that “from the
mid-1970s to the end of the 1980s, feminist criticism of Frankenstein assumed a shape that
followed closely the contours of evolving feminist analyses of women’s relationship to
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